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Update July 9, 2007: Nuclear
weapons withdrawn from Ramstein Air Base. European
deployment reduced to about 350 weapons. Read the story
here.
» News since report was
published
June 13:
Russia refuses to talk tactical nukes because weapons are
not covered by any treaty.
June 12:
Two members of the Green Alliance in the European Parliament
submit a
Written Declaration calling for the withdrawal of nuclear
weapons from Europe by the end of 2006.
June 7:
Turkish parliament debates US nukes. May 25: Majority of Europeans want
US nukes to go,
survey finds. January 30, 2006: The German
parliament group Die Linken presents
a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from Germany. Die Linken also sends the government
a list of 28 questions about the status of nuclear weapons
in Germany. (Both documents in German) October 31, 2005: During
an interview with Der Spiegel, Ronald Rumsfeld suggested
that European NATO countries are responsible for the continued
presence of US nuclear bombs in Europe.
September 29: In
an op-ed in the news paper
De Standaard, Belgian MP Diek van der Maelen calls for a
withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe.
July 13: Belgian
House of Representatives resolution calls for withdrawal of
NATO nukes.
June 30:Ukraine says it will not permit nuclear weapons if it joins NATO.
June 9: The NATO Nuclear Planning Group
reaffirms continued deployment of US nuclear bombs in
Europe.
June 4:Der Spiegel reports that the German government has
decided not to raise in NATO the issue of US nuclear weapons withdrawal
from Germany after all.
June 2:
Interfax quotes Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov saying
Russia will only talk about tactical nukes when US nukes have
been withdrawn from Europe.
May 26: Belgian Defense Minister André Flahaut states in
parliament that
Germany has not contacted Belgium about the future of US
nuclear weapons in Europe and the issue is not on the agenda for
the NATO meetings in June.
May 23:Der Spiegel
reports the US has quietly removed nuclear bombs temporarily
from Ramstein Air Base due to major construction work.
May 6: German Defense Minister Peter Struck
states during visit to Ramstein Air Base that Germany will
consult with other NATO countries about removing US nuclear weapons from
Europe.
May 3: Egypt
says at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference
that it would examine whether "nuclear sharing" was a violation
of the treaty.
May 2: On behalf of the non-aligned countries at the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference,
Malaysia calls for an end to "nuclear sharing for military
purposes under any kind of security arrangements."
May 2:Der Spiegel publishes poll showing 3/4 of
Germans want US nuclear weapons withdrawn.
April 26: Norwegian Christian Democratic Party
states during Parliament debate that US nuclear weapons
should be withdrawn from Europe.
April 21: Belgian Senate
unilaterally calls for withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from
Europe.
April 13: German Liberal Party (FDP)
proposes
a resolution calling
for withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany.
U.S. Nuclear
Weapons in Europe
New report provides unprecedented details
(February 2005)
The United States continued to
deploy roughly 480 nuclear bombs in Europe, more than double the number
normally estimated by the media and non-governmental analysts. The
deployment was detailed in the report "U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe" published by the
Natural Resources
Defense Council. The weapons
are all B61
gravity bombs and are deployed at eight bases in six NATO countries:
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom (see map
below).
The 480 nuclear bombs in Europe are the last of a huge arsenal of
forward-deployed weapons that NATO and the Warsaw Pact used to deploy in
Europe during the Cold War. The Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons in
Eastern European countries, but all of these weapons have been withdrawn
to Russia. On the NATO side, the stockpile peaked at some 7,300
nuclear warheads in 1973 and gradually declined over the subsequent
years (see table). In 1991, the U.S. government decided -- and NATO
agreed -- to withdraw almost all of the remaining weapons, but left 480
air-delivered bombs in place.
Today, the United States is the only nuclear power that continues
to deploy nuclear weapons outside its own territory. The approximately 480 nuclear
bombs in Europe are intended for use in accordance with NATO nuclear
strike plans, the report asserts, against targets in Russia or countries in the Middle East
such as Iran and Syria.
The report shows for the first time how many U.S. nuclear
bombs are earmarked for delivery by non-nuclear NATO countries. In times
of war, under certain circumstances, up to 180 of the 480 nuclear bombs
would be handed over to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and
Turkey for delivery by their national air forces. No other
nuclear power or military alliance has nuclear weapons earmarked for
delivery by non-nuclear countries.
Although the United States retains
full control in peacetime, this
quasi-nuclear status of non-nuclear NATO countries violates the
objective of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S.
and NATO argue that there is no violation because the U.S.
retains control of the weapons. But the allied nuclear role is far
from dormant in peacetime, with host country pilots practicing
nuclear strikes and their aircraft being maintained ready to
delivery the nuclear weapons if necessary. Besides, the strictly
legal argument misses the bigger point: equipping non-nuclear NATO
countries with the means to deliver nuclear weapons if necessary
contradicts the non-proliferation standards that the U.S. and Europe
are trying to impress upon other countries such as Iran and North
Korea.
Satellite images of the bases are available
for download in the right-hand bar.
The report reveals that
although the U.S. in 1994 and 1996 withdrew Munitions Support
Squadrons (MUNSS) from five national bases in Germany, Italy and
Turkey, the weapons at the bases were not returned to the United
States but instead moved to the main U.S. operating bases in those
three countries. Moreover, the weapons continued to be earmarked for
delivery by host nation aircraft. MUNSS number designations were
changed in 2004 and logistics concentrated at Spangdahlem Air Base
in Germany for the remaining four nuclear weapons custodian units
deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
Nuclear Weapons For U.S. And NATO
Forces
Note: Of the weapons listed at Ramstein Air
Base, 40 may have been returned to the United States.
The report also provides new insight into the
logistics of the nuclear weapons deployment in Europe, including the
capacity and characteristics of the Weapons Storage and Security
System (WS3) used to store the weapons underground inside Protective
Aircraft Shelters at the individual bases. It also highlights the
fleet of Weapons Maintenance Trucks (WMTs) dispersed to the bases to
provide on-site maintenance of the nuclear bombs. Because this
maintenance program occasionally disassembles weapons inside the
Protective Aircraft Shelter, the report reveals, the U.S. Air Force
discovered in 1997 that the procedure created a risk of inadvertent
nuclear explosion if a disassembled weapon was struck by lightning.
Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Explosion
at NATO Bases
A U.S. Air Force safety review determined in
1997 that lightning could cause an accidental nuclear
explosion during service of B61 nuclear bombs in NATO’s
protective aircraft shelters.
Another finding of the report is that
the the United States have quietly modernized the B61 nuclear bombs
in Europe over the last five years to upgrade the bombs' use-control
and improve the stability of the weapons' during employment.
Recent Modernization of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons In Europe
Between October 1998 and September 2003, the
United States modernized the nuclear surety capabilities and
the trajectory spin control of the B61 nuclear bombs in
Europe.
The report also documents that the
U.S. military in 1994 made arrangements for nuclear targeting and
use of nuclear weapons in Europe outside European Command's (EUCOM)
area of responsibility. For EUCOM, this means
CENTCOM (Central Command) which incorporates Iran and Syria (see
1994 documents in the right-hand bar). It is unclear whether NATO
parliaments are aware of arrangements to target and potentially
strike Middle Eastern countries with nuclear weapons based in
Europe. The arrangements may be the result of a general broadening
of U.S. nuclear policy after the Cold War to also target
proliferating nations with nuclear weapons.
A Role For NATO Nuclear Weapons Against
Iran?
Documents partially declassified and released
under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act reveal that
arrangements were made in the mid-1990s to allow the use of
U.S. nuclear forces in Europe outside the area of
responsibility of U.S. European Command (EUCOM). As a result
of these arrangements, EUCOM now supports CENTCOM nuclear
missions in the Middle East, including, potentially, against
Iran and Syria. (Download full copy of these two documents
from the right-hand bar)
The report concludes that the United
States and NATO have been incapable of articulating a credible
mission for the nuclear weapons, that the deployment needlessly
continues a nuclear deterrence relationship with Russia in Europe,
and that equipping non-nuclear NATO countries with the capabilities
to delivery nuclear weapons undercuts U.S. and NATO nonproliferation
objectives in the 21st century. The report asserts that NATO's
recent announcement that the readiness level of nuclear-capable
aircraft has been reduced to "months" suggests that the nuclear
electronic and mechanical interfaces on the strike aircraft may have
been removed from the aircraft, in which case there is no
operational need to keep the nuclear weapons in Europe.
The principle of nuclear burden-sharing began to
unravel in 2001 when nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Greece. The
inactivation of the Munitions Support Squadron at Araxos Air Base
was
ordered in April 2001 after the withdrawal of the weapons was
authorized by Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-74 in November
2000. Greece's departure from NATO's nuclear club contradicts the
Alliance's Strategic Concept from 1999 which emphasizes widespread
deployment of nuclear weapons in European member countries. If
Greece can withdraw with no severe consequences for NATO deterrence
or unity, so can the other European host countries that currently
perform the NATO nuclear strike mission.
The report recommends that all the
weapons should be withdrawn to the United States, and that the U.S.
and NATO should use the political leverage from such a move to
engage Russia to drastically reduce the large number of Russian
non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as revitalize efforts to
create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Initiatives
like these, the report concludes, would -- unlike continuing to
maintain U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe -- provide real security
benefits to NATO.
The full report is available from the right-hand bar
along with a number of documents released under FOIA. Also made
available are satellite photos of many of the European bases where
U.S. nuclear weapons are stored.
