Strategic Nuclear Forces: STRATCOM's View
U.S. Strategic Command, 1992

Shortly after the Washington Summit Agreement between the United States and Russia in June 1992, and only a few months before the START II Treaty was signed in January 1993, representatives for U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) went to Washington, D.C., to brief then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell on the implications of the Washington Summit Agreement.

U.S. nuclear planning was in turmoil following dramatic international changes and sweeping unilateral arms cuts ordered by President Bush in September 1991 and January 1992. The Office of the Secretary of Defense wanted an in-depth study of the strategic nuclear forces, and both the Joint Staff and U.S. Air Force considered this to be STRATCOM's responsibility. In a number of conferences held with the Joint, Air and OPNAV Staff, Air Combat Command (ACC), and the commanders of the surface and submarine fleets in the Atlantic and Pacific, STRATCOM developed what it called "a preferred USSTRATCOM force structure" for what the U.S. nuclear posture should look like after START II.

The preferred force structure STRATCOM presented to Cheney and Powell attempted to create order and some predictability in the U.S. arms control process by defining a number of principles for what could be done and what should not be done:

• * Flexibility is key to war planning, i.e. retain weapon platforms;

• * New nuclear certification schedule for the B-2;

• * Transition B-1 to conventional role;

• * Modification of B-52Hs by removing internal ALCM capability from 47 aircraft and removing the external ALCM capability from 47 B-52Hs scheduled to receive heavy conventional upgrade by the fall of 1996 (the latter delayed until the FY96 POM);

• * Assignment of Air Reserve Component to nuclear bomber functions;

• * Modernization and life-extension of Minuteman III ICBMs;

• * Maintain Peacekeeper ICBM until 2001;

• * Transfer some W87 warheads from retired Peacekeepers to Minuteman III ICBMs;

• * Maintain two-ocean SSBN force with full target coverage in both oceans, large operating areas, and maximum reconstitution capability;

• * Less than 18 SSBNs is undesirable;

• * Protect MIRV on SLBMs since START prohibits uploading.

The briefing was also a warning, of sort, which cautioned against cutting too deep too quickly and emphasized the need to protect and retain key programs and planning capabilities. In hindsight, the briefing also presented several projects -- such as the transformation of the B-1 to a conventional role, the retirement of the Peacekeeper ICBM, and the transfer of some W87 warheads from retired Peacekeepers onto Minuteman missiles -- that a decade later would be central components of the "new" cuts of the Bush administration's 2001 nuclear posture review.

In preparing for the briefing, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) stressed to the Secretary of Defense that the study "highlights the importance of identifying, in the near term, the force structure with which we will want to move into the 21st century."

The study was STRATCOM's first chance to prove its worth after replacing the split Air Force-Navy nuclear planning structure from the Cold War. By centralizing all nuclear command and control in a single command, the hope was to ensure a more impartial and realistic nuclear planning. Indeed, in undertaking the study, ASD(ISP) said after visiting Offutt Air Force Base prior to the briefing, STRATCOM had "filled the void that we sought to eliminate through the establishment of the Command: provide a single voice which could (1) analyze impartially the full range strategic force issues, integrating force structure, targeting, operational, and arms control considerations; and (2) speak to these national requirements in programmatic and budgetary fora, and bring them forward for your review."

Yet the status of STRATCOM as a nuclear super-command also monopolized somewhat the analysis of the nuclear posture. A change in structure did not necessarily mean a change in mindset so a central principle in STRATCOM's efforts was that the preferred force structure should meet the needs of the "warfighter" by maintaining highly survivable, flexible, and modern offensive forces. These principles inevitably limited the changes that could be made, and were deeply rooted in the Cold War nuclear planning culture. The same principles became the basis for the 1993 Sun City study.