


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Obtained Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by Hans M. Kristensen  
97-284

(U) SUN CITY is a USSTRATCOM study into future force structures.  
(U) In November 1992, the USCINCPAC preferred force structure was briefed to the Secretary of Defense. The force is START II compliant and gives the flexibility required for planners and war fighters. With the realities of a decreasing budget and anticipation of potential decisions between highly MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) and less highly MIRVed forces, USSTRATCOM thought it prudent to conduct a study of alternative force structures. Throughout the briefing we use the term "MIRV" loosely to indicate the concentration of weapons on a platform. The study captures the effectiveness of each force structure option in its ability to hold the threat at risk, its planning flexibility and its affordability.


Obtained Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by Hans M. Kristensen  
97-284

PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT, AS INDICATED ON USSTRATCOM/J5 MEMO, 4 JUN 97, SUBJECT: FOIA REQUEST 97-35 SUN CITY STUDY DATED 1993, HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THAT MEMO HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THAT DOCUMENT.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

- Force structure analysis
  - Nine options
  - Four target bases
  
- Planning ability
- Cost

1b USSC  
2  
1b USSC

2

USSTRATCOM

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(U) Of the numerous force structure options initially considered, nine were eventually selected as most representative. As will be seen, six of these options are at the 3500 START II accountable limit. The other three options fall well below 3500 weapons.

~~(S)~~

1b  
USSC

(u) ~~(S)~~ As warfighters, it was critical to evaluate the impact of few, heavily MIRVed platforms versus many, lighter MIRVed platforms. The measure of the relationship between MIRVs and number of platforms is the impact on the ability to effectively plan the forces.

(u) ~~(S)~~ Cost is detailed for each force option. In today's fiscal environment, we considered cost a critical driver and made every effort to determine option affordability.

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### FACTORS DRIVING STUDY

- Washington Summit Agreement (WSA)
- START II
- CINCSTRAT force structure position
- Continuously changing/reducing world threat
- New administration budgetary concerns
- DOD "bottom up" review

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3

(U) USSTRATCOM viewed SUN CITY as a prudent undertaking in light of several important factors. The Washington Summit Agreement (WSA) of June 1992 between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin was a landmark event that significantly reduced the strategic nuclear arms of the United States and the Former Soviet Union. The START II treaty signed in January 1993 confirmed the WSA. As a primary advocate for strategic nuclear weapons, USCINCSTRAT established a preferred force structure for all strategic platforms for the year 2003 (when START II is projected to be fully in effect). This preferred position considered bomber, ICBM and SLBM issues of modernization, reduction, costing and flexibility and established a decision timeline for all major events. The Clinton administration's goal of further cutting the military budget (and the "bottom-up" review) has led USSTRATCOM to revisit the preferred force structure and look at a wide range of possible alternatives.


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- (u) This briefing addresses strategic nuclear force options. As previously noted, cost is a critical consideration of the overall process, as is an understanding of what fiscal reductions strategic forces have already absorbed over the last ten years. The budget reductions from 1985-94 illustrate the downward trend in funding profiles.
- (u) Over the time period from 1985 to 1994, the Department of Defense budget has decreased from approximately \$360 B (FY93 dollars) to \$240 B. This represents a 33.5% total decrease over this period.
- (u) The strategic forces budget over that same period, however, decreased from approximately \$31 B (FY93 dollars) to \$8 B, a 74.5% total decrease.
- (u) This roughly 2:1 ratio represents a decrease not only of current force structure, but of modernization and R&D funding for future forces as a result of the end of the "Cold War". The questions becomes how much more can the nation afford to give in the future?

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SUN CITY FORCE STRUCTURES

5 \_\_\_\_\_ USSTRATCOM

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1b USSC  
5b USSC

~~(S)~~ In light of the fiscal realities, these were the nine force structure options evaluated. Option 1 is the USSTRATCOM preference briefed to SECDEF and CJCS in November 1992.

1b USSC  
5b USSC

~~(S)~~

1b USSC  
5b USSC

~~(S)~~

1b USSC  
5b USSC

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**APPROACH**  
(THREE KEY QUESTIONS)

➡ • **WHAT IS THE RIGHT SIZE?**  
- The size of the force must be sufficiently capable against a range of threats

• **WHAT IS THE RIGHT MIX?**  
- The mixture of bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs must retain flexibility and capability

• **WHAT IS THE RIGHT COST?**  
- The force must be affordable

USSTRATCOM

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(U) In determining the force structure for the future, there were three basic questions to answer: (1) Do we have the right size to cover the projected target base? (2) Do we have the right mixture of SSBNs and bombers to provide adequate capability and flexibility to cover the various SIOP timing plans? (3) Is the force structure of the future affordable?

(S)

The smaller force structures (and target sets) are analyzed for parametric purposes but are useful in realizing the magnitude of the force structure required for smaller target sets and conversely the magnitude of the target set that can be covered given the smaller force structure.


1b USSC

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} 1b USSC

} 1b USSC

(S)

1b USSC


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Page 7

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INSTALLATIONS

~~SECRET~~ USSTRATCOM

1b USSC

(S)

1b USSC


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**WEAPONS REQUIRED  
DERIVATION**

To get from # of installations to weapons  
required a series of calculations must be  
done

USSTRATCOM

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1b  
USSC

(S) In previous work (the Phoenix Study) we developed rules of thumb, based on historical data, which allow us to approximate the number of weapons required for a given number of installations,

1b  
USSC

(S)

1b  
USSC


(S)

1b  
USSC

(U) (S) By applying the above conversions and additions to the number of installations, the weapons required can be determined.

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SRF SIZING CONSIDERATIONS  
(2003 Estimate)

~~SECRET~~

10 *USSTRATCOM*

} 1b  
USSC

~~(S)~~ Before proceeding, we would like to explain our SRF conclusions a little bit further. [

~~(S)~~

} 1b  
USSC

} 1b  
USSC

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Page 10

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The seal of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is located in the top left corner of the page. It features a circular design with an eagle and a globe, surrounded by the text "UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND".

SIZING THE FORCE(SRF)

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11 USSTRATCOM

1b  
USSC  
5b  
USSC

(S)

1b  
USSC  
5b  
USSC

(S)

1b  
USSC  
5b  
USSC


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 **WEAPONS REQUIRED**

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~~SECRET~~ <sup>12</sup> **USSTRATCOM**

1b USSC

(S)

1b USSC

(S)

1b USSC


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**WEAPONS AVAILABLE  
FOR EACH OPTION OVER THE NEXT DECADE  
(NOMINAL BOMBER LOADS USED)**

~~SECRET~~ 13 **USSTRATCOM**

16.5k  
USSC u

(S)

} 16.5b  
USSC USSC


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1b USSC 5b NSSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC


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
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(S)

(S)



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**APPROACH**  
(THREE KEY QUESTIONS)

- **WHAT IS THE RIGHT SIZE?**
  - The size of the force must be sufficiently capable against a range of threats
- ➔ • **WHAT IS THE RIGHT MIX?**
  - The mixture of bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs must retain flexibility and capability
- **WHAT IS THE RIGHT COST?**
  - The force must be affordable

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16

USSTRATCOM

(u) (S) The next area addressed is the mixture of the triad. Flexibility and capability are paramount, especially in light of the thinning target base. Flexibility improves capability to adapt to changes in guidance. The question to answer is "Do highly MIRVed forces become inefficient as the target base becomes less dense and what is the relationship between high and lower MIRVed bombers and SSBNs?"

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**WHAT IS THE RIGHT MIX**

DISCRIMINATING                      NON-DISCRIMINATING

**CODES**  
 S=SSBN ONLY  
 B=BOMBER ONLY  
 A=SSBN & BOMBER

~~SECRET~~                      USSTRATCOM

17

*Handwritten notes: "1b 5b USSC" on the left and right sides of the slide.*

(U) Many factors were considered in this section of the study. All the discriminating factors were used for the final mix evaluation. There were several factors considered however, that showed no discrimination. A few of these factors are discussed in the non-discriminating section of this briefing.

(S) Most of the factors looked at applied to multiple platforms but some were platform-specific and are so coded. "S" indicates that the measure was evaluated only against the SSBN. "B" indicates bombers only, and "A" means the measure applied to both bombers and SSBNs.

*Handwritten note: "1b 5b USSC" with a bracket.*

(U) Detailed results of these factors are included in this section.

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ALLOCATION/APPLICATION  
PLANNING INEFFICIENCIES

5b 1b  
USSC USSC  
5b 1b  
USSC USSC  
5b 1b  
USSC USSC

• TODAY'S GUIDANCE

5b 1b  
USSC  
USSC 1 b 5b  
USSC 1 b 5b  
USSC 1 b 5b  
USSC 1 b 5b

~~SECRET~~

18

USSTRATCOM

(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC USSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC USSC

(S)


(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC USSC

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**SSBN ALERT CAPABILITY**

- RANGE OF D-5 MISSILE
  - W88 WARHEAD USED
- TIME TO MOVE INTO RANGE
- MAINTAINING ALERT TARGET PACKAGES
  - SINGLE AND TWO OCEAN CASES

1b USSC

~~SECRET~~ 19 \_\_\_\_\_ **USSTRATCOM**

(U) The next three slides will show you the processes we used to determine SSBN alert capability. This was a critical factor that was required before commencing the allocation/application process.

(S)U

(S)

(S)

1b  
USSC

1b  
USSC

1b  
USSC

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~~SECRET~~

PATROL ARCS FOR D-5 WITH W-88  
(RANGING AND FOOTPRINTING CONSIDERED)

~~SECRET~~  
1b-USSC  
5b-USSC

~~SECRET~~

1b-USSC  
5b-USSC

(S)

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(S)

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

~~SECRET~~


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SSBN TIME TO MOVE INTO RANGE



~~SECRET~~ 21

16-USSC

~~(S)~~

} 16-USSC

~~(S)~~

} 16-USSC

~~(S)~~

} 16-USSC

~~SECRET~~

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**ALERT PACKAGE SUSTAINABILITY  
(FOR EACH OCEAN)**

~~SECRET~~

22

USSTRATCOM

1b USSC

1b USSC

(S)

1b USSC


(S)

1b USSC

~~SECRET~~

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SSBN ALERT CAPABILITY

} 1b USSC  
5b USSC

~~SECRET~~ 23 USSTRATCOM

~~(S)~~ This slide summarizes the previous SSBN slides and provides the SSBN assumptions used in the Air Room for allocation/application. Following are the results of the actual layoffs.

} 1b, 5b USSC  
USSC


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 ~~SECRET~~

ALERT TARGET COVERAGE

~~SECRET~~ USSTRATCOM

24

1b, 5b US  
USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

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
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(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC


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1b, 5b  
USSC

1b, 5b  
USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC

However, when faced with the decision to leave a target uncovered or to apply an unlikely weapon to the target, the choice becomes academic. ]

1b, 5b  
USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC

assessed accordingly.

The penalty was


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 **SECRET**

SSBN PLANNING INEFFICIENCIES

~~SECRET~~

27 **USSTRATCOM**

3 - 1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(S)

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(S)

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC


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 ~~SECRET~~

BOMBER INEFFICIENCIES

~~SECRET~~ 28 USSTRATCOM

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(S)

{ 1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
USSC  
USSC


~~SECRET~~

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 **BOMBER  
AVERAGE LOADS** ^

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 29 USSTRATCOM

1b, 5b  
uSSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
uSSC

(S)

1b, 5b  
uSSC


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1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

~~SECRET~~

30

USSTRATCOM

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

~~(S)~~

1b, 5b  
USSC, USSC

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**RECONSTITUTION AFTER  
TREATY BREAKOUT  
(STOCKPILE CONSTRAINTS CONSIDERED)**



USSTRATCOM

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HEDGE

1b, 5b USSC

(U) That concludes the results of the Air Room allocation/application and we will now consider additional criteria relevant to an assessment of the force structure mix. We will assess each of the 9 options by assigning a penalty for capability lost as compared to Option 1, the USSTRATCOM preferred START II force structure.

(S)

1b USSC  
5b USSC

(S)

Excluded Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by [redacted] Anderson  
97-28h

1b, 5b USSC

(S)

1b, 5b USSC

1b, 5b USSC

(continued)


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(continued)

~~(S)~~

? 1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

~~(S)~~

? 1b, 5b USSC  
USSC

(U) As indicated on the chart, penalties are assessed for weapons reconstituted as compared to Option 1, the STRATCOM preferred force option.

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
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(S) Another discriminating factor for higher MIRVed platforms is the impact of a single carrier loss of one SSBN and one B-52H. For example, an SSBN could be lost or a B-52H could crash on take-off.

However, we also indicate above the bars the percentage of the total available weapons lost by the failure of one SSBN and one B-52H. The penalty is assessed against weapons lost compared to Option 1.

1b, ussc  
5b ussc

1b ussc  
5b ussc


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16 USSC  
5b  
USSC

~~(S)~~


1 bus:  
5b  
USSC

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1b, 5b-4SSC  
4SSC

~~(S)~~ A highly MIRVed B-52H force is also impacted by a scenario in which those B-52Hs with the full conventional modifications are deployed in support of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC).

1b, 5b  
4SSC


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1b, 5b  
USSC

(S) We also considered some additional factors which turned out to be nondiscriminating between the force options. The balance of the TRIAD is one such factor.

1b USSC  
5b  
USSC


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TIMING PLAN CAPABILITY

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16 USSC

(S)

} 16 USSC


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(S)

1b  
USSC


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**PARITY AND STABILITY ANALYSIS**

- **Advantage Ratios - US vs Russia comparison**
  - Delivery vehicles
  - Weapons
  - Megatonnage
  - Hard target kill
- **Stability Measures**
  - Stability index
  - Sensitivity to generate
  - Sensitivity to Prompt Retaliatory Launch
  - Second Strike Dialect
  - Incentive Index
  - Drawdown curves



*USSTRATCOM*

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(U) In-depth analysis of US-Russia parity and various measures of stability provided interesting results; however, the measures did not discriminate between the force options.

(U) In considering US-Russia parity, advantage ratios were calculated for delivery vehicles, weapons, Megatonnage (MT), Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT), Hard Target Kill (HTK), and Time Urgent Hard Target Kill (TU HTK). The ratios were calculated for each force option for each year from 1994-2003. We will show you the results for 1994 and 2003 only and explain why we feel advantage ratios should be considered as non-discriminating.

(U) A number of different stability measures were considered. The measures listed are the products of "think tanks" such as RAND Corporation and the national labs, and are quite complex. We will show you one measure, the Stability Index and explain our conclusions.

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ADVANTAGE RATIOS ~~SECRET~~

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1b, 5b -u  
USSC

(S)

1b USSC  
5b USSC

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1bussc  
5bussc

~~(S)~~ The Stability Index is one of the first strike stability measures analyzed. The Stability Index is based on the cost of initiating strike versus the cost of waiting to strike. A higher index is typically considered to be more stable.

1bussc  
5bussc

(U) The other stability measures provided similar results of a trend in increased stability from the 1992 benchmark and little discrimination between the 9 force options.


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1bussc  
5bussc

(S) The discriminating factors which influence the proper mix have been assigned penalties for degraded flexibility and capability as compared to Option 1, the STRATCOM preferred force structure.

1bussc  
5bussc

(S)

1bussc  
5bussc

~~SECRET~~

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**APPROACH**  
(THREE KEY QUESTIONS)

- **WHAT IS THE RIGHT SIZE?**
  - The size of the force must be sufficiently capable against a range of threats
- **WHAT IS THE RIGHT MIX?**
  - The mixture of bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs must retain flexibility and capability
- ➔ • **WHAT IS THE RIGHT COST?**
  - The force must be affordable

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### COSTING ASSUMPTIONS

- Offensive strategic forces only (i.e no intel, reconnaissance, etc.)
- Cost factors from FY94 PB
- Costs past FY99 assume spending at FY99 level adjusted for projected inflation + mods
- Inflation factors from FY94 PB
- D-5 backfit costs included
- D-5 buy reduced to 24/year
- MM II costs deleted
- Full life extension costs for MM III included
- Phase II Guidance Upgrade for MM III included
- Base operations costs included

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- (u) The cost section of the briefing depicts the significant reductions taken by strategic forces in previous DoD budget cuts and outlines what capabilities are impacted under various levels of funding over the next 10 years.
- (u) These cost figures include only strategic offensive forces. The figures do not include tankers, C3, reconnaissance, intelligence, or other non-offensive weapon systems.
- (u) Budget figures from President Clinton's budget and the current Services data bases were used to show funding profiles.
- (u) The two major planned modifications, D-5 Restructured Backfit and MM III Life Extension/Guidance Upgrade, were included in appropriate options, those with 18 or 14 SSBNs for backfit and all options for ICBMs.


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(u) This slide graphically shows the DoD Budget reductions and even more dramatically the reductions in the strategic forces portion of the budget since 1985. While the total DoD budget has decreased by 33%, the strategic forces budget has decreased by almost 75% during the same period. The figures portrayed are in FY93 Constant Year Dollars.

(u) NOTE:

DoD Budget figures are from the 1 Oct 92 FYDP update.

Two back-up slides show included and excluded items in more detail.


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**DoD FUNDING COMPARISON**  
(FY93 \$)

- 15 YEAR AVERAGE (1979 - 1994)
  - DoD BUDGET - \$314B
  - STRAT OFFENSE - \$20B (6.4% OF DoD)
- FY98 BUDGET LEVEL
  - DoD BUDGET - \$211B
  - STRAT OFFENSE - \$6.4B (3.2% OF DoD)
- DECREASE
  - DoD - 36%
  - STRAT OFFENSE - 68%

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(U) In taking a longer view, the 15-year average Defense spending rate shows what percentage of the DoD budget has historically been spent on strategic forces. It also shows the DoD and strategic funding forecasts for FY98. DoD funding will fall by 36% by FY98, while strategic funding will decrease by 68% overall, thus reducing the strategic portion of the DOD budget by 50%, from 6.4% to 3.2%. The strategic funding decrease is already programmed and does not include any further reductions that may occur during this summer's bottom-up review.


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(u) Many of the strategic forces cuts have occurred in just the last few years, mostly as a result of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, START I, and START II. The top line portrays the level strategic funding would have fallen to if a proportional share of the DoD reduction had been attributed to strategic forces. The bottom line, which bounds the shaded area, depicts the cuts actually taken and amounts to an additional \$26.6 Billion above the proportional share. If the two are combined, the total reduction to strategic forces amounted to \$38 Billion. The list of programs shows what force structure was retired and what modernization was cancelled or dramatically reduced.

(u) These charts graphically depict the strategic force reshaping and restructuring that has already occurred. Strategic forces led the way during the cold war, brought an end to that confrontation, and continue to lead now. We've already paid at the bank in reduced force structure and modernization by a 2-to-1 margin.

(u) That brings us to the question: "Where do we go from here?"

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## SECDEF ON STRATEGIC FORCES

- LONG RANGE APPROACH TO PLANNING & FINANCE
  - ACROSS THE DECADE RATHER THAN JUST FYDP
- CREATE "STRATEGIC POT" FOR STRAT PROGRAMS
  - TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PROGRAMS
  - PLAN FOR SMOOTH R&D, PROCUREMENT LEVELS
- AFTER CUTS, INCREASE FUNDING ONLY TO KEEP PACE WITH INFLATION
- PICK A STRATEGIC FORCE BASELINE AND FUND TO THAT LEVEL
- MINIMUM MODERNIZATION

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
(u) Since the bottom-up review is currently underway and will realistically define the Defense guidance for the next decade, the Sun City effort addresses positions previously stated by Secretary of Defense Aspin while he was Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The above statements were obtained from various speeches and papers prepared by Mr. Aspin and may indicate where he wishes to take strategic forces funding.

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(a) Reviewing former President Bush's budget and President Clinton's budget in FY93 Constant Year Dollars shows the different emphasis on funding and the rate of down-sizing military forces. While former President Bush's budget decreased at a 1.0 to 1.75% rate in FY93 Constant Year Dollars, the current budget decreases at a 4 to 5% negative real growth rate through FY97. As Secretary Aspin has stated, the DoD budget decreases through FY97, then grows with inflation after that, hence the horizontal line between FY97 and FY98.

(u) NOTE:


President Bush's budget figures are from JCS/J-8.

President Clinton's budget figures are from the Secretary's press release on 27 Mar 93. In that announcement, negative real growth from 1993 to 1998 was expressed as follows: 8.5% for FY93, -5.0% for FY94, -3.0% for FY95, 5.1% for FY96, -5.0% for FY97, and 0% for FY98 and beyond.

Then-Year Dollar differences are:

| FY94     | FY95     | FY96     | FY97     | FY98     |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| -\$15.3B | -\$21.8B | -\$30.1B | -\$41.8B | -\$43.5B |

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(U) This chart shows strategic forces funding for former President Bush's and President Clinton's budgets. Data comes from the respective Service data bases. The Clinton FYDP line is the currently programmed TOA for B-52, B-2, MM III, Peacekeeper and Trident systems. In the near term, it also includes funding for the SRAM and B-1B systems. Pending the bottom up review, some questions exist concerning the relationship between the current funding line (President Clinton FYDP) and the potential for further reductions based on any bottom-up review proportional share cuts which might be attributed to strategic forces. To emphasize this point on force structure cuts, taking President Bush's FYDP line and decreasing it by the percentages on the previous slide, the resultant proportional cut baseline would resemble the dashed line rather than the Clinton FYDP line as shown. This dashed line is strictly a percentage cut from the Bush baseline and has no force structure solution. The impact of the funding difference is obviously dramatic.

(U) One other item of note. The significant FY95 decrease is for reductions in B-2 and ACM procurement funding, SRAM and Poseidon retirement, and B-1B transfer to conventional-only operations.

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STRATEGIC OPTION COSTS  
ACROSS THE DECADE

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
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
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


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(u) The current Defense budget reduces out-year target spending by more than 15% relative to the previous position before leveling off in FY97. If that rate of decline, 4 to 5% negative real growth, was used to decrement the funding already programmed for Strategic Forces in the FYDP, the effect would be dramatic. Such a hypothetical rate of decline is shown above and identified as the "Decrement Line."

(u) What fiscal reduction is feasible while still maintaining a credible deterrent force? Starting with a fixed point of the FY94 funding position, this slide shows the impact of 5% to 10% negative real growth in strategic forces through FY98 and then shows the impact of 0% real growth after FY98 to reflect the Secretary of Defense's position. A constant 3% per year inflation is used throughout the period.

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


Continued.

- (u) Two points to note. First, FY94 was chosen as the starting point because of the programmed decrease in strategic forces spending from FY94 to FY95 (approximately \$1 billion). As previously stated, this drop is a result of near-completed procurement funding for the B-2 and ACM along with various force structure reductions/realignments. Given that the B2 and ACM represented the last of the major modernization efforts (other than D-5 for the Atlantic fleet and MM III Life Extension/Guidance Upgrade), strategic forces funding levels are essentially driven to sustainment levels only. Second, the decline in funding was carried out one year further than DoD projections, from FY97 to FY98, as a prudent method to account for unforeseen events such as congressional budget cuts and unrealized DMR savings.
- (u) The cost of each option was compared with the various real growth, or negative real growth, lines across the decade. In any year an option costs more than a given real growth line, it was judged too costly at that real growth rate and colored red on the next slide. If the cost of the option fell below the specific real growth line, it was judged affordable and colored green in that year at that real growth rate.

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### FOLLOW-ON CONSIDERATIONS

- Declining Budget = Decreased Expenditures on Future Systems
- Need to Maintain/Increase RDT&E and Procurement Spending in Out-Years
  - Life Span of Current Systems
    - » B-52 – Already 30+ Years Old
  
- Industrial Base Capability to:
  - » Develop Bomber Aircraft
  - » Upgrade/Replace Guidance Systems
  - » Make Solid Rocket Boosters (for ICBMs and SLBMs)
  - » Build Submarines
  - » Manufacture Nuclear Weapons Material

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
(U) (S) Before proceeding to the final evaluation, we show this slide to depict some follow-on considerations that should be dealt with as we proceed into the future. The force will continue to age and will require R&D and procurement efforts for modification or replacement. Furthermore, the industrial base must be sustained as necessary to meet the needs of strategic force systems. Although Sun City did not deal directly with these issues, they cannot be postponed indefinitely; it takes years to bring a new submarine or ICBM on line. In fact, the B-2 has taken over 15 years to bring on line.

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
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RECOMMENDATION

- **OPTION 1 REMAINS STRATCOM'S PREFERRED WARFIGHTING FORCE STRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT START II**

- STRATEGIC FORCE "PEACE DIVIDEND" HAS BEEN PAID
- OPTION 1 IS ESSENTIALLY AFFORDABLE WITH A 7% NEGATIVE REAL GROWTH BEGINNING IN FY94 AND PROCEEDING UNTIL FY98
  - THEN FUNDED TO KEEP PACE WITH INFLATION

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(u) (8) In conclusion, Option 1 remains our preferred START II force structure. The Option 1 force mix provides the most capability and flexibility for all criteria examined. Option 1 is affordable at approximately a 7% negative real growth from FY94 through FY98 and at a funding level that keeps pace with inflation thereafter. A comparison of the strategic force funding decline to the DOD funding profile from 1988 to the present illustrates the fact that a strategic force "peace dividend" has been paid.


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RECOMMENDATION(cont)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:  
USSTRATCOM/J5B

4 June, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR J060

Subject: FOIA request 97-35 - "The Sun City Alternative Force Structures Study"

1. The staff conducted a declassification review and release or denial determination for "The Sun City Alternative Force Structures Study." As declassification authority, I am authorizing the declassification of the requested SECRET records, except those portions bracketed in pencil which are listed on the attached memo.

2. Specifically, the following sections are declassified:

Page 1, entire page  
Page 2, last two paragraphs  
Page 4, entire page  
Page 6, slide: Slide on top of page and unbracketed text of paragraph  
Page 9, last paragraph  
Page 16, entire page  
Page 43, entire page  
Pages 44 - 50, entire page  
Page 53, text under slide  
Page 54, text under slide  
Page 56, text under slide  
Page 59, last paragraph


3. In addition, as classification authority, I am authorizing the classification of two sections of the document that were previously listed as unclassified.

4. Specifically, the following sections are SECRET:

Page 15, last paragraph: b1, b5, EO12958 Section 1.5[a]. Classify last paragraph as SECRET because it concerns military plans and advice, opinions, recommendations and evaluations which would reveal the deliberative process of a component of the defense department.

Page 19, second paragraph: b1, EO12958 Section 1.5[a]. Classify second paragraph as SECRET because it concerns military plans, weapon systems, and military operations.

5. The point of contacts are LCDR Hartman or Mr. McKenna, J537, 4-1652.

  
RONALD C. MARCOTTE  
Major General, USAF  
Director, Plans and Policy

Attachments  
a/s