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~~(PHOENIX EYES ONLY)~~

OPR: HQ SAC/XP
DATE: 11 SEPT 91
CLASS. BY: MULT SOURCES
DECLASS ON: OADR

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1891

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FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW

OPR: HQ SAC/XPA
24 AUG 1991

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

- A METHODOLOGY PRIMER

OPR: XP

CLASSIFIED BY: MULT. SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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
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Determining Force Needs

The starting points

- Who do you target?
- What do you hold at risk?
- How many "targets" do we have?
- What quality of weapons do we need?
- What quantity of weapons do we need?
- What about a "reserve"?
- How do we hedge against uncertainty?



94 NPR !

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Who do you target?

For the near term, the Soviet Union remains the only nation capable of destroying our society.



R0T

Handle the Soviet Union and you can deter all other potential threats.

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Determining Future Requirements

Working out how much is enough

- Step 1: How many installations must we target?
- Step 2: How many aim points (DGZs)?
- Step 3: Do we need "special weapons" due to hardness or timing requirements?
- Step 4: How many weapons do we need to be sure enough will arrive on target?
- Step 5: How much of a "reserve force" do we need?
- Step 6: How do we hedge against uncertainty in the future?


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Step 1

How many installations?



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SIOP INSTALLATIONS

USSR ONLY







B1
USSC

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Step 2

How many aim points?




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TARGET BASE
SOVIET UNION ONLY



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B1

7 SIOP #

• DGZ DATA FOR 6, 6A, 6B, 6F, 6G, ARE EXTRAPOLATIONS WORKING TO GET DATA

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

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STEP 3

Special Weapons

- * Given the high quality of today's weapons, we can generally assume that if any weapon arrives, it will accomplish the task required
- * Those few situations that call for qualities beyond the average weapon are handled by exception




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HARD TARGET KILL

WEAPONS AVAILABLE



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Step 4

Weapons Quantity

- * We counted the number of installations (10).
- * We reduced this number to aim points (8).
- * We determined we did not need "special weapons".
- * We now must calculate the minimum number of weapons we need to start with to ensure that one arrives at every aim point.
- * To do this, we take into account each weapon's probability of arrival (PA).

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Step 4 (Cont.) Probability of Arrival

- * Probability of Arrival = overall probability that a weapon will arrive on its target.

$$PA = PLS \times WSR \times PTP$$

- * PA is the product of the following:
 - ** PLS or Prelaunch Survivability: the probability a weapon will survive attack and launch.
 - ** WSR or Weapon System Reliability: the probability a weapon will function as designed.
 - ** PTP or Probability to Penetrate: the probability a weapon will get through an enemy's defenses to its target.

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Step 4 (Cont.)

What Affects PLS?



- * If a nuclear weapon accurately attacks a target, the target will be destroyed.
- * The trick is to either hide or move.
 - Get your submarines out of port before the attack arrives.
 - Have your bombers launch to escape the attack based on tactical warning.
 - If possible, launch your silo-based ICBMs before the full attack arrives.

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PLS



B1
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—•— SLBMs + ICBMs *— BOMBERS

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Step 4 (Cont.)



What Affects WSR?

- * The more complex the weapon system, the more difficult it is to maintain WSR.
- * The overall weapon system must be reliable enough to function successfully for the duration of the system's combat mission.
- * Once again, you must consider both the reliability of the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle that carries (the ICBM, the submarine and SLBM, or the bomber) and the reliability of the weapon itself.

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WSR



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—•— SLBMs —+— ICBMs —*— BOMBERS

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Step 4 (Cont.) What Affects PTP?


- * The issues here are:
 - What is the probability that an enemy can detect our attacking forces?
 - If detected, what is the probability that they can track them sufficiently to direct defensive systems against them?
 - If so directed, what is the probability that the defenses can engage and destroy our attacking forces?

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PTP



B1
USSC

—•— SLBMs —+— ICBMs —*— BOMBER

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Step 4 (Cont.) Calculating PA

- * What is the PA of an ICBM with:
 - ** 100% pre-launch survivability (PLS)
 - ** 90% weapon system reliability (WSR)
 - ** 100% probability of penetrating enemy defenses (PTP)



- * What is the PA of a bomber weapon with:
 - ** 100% pre-launch survivability (PLS)
 - ** 85% weapon system reliability (WSR)
 - ** 85% probability of penetrating enemy defenses (PTP)

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PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL



B1
USSC

—•— SLBMS —+— ICBMs —*— BOMBERS

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Step 4 (Cont.)

Calculating Arriving Weapons


- * Need to destroy 8 aim points
- * Arms Control:
 - 4 ICBMs (PA/75%) with 1 RV each
 - 4 SLBMs (PA/75%) with 1 RV each
 - Unlimited bombers (PA/50%) 1 bomb each
- * To meet the basic attack requirement:
 - 4 ICBMs x .75 = 3 aim points destroyed
 - 4 SLBMs X .75 = 3 aim points destroyed
- * With 50% PA, need 4 bomber weapons to kill last 2 aim points

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WEAPON QUALITY

PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL



B1
USSC

— SLBMS + ICBMs * BOMBERS

PA = WSR * PLS * PTP

EX: (.9 * .9 * .9) = .73

PD (CEP, YIELD, VNTK)

(VNTK = 44L7)



B1
USSC


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Step 4 (Cont.)

Calculating Arriving Weapons

- * Need to destroy 8 aim points
- * If the force wide probability of arrival were 1.0, 8 weapons would be required.
- * If the force wide PA were 80%, then the absolute minimum needed would be 10,
 - assuming we knew exactly which weapons did not arrive; and,
 - if we could retarget other weapons to compensate.



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CALCULATING ARRIVING WEAPONS (YEAR 2001)




31
B5
USSC

* ARMS CONTROL:

6000 ACCOUNTABLE WARHEADS

4900 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

1600 SNDVs



B1
B5
USSC

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Step 5 Reserves

- * Traditionally, we have held a portion of our most survivable forces in a secure reserve.
- * The secure reserve handles contingencies and gives limited restrike capability.
- * For our example, suppose the standard were to set aside 25% of our SLBM force.
- * We must consider the removal of this force from the basic attack.

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SRF

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Step 5 (Cont.)

Recalculating Arriving Weapons


- * Need to destroy 8 aim points
- * Arms Control:
 - 4 ICBMs (PA/75%) with 1 RV each
 - 4 SLBMs (PA/75%) with 1 RV each
 - Unlimited bombers (PA/50%) 1 bomb each
- * To meet the basic attack requirement:
 - 4 ICBMs x .75 = 3 aim points destroyed
 - 3 SLBMs X .75 = 2.25 aim points destroyed
 - 1 SLBM in the secure reserve
- * With 50% PA, need 6 bomber weapons to kill last 3 aim points

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
RECALCULATING ARRIVING WEAPONS



B1
B5
USSC

* ARMS CONTROL:

- 6000 ACCOUNTABLE WARHEADS
- 4900 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
- 1600 SNDVs



B1
B5
USSC

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Step 6 TRIAD Hedging

- * The TRIAD will be more important in the future because:
 - ** fewer eggs in fewer baskets; and,
 - ** fewer kinds of both eggs and baskets.
- * TRIAD hedging protects against the failure of one of the primary legs of an attack.
- * Under the TWIN TRIAD concept, and as in our example, the bomber augments the attack and then is sized to hedge against the failure of one of the ballistic legs.

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Step 6 (Cont.)

How could a leg fail?

- * Associated with PLS:
 - ** a communications failure could make the ICBM force "ride-out" a full attack
 - ** a breakthrough could make the ocean transparent to satellites

- * Associated with WSR:
 - ** a design flaw in the Minuteman III or Trident II missile of the associated nuclear weapons

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Step 6 (Cont.) Calculating Hedges

Hedging the loss of the ICBM leg:

- * 4 ICBMs (PA=.75) provide 3 arriving weapons to the basic attack.
- * 6 bomber weapons (PA=.50, 3 arriving wpns) hedge the loss of the 4 ICBMs.

Hedging the loss of the SLBM leg:

- * 3 SLBMs (PA=.75) provide 2.25 arriving weapons to the basic attack.
- * 5 bomber weapons (PA=.50, 2.5 arriving wpns) hedge the loss of the 3 SLBMs.

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

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HEDGE CALCULATION



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USSC

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Requirements Summary

To attack 8 aim points

Basic Attack

- ICBMs 4 (100% of ICBMs)
- SLBMs 3 (75% of SLBMs)
- Bombers 6 (50% of Bombers)

Reserve Force

- SLBMs 1 (25% of SLBMs)

Hedge Force

- Bombers 6 (50% of Bombers)

Totals Needed

- ICBMs 4
- SLBMs 4
- Bombers 12

Total Weapons

20

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

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REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

BASIC ATTACK



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Observations

- * Hedging in the traditional TRIAD concept will be much more important in the future.
- * The TWIN TRIAD concept places the initial day-to-day deterrence burden on the two ballistic legs.
 - ** The bomber leg augments their attack as needed and hedges against the failure of one ballistic leg.
- * Balance between the ballistic missile legs (ICBM/SLBM) permits a consistent bomber hedge requirement.

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Observations (Cont.)

- * The Secure Reserve is not a hedge. ((
 - ** It is mostly SLBMs, most enduring assets.
 - ** Cannot hedge against failure of SLBMs in the basic attack.


- * The decline of the overall target base gives us the chance to use bombers in a real TRIAD hedge role for the first time.

- * Placing the bomber force in this role allows the use of the bomber to swing as needed between the TWIN TRIADS. It makes both the TRIAD and the TWIN TRIADS possible.

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TOTAL WEAPONS



[] B1, B5
USSC

B1
B5
USSC

■ ICBM
[] B1, B5
USSC

▨ SLBM

▤ BMBER COV ▨ SRF

+ PB

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TOTAL WEAPONS

[] B1, B5
USSC

B1
B5
USSC



■ ICBM

▨ SLBM

▩ BMBER COV ▨ SRF

+ PB

△ PB MINUS B1

B1
B5
USSC


B1, B5
USSC

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TOTAL WEAPONS

[] B1, B5
USSC



B1
B5
USSC

■ ICBM


▨ SLBM

▩ BMBER COV ▨ SRF

+ PB

B1
B5
USSC [

TOTAL WEAPONS



] B1, B5
USSC



B1
B5
USSC

■ ICBM

▨ SLBM

▤ BMBER COV

▧ SRF


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USSC

] + PB



—△ PB MINUS B

] B1, B5
USSC

TOTAL WEAPONS



TOTAL WEAPONS



■ ICBM
B1
B5
USSC

▨ SLBM
+ PB


▤ BMBER COV
▧ SRF
-△ PB MINUS B1

B1
B5
USSC

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
TOTAL WEAPONS



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TOTAL WEAPONS



■ ICBM

▨ SLBM

▩ BMBER COV ▨ SRF

+ PB

-△ PB MINUS B-1

B1
B5
USSC

B1, B5
USSC

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WARNING NOTICE
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WNINTEL

Use of Heavy Bombers in Strategic Nuclear Operations in a Changing Environment (U)



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U.S.S.C.


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SEP 1991

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RAND

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TREND IN U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
MILITARY DAMAGE EXPECTANCY
PROGRAMMED FORCE

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

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WEAPONS -- ARSENAL VS ARRIVING



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B1
USSR

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9 SEP 1991

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INC. BULLET POINTS NUMBER OF DGZs BASED ON A DGZ/INSTALLATION RATIO
.25 .525 .9 .075 .05 .025 .8 .775 .75 .725 .7

6000	5700	5550	5400	5250	5100	4950	4800	4650	4500	4350	4200
5900	5645	5495	5340	5190	5040	4890	4740	4590	4440	4290	4140
5800	5540	5390	5240	5090	4940	4790	4640	4490	4340	4190	4040
5700	5445	5295	5140	4990	4840	4690	4540	4390	4240	4090	3940
5600	5350	5200	5050	4900	4750	4600	4450	4300	4150	4000	3850
5500	5255	5105	4950	4800	4650	4500	4350	4200	4050	3900	3750
5400	5160	5010	4860	4710	4560	4410	4260	4110	3960	3810	3660
5300	5065	4915	4760	4610	4460	4310	4160	4010	3860	3710	3560
5200	4970	4820	4670	4520	4370	4220	4070	3920	3770	3620	3470
5100	4875	4725	4570	4420	4270	4120	3970	3820	3670	3520	3370
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4900	4685	4535	4380	4230	4080	3930	3780	3630	3480	3330	3180
4800	4590	4440	4290	4140	3990	3840	3690	3540	3390	3240	3090
4700	4495	4345	4190	4040	3890	3740	3590	3440	3290	3140	2990
4600	4400	4250	4100	3950	3800	3650	3500	3350	3200	3050	2900
4500	4305	4155	4000	3850	3700	3550	3400	3250	3100	2950	2800
4400	4210	4060	3910	3760	3610	3460	3310	3160	3010	2860	2710
4300	4115	3965	3810	3660	3510	3360	3210	3060	2910	2760	2610
4200	4020	3870	3720	3570	3420	3270	3120	2970	2820	2670	2520
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3500	3355	3205	3050	2900	2750	2600	2450	2300	2150	2000	1850
3400	3260	3110	2960	2810	2660	2510	2360	2210	2060	1910	1760
3300	3165	3015	2860	2710	2560	2410	2260	2110	1960	1810	1660
3200	3070	2920	2770	2620	2470	2320	2170	2020	1870	1720	1570
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2700	2595	2445	2290	2140	1990	1840	1690	1540	1390	1240	1090
2600	2500	2350	2200	2050	1900	1750	1600	1450	1300	1150	1000
2500	2405	2255	2100	1950	1800	1650	1500	1350	1200	1050	900
2400	2310	2160	2010	1860	1710	1560	1410	1260	1110	960	810
2300	2215	2065	1910	1760	1610	1460	1310	1160	1010	860	710
2200	2120	1970	1820	1670	1520	1370	1220	1070	920	770	620
2100	2025	1875	1720	1570	1420	1270	1120	970	820	670	520
2000	1930	1780	1630	1480	1330	1180	1030	880	730	580	430

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FORCE STRUCTURE

REVIEW

Obtained Under the
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by Hans M. Kristensen
97-426

OPR: HQ SAC/XPA
15 AUG 1991

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING
- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY
- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
 - ARMS RACE STABILITY
 - DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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NATIONAL GUIDANCE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

• NSDD-13



• NUWEP 91



• JSCP 91-92

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USSC



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USSC



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USSC

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OBJECTIVES

- ✓ • NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
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 - SUSTAINABILITY

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 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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BASIC SIOP

- NSDD-13




- NUWEP 91




- JSCP 91-92



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
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DEFINITIONS BASIC SIOP STRATEGY



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USSC


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
BASIC SIOP



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

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BASIC SIOP

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - ✓ •• RESERVE
 - HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY

- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
 - ARMS RACE STABILITY
 - DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

UNCLASSIFIED




RESERVES

- NSDD-13




- NUWEP 91



- JSCP 91-92



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
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DEFINITIONS

NUCLEAR RESERVE ALTERNATIVES



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

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


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OTHER POWERS (WORST ESTIMATE YEAR 2015)



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SOURCE: DIA REPORT TO SAG (SEP 90)
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
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
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR CLUB



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
MID EAST/ASIAN NUCLEAR CLUB



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AFRICAN NUCLEAR CLUB



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WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
NUCLEAR
CLUB

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - ✓ •• HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
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 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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HEDGE

- NSDD-13




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- JSCP 91-92



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
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DEFINITIONS HEDGE ALTERNATIVES



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

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SUMMARY BOMBER FORCE SIZING ASSUMPTIONS




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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY COMPARISON



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STRATEGY COMPARISON

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by Hans M. Kristensen
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WEAPON/DGZ RATIO
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

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STRATEGY COMPARISON



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] WEAPON/DGZ RATIO
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
WEAPON REQUIREMENTS

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B5
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
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ICBM
 SLBM
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



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■ ICBM

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BOMBER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY



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
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
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FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS VS NEG REAL GROWTH



O&S, Milcon, RDT&E





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WHAT'S AFFORDABLE



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
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BOMBER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY



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

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B5
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WHAT'S AFFORDABLE



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USSC



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-3%




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USSC



FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS VS NEG REAL GROWTH



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USSC


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O&S, Milcon, RDT&E

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FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS VS NEG REAL GROWTH




B1
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USC

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O&S, Milcon, RDT&E



OTHER POWERS (WORST ESTIMATE YEAR 2000)



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
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
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CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL



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USSC

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John P.



FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW

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24 AUG 1991

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OBJECTIVE TO STRATEGIES

ALTERNATIVE

1

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3

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

BASIC SIOP

RESERVE

HEDGE



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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

BASIC JSCP

BASING

SUSTAINABILITY



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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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 - HEDGING

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 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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OBJECTIVE TO STRATEGIES

ALTERNATIVE

1

2

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE


- BASIC SIOP
- RESERVE
- HEDGE



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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

- BASIC JSCP
- BASING
- SUSTAINABILITY



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
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NATIONAL GUIDANCE CONVENTIONAL

- DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE FY 1992-1997

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NATIONAL GUIDANCE CONVENTIONAL

- DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE FY 1992-1997

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING
- ✓ • CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
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JSCP GUIDANCE CONVENTIONAL

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JSCP 93-95 CONCLUSION
HOW IT IMPLEMENTS NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY



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MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY
(MRC)

JSCP CY 93-95



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COMBATANT CINC SUPPORT JSCP CY 93-95

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
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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

JSCP ALLOCATION CY93-95



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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY


- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
 - ARMS RACE STABILITY
 - DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING BASING




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Basing Tradeoffs

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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING BASING REQUIREMENTS

- CONUS
 - BASE LEVEL SUPPLY SYSTEM
 - MUNITIONS
- REGION
 - WAR RESERVE SPARE KIT
 - INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE
 - PRE-POSITIONED MUNITIONS
- THEATER
 - WAR RESERVE SPARE KIT
 - AIRLIFT OF MUNITIONS/FUELS
 - INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE

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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING BASING COST DRIVERS

- NUMBER OF CONUS BASES
- NUMBER OF REGIONAL MOBs
 - CARETAKER FORCE
 - ILMs
 - AIRCRAFT TYPES SUPPORTED BY ILMs
 - PREPOSITION MUNITIONS
- NUMBER OF FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS
 - AIRLIFT OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
 - AIRLIFT MUNITIONS
- HOW MUCH REDUNDANCY IS NEEDED
 - COVER POTENTIAL CONFLICT AREAS
 - RESPOND IN TIME
 - SUSTAIN OPERATIONS

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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 - ✓ •• SUSTAINABILITY
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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING SUSTAINABILITY


- DURATION OF AIR CAMPAIGN
 - CRITICAL TARGETS (2-5 DAYS)
 - LESS CRITICAL (20-40 DAYS)
- INTENSITY OF AIR CAMPAIGN
 - NUMBER OF TARGETS
 - LEVEL OF DAMAGE PER TARGET

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Sorties Available Per 100 PAA

No Attrition



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Sorties Available Per 100 PAA
2% Attrition



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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING TARGET BASE

- HIGH PAYOFF FIRST HOURS
 - COMMAND AND CONTROL
 - EW/GCI
 - SEAD
 - TRANSPORTATION NETWORK (LOC)
 - POWER GRID NETWORK
 - AIRFIELDS
- LESSER PAYOFF IN FIRST HOURS
 - INDUSTRY
 - GROUND FORCES


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AIR TARGET COMPLEXES (FIXED)



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AIR TARGET COMPLEXES
(CRITICAL)



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AIR TARGET COMPLEXES (LESS CRITICAL)

Obtained Under the
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97-42h

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SORTIES REQUIRED PER TARGET COMPLEX




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• AREA AND POINT TARGET MIX

KOREA EXAMPLE BOMBERS NEEDED



[A large rectangular area with a dashed border, intended for a map or diagram. The interior is mostly blank, with some faint horizontal lines suggesting a grid or structure.]


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TIME REQUIRED TO STRIKE STRATEGIC TARGET SET

SCENARIO 2

B-2s




— (192) CRITICAL TGTS

—◊ CRITICAL TGTS [WX]


—* (584) TOTAL TGTS

—◻ TOTAL TGTS [WX]

SOURCE: AF/XOX



Conventional Warfighting Options




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DESERT STORM



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
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
Air Power Wheel

Area Targets

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
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Air Power Wheel

Point Targets




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


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
Bombers Required to Destroy 100 Targets



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MATCHING STRATEGIES



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Bomber Requirements Summary

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
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BOMBER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

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Bomber Requirements Summary

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BOMBER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY



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FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW

OPR: HQ SAC/XPA
28 AUG 1991

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING

- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY

- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
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 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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
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GUIDANCE

- NSDD-13

- NUWEP 91



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STABILITY GUIDANCE

- NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
AUGUST 1991
 - IMPROVE STABILITY BY:
 - PURSUING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
 - MODERNIZE OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT
 - REDUCING MILITARY CAPABILITIES THAT COULD PROVIDE INCENTIVE TO ATTACK

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING
- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
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- ✓ • ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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CRISIS STABILITY GUIDANCE

- JCSP ANNEX C, FY 89-90
 - US MUST NOT BE UNDER PRESSURE TO EMPLOY VULNERABLE FORCES
 - SOVIETS MUST NOT BE PROVIDED ANY INCENTIVE TO INITIATE A NUCLEAR ATTACK
 - REQUIRES THAT THE US:
 - REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES IN ITS FORCES
 - REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES IN ITS C3I SYSTEMS
 - IMPROVE ABILITY TO OBTAIN AND REACT TO WARNING
 - IMPROVE ABILITY TO DETECT AND ASSESS A SOVIET ATTACK
- JCSP ANNEX C, FY 91-92
 - CRISIS STABILITY REQUIRES THAT NO NUCLEAR POWER IS UNDER PRESSURE TO INITIATE NUCLEAR WAR TO PROTECT VULNERABLE FORCES

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CRISIS STABILITY

- REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR IN A CRISIS SITUATION
 - GOAL: REDUCE "PERCEIVED" ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST
- STABILIZING ACTIONS
 - MAKE FORCES MORE SURVIVABLE
 - REDUCE FIRST STRIKE "COUNTER FORCE" CAPABILITY
- DESTABILIZING ACTIONS
 - INCREASE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
 - DEPLOY FORCES IN LESS SURVIVABLE MODES

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CRISIS STABILITY MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

- ICBM RVS/(SILOS OR HARD TARGETS)
 - MEASURES CAPABILITY OF FIRST STRIKE
 - IGNORES SLBMS AND ACFT
 - CHANGES IN RATIO DO NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO CHANGES IN STABILITY
- % FORCE SURVIVABLE (MORE SURVIVABLE - LESS INCENTIVE)
 - MEASURES SENSITIVITY TO:
 - GENERATION RATES
 - ALERT RATES
 - ASW BREAKTHROUGH
 - PROMPT RETALIATORY LAUNCH
 - RACE TO GENERATION
 - MOBILITY
 - STRATEGIC DEFENSE
 - CAN BE PRESENTED USING
 - DE
 - NUMBER SURVIVING
 - NUMBER SURVIVING/DGZ

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CRISIS STABILITY ICBM RATIOS




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WPNS INCLUDE MMIII + PKPR

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DAMAGE ACHIEVED GENERATED



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US SURVIVING FORCE

-  ACFT
-  IC,ACFT
-  SL,ACFT
-  IC,SL,ACFT

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SURVIVING WPNS GENERATED.



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SURVIVING US FORCE

■ ACFT ▨ IC,ACFT ▩ SL,ACFT ▧ IC,SL,ACFT

DOES NOT INCLUDE SRF


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SOVIET SURVIVING WPNS GENERATED



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SURV. SOVIET FORCE

■ ACFT ▨ SL,ACFT ▩ IC,ACFT ▧ IC,SL,ACFT

SOVIET NIE11 - 3/8/91 START FORCE
DGZ ARE FUTURE PROJ FROM BTB 6G DATABASE

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
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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)





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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)



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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)



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
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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)



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CRISIS STABILITY CONCLUSIONS

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CURRENT LEVEL OF STABILITY]

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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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 - BASIC JSCP
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- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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 - ✓ •• ARMS RACE STABILITY
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 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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ARMS RACE STABILITY

- AVOID DEPLOYMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO COUNTER DEPLOYMENTS (LEADING TO COUNTER-COUNTER DEPLOYMENTS, ETC)

- REDUCE CAPABILITY TO BREAK TREATY LIMITS
 - PHYSICAL CHANGES IN DOWNLOADED ICBMS TO REDUCE CAPABILITY TO RE-LOAD

- THINGS TO CONSIDER
 - DOWNLOADING
 - SDI/GPALS

FOR THE FORCE STRUCTURES BEING CONSIDERED
ARMS RACE STABILITY IS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE

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PROLIFERATION GUIDANCE

- NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE US - AUG 91
 - PREVENT THE TRANSFER OF MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND RESOURCES
 - STRENGTHEN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS
 - EXPAND MEMBERSHIP OF MULTILATERAL REGIMES DIRECTED AGAINST PROLIFERATION
 - PURSUE NEW INITIATIVES (EX. CHEMICAL WPNS TREATIES)

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DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION

- MAINTAIN FORCE CAPABILITY SO THAT ALLIES DON'T SEE NEED TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WPNS
- DISCOURAGE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
- CONTINUE START I-II TO DEMONSTRATE TO 3RD WORLD US/SOVIET INTEREST IN REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- INCREASE EMPHASIS ON DEFENSES
 - SOVIET RESPONSE MUST BE CONSIDERED

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OBJECTIVES


- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING
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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS US / USSR ADVANTAGE RATIOS



BI
USSR

—•— SNDVS + WPNS * MT — EMT × HTK ◊ HTK IC/SL

HISTORY REV, TWIN PEAKS & 91-DNIE

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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■ VEH ■ WPNS ■ MT ■ EMT ■ HTK ■ TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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VEH
 WPNS
 MT
 EMT
 HTK
 TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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VEH
 WPNS
 MT
 EMT
 HTK
 TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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VEH
 WPNS
 MT
 EMT
 HTK
 TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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■ VEH ■ WPNS ■ MT ■ EMT ■ HTK ■ TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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■ VEH ■ WPNS ■ MT ■ EMT ■ HTK ■ TU HTK

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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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■ VEH ■ WPNS ■ MT ■ EMT ■ HTK ■ TU HTK


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US/USSR CAPABILITY RATIOS



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USSC

■ VEH ■ WPNS ■ MT ■ EMT ■ HTK ■ TU HTK

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 - ✓ •• RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS US / OTHER NUCLEAR NATIONS



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— SNDVS + WPNS

SOURCE: 544 SIW, UK LIAISON OFFICE

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Observations

- * Hedging in the traditional TRIAD concept will be much more important in the future.
- * The TWIN TRIAD concept places the initial day-to-day deterrence burden on the two ballistic legs.
 - ** The bomber leg augments their attack as needed and hedges against the failure of one ballistic leg.
- * Balance between the ballistic missile legs (ICBM/SLBM) permits a consistent bomber hedge requirement.

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Observations (Cont.)

- * The Secure Reserve is not a hedge.
 - ** It is mostly SLBMs, most enduring assets.
 - ** Cannot hedge against failure of SLBMs in the basic attack.


- * The decline of the overall target base gives us the chance to use bombers in a real TRIAD hedge role for the first time.

- * Placing the bomber force in this role allows the use of the bomber to swing as needed between the TWIN TRIADS. It makes both the TRIAD and the TWIN TRIADS possible.

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PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE




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
WHAT'S AFFORDABLE



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STRATEGY COMPARISON



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WEAPON REQUIREMENTS




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START II STUDY

BACKGROUND: POST START I STRATEGIC (LONG-RANGE) NUCLEAR WARHEADS



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AFCSA/SASF
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RESERVES

- NSDD-13



- NUWEP 91



- JSCP 91-92



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


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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)



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HEDGE

- NSDD-13



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- NUWEP 91



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- JSCP 91-92



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PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE



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Bomber Requirements Summary

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
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
Basing Tradeoffs



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KOREA EXAMPLE BOMBERS NEEDED



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OBJECTIVE TO STRATEGIES

ALTERNATIVE

1

2

3

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

BASIC SIOP

RESERVE

HEDGE



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CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

BASIC JSCP

BASING

SUSTAINABILITY



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OBJECTIVE TO STRATEGIES

ALTERNATIVE

1

2

3

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

BASIC SIOP

RESERVE

HEDGE



CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

BASIC JSCP

BASING

SUSTAINABILITY




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
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 ICBM
 B-1 PEN

 SLBM
 B-1 S/O


 B-2 PEN
 B52H S/O







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 ICBM
 B-1 PEN

 SLBM
 B-1 S/O

 B-2 PEN
 B52H S/O



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CRISIS STABILITY SURVIVING WEAPONS (GEN)



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OBJECTIVES

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - BASIC SIOP
 - RESERVE
 - HEDGING
- CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING
 - BASIC JSCP
 - BASING
 - SUSTAINABILITY
- ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - CRISIS STABILITY
 - ARMS RACE STABILITY
 - DISCOURAGE PROLIFERATION
 - AVOID ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
 - RATIOS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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WHAT WE THINK ABOUT ICBMs

- WHY ICBMs
- ICBM HISTORY
- ICBM MODERNIZATION
- NEW WORLD ORDER
- POSTURING FOR START II

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WHY ICBMs?

Historical ICBM Strengths

- RAPID RESPONSE
 - 30 MINUTE TOF
 - COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY
 - RAPID
 - SECURE
 - REDUNDANT
- ACCURATE AND EFFECTIVE
 - WSR + CEP + YIELD = PROMPT HARD TARGET KILL
- SOVEREIGN BASING
 - UNAMBIGUOUS ATTACK INDICATIONS
 - SECURE FROM UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACKS (TERRORISTS)

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WHY ICBMs ?(cont)

Historical ICBM Strengths

- HIGHEST ALERT RATE

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- POSITIVE CONTROL

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- RAPID RETARGETING

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WHY ICBMs? (cont)

Historical ICBM Strengths

- ECONOMY OF OPERATION



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ICBM HISTORY

- ATLAS/TITAN I--Late 1950s
 - ABOVE GROUND LAUNCH
 - LIQUID FUELED
 - AREA TARGET CAPABLE
- TITAN II--EARLY 1960s
 - UNDERGROUND LAUNCH
 - LIQUID FUEL
 - IMPROVED ACCURACY (NO HTK)

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ICBM HISTORY (cont)

- MINUTEMAN
 - CORNERSTONE OF 1960s NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
 - SURVIVABLE
 - PROMPT
 - ECONOMIC TO OPERATE
 - EFFECTIVE
 - UNDERGROUND, HARDENED, DISPERSED LFs/LCCs
 - CAPABLE OF RIDING OUT A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE


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WHAT CHANGED?

- SURVIVABILITY CAME INTO QUESTION IN 1970s



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ICBM MODERNIZATION

Search for Survivability

- GOAL: RESTORE SURVIVABILITY
 - COMPLICATES SOVIET TARGETING
 - ENABLES ICBM TO SURVIVE A FIRST STRIKE
 - ENHANCES STABILITY
 - RETAIN PROMPT HTK CAPABILITY OF ICBM
- OPTIONS
 - SHELL GAME
 - 200 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES SHUTTLED BETWEEN 2400 SHELTERS
 - SOUTHWEST US BASING

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ICBM Modernization (cont)

Search for Survivability



- PEACEKEEPER RAIL GARRISON



- PEACETIME



- INCREASED READINESS



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ICBM Modernization (cont) Search for Survivability

- SMALL ICBM (SICBM)

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- PEACETIME
 - MOB IS AT EXISTING MISSILE BASES
 - HMLs PARKED ON EXISTING MISSILE SITES
- INCREASED READINESS

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ICBM Modernization Today

- SHELL GAME - CANCELLED
- PEACEKEEPER RAIL GARRISON
 - R & D
 - PROGRAM TO BE SHELVED AFTER FIRST TEST LAUNCH
 - DEMONSTRATE CAPABILITY
- SICBM
 - R & D



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NEW WORLD ORDER

- REDUCED SOVIET THREAT
 - ECONOMY DRIVEN
 - FEWER ATTACKING SOVIET WEAPONS
- PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY
 - POTENTIAL FOR NON-SOVIET ATTACK
- SHRINKING DEFENSE BUDGET
- START II ON HORIZON

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REDUCED SOVIET THREAT

- ATTACK FORCE DECLINING




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- INCREASED TURMOIL - RECENT COUP ATTEMPT
 - COUP LEADERS CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS ??
 - BREAKUP OF REPUBLICS

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SHRINKING DEFENSE BUDGET



—•— 0% GROWTH —+— PLANNED —*— ESTIMATED (-3%)
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START II

- THEME IS "STABILITY"
 - DeMIRVing ICBMs
 - DOWNLOADING SLBMs

- NOTIONAL LIMITS:

TOTAL WARHEADS	3000-4000
BM WARHEADS	2000-2500
SNDVs	1200-1500

- "BALANCE" IS MORE IMPORTANT - WITH REDUCED VARIETY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS
 - REDUCES TRIAD IMPACT RESULTING FROM CATASTROPHIC SYSTEM FAILURE
 - REQUIRES FEWER BOMBER WEAPONS TO HEDGE LARGEST LEG



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OLD VISION ... FUTURE WORLD

OLD VISION...CURRENT DIRECTION

- TOWARDS FEWER SILOs
 - EMPHASIS ON VULNERABILITY (TO LARGE ATTACK)
 - FOCUS ON MOBILITY (PKRG,SICBM,TRIDENT SSBN)

FUTURE WORLD CONDITIONS

- EMPHASIS ON MOBILITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH NEW WORLD ORDER
- THREAT TO SILOS NOW REDUCED AND NUMERICALLY LIMITED
- NO CONSIDERATION OF GPALS
- CHANGE IN RISK TOLERANCE

- GIVEN SHRINKING DEFENSE BUDGET & SMALLER TRIAD BUDGET
 - FOCUS SHOULD BE ON LOWER COST SYSTEMS WITH ADEQUATE CAPABILITY
- TRIDENTS
 - TOO MANY EGGS IN TOO FEW BASKETS (WORSE AT START II)
- SHIFT IN DIRECTION
 - AWAY FROM MOBILITY -- HIGH COST/NEW SYSTEM
 - TOWARDS SILOs -- LOW COST/PROVEN TECHNOLOGY

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AT REDUCED WEAPONS LEVELS

- LOWER INCENTIVE TO STRIKE FIRST
 - APPROACHING 1:1 EXCHANGE RATIO
 - AT "BEST" INITIATOR REMOVES BOTH ARSENALS
 - BETTING OPPONENT WILL RIDEOUT ATTACK
 - AT "WORST" INITIATOR ATTACKS EMPTY HOLES
- GPALs FURTHER DEINCENTIVIZES AGAINST FIRST STRIKE
 - ADDS UNCERTAINTY TO WAR PLANNER
 - SOME RVs GET DESTROYED

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SURVIVABILITY WITH GPALS



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WHAT HAS CHANGED?

Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen

97-42h

- ✓ THE SOVIET THREAT ... (FADING?)
 - MOBILITY WAS ESSENTIAL IN THE FACE OF AN UNCONSTRAINED SOVIET THREAT.
 - A NUMBER OF FACTORS WILL LIKELY EFFECT THE THREAT OUR SILOS MAY FACE.
 - START I LIMITS ON TOTAL RVS
 - THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CRISIS
 - START II PRESSURE TO DE-MIRV
 - GPALS AND FUTURE DEFENSES
- ✓ THE US BUDGET ... (MOBILITY IS EXPENSIVE!)
 - MOBILITY, ESPECIALLY IF ONLY A FUTURE OPTION, IS LIKELY NOT TO SURVIVE ABES

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IF NO MOBILITY, THEN WHAT?

- ✓ MOBILITY PROVIDES MORE THAN SURVIVABILITY.
 - MOBILITY LETS US EXPAND ICBM FORCE STRUCTURE WITHOUT BUILDING SILOS.
- ✓ WITHOUT MOBILITY AS AN OPTION, WE SHOULD KEEP MORE SILOS.
 - NEED ENOUGH TO HOUSE A DE-MIRVED FORCE (SINGLES) AND STILL MAINTAIN SOME BALANCE IN TRIAD WITH SLBMS.
 - BY-PRODUCTS ARE THAT SILOS ARE:
 - CHEAP TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE;
 - NO PROBLEM WITH PUBLIC INTERFACE; AND,
 - SECURE FROM TERRORIST TO TORNADO.

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IF NO MOBILITY, NEW MISSILE?

- ✓ NEW MISSILE IS TIED TO MOBILITY.
- NOT CLEAR A NEW MISSILE IS NEEDED FOR A SILO-BASED FORCE.




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WHY RETAIN 150 SILOs?

- BETTER BALANCE IN TRIAD
 - REDUCED TRIAD IMPACT RESULTING FROM CATASTROPHIC SYSTEM FAILURE
- COST (vs MOBILE SYSTEM)
 - 150 ADDITIONAL SILOs MAINTAINED PER YEAR VERSUS NEW UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGY
 - COST SAVINGS TO TAXPAYER, RETAIN CAPABILITY



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POSTURING FOR START II

What Role for ICBMs?



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
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HOW DO WE DO IT

Numerous Options

- DEMIRV MM IIIs



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OBSERVATIONS ON ICBM FORCE

- IN 1960s, ICBMs WERE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEM
- IN 1970s, ICBM SURVIVABILITY WAS DOUBTFUL
- IN 1980s/1990s, MOBILITY PROGRAMS PURSUED TO ADD SURVIVABILITY BACK TO ICBMs



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
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RECONNAISSANCE ROADMAP



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
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PRIORITIZED PROPOSED FUNDING

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT/PAA



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FUNDING

PROPOSED FUNDING

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

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


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
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BOMBER MODIFICATIONS




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ICBM MODIFICATIONS




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

BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE



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


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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAPABILITY



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
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAPABILITY




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START ACCOUNTABILITY

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START ACCOUNTABILITY ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:
USSTRATCOM/J0734
901 SAC BLVD STE 1E5
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6073

18 November 1997

Mr. Hans M. Kristensen
1927 Tulare Avenue
Richmond CA 94805-2024

Reference your 5 September 1997 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (97-42h) for "The Phoenix Study."

Our denial authority, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Colonel, USAF, Staff Judge Advocate, is denying release of certain portions of the requested document. See the annotations along the right margins. The annotations "b1;" and "b5" refer to specific exemptions authorized by the Freedom of Information Act 5 U. S. C. 552, as explained below.


"b1;" 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). The information contained in the sentence or paragraph is properly and currently classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, as it **contains information concerning historical military plans and intelligence projections of the future target base**, and are specifically classified under the criteria established by Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5(a).

"b5;" 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). Internal advice, recommendations, and subjective evaluations, as contrasted with factual matters, that are reflected in records pertaining to the decision-making process of any agency, whether within or among agencies, or within or among DOD Components.

Should you decide to appeal this decision, you must write to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) within 30 days of the date of this letter. Include any reasons for reconsideration you wish to present, and attach a copy of this letter. Address your letter as follows:

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
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Department of Defense Directive 5400.7-R, DOD Freedom of Information Act Program, provides we assess fees for processing FOIA requests. However, we waive fees in this instance.


A. F. KREMER
Command FOIA Manager
Office of the Chief, Information Management

Attachment: The Phoenix Study