

UNCLASSIFIED

M-T-V

~~SECRET~~

121705Z DEC 97

13

PAASZYUW RUGNOA0438 3461736-SSSS--RHDIAAA.

ZNY ~~SSSS~~

P 121705Z DEC 97

FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC//

TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J38NOD/J38NOB//

INFO RUGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC/ECJ5/ECJ3/ECJ36/ECJ5N//

RUCBACM/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA//J5/J53/J536//

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J5//

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3//

RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//J3/J5//

RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//

RUPEUNA/USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO//J3/J5//

RUCUBBB/USCINCSSTRAT COMMAND CENTER OFFUTT AFB NE

RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//J55/J551/J553//

RUPEUNA/CINC NORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J3/J5//

RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3//

RUAGNAN/CINCUNC SEOUL KOR

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//J3//

RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XO/XONO//

RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/DON//

RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP/XPX//

RUFQAAA/USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE//SPASAC//

BT

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

MSGID/GENADMIN/ECJ5//

SUBJ/CONUS-BASED DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) READINESS REQUIREMENTS

(U)//

REF/A/RMG/JOINT STAFF/201629ZNOV97//

POC/DAVEY/CDR ECJ5-N/CP/LOC:STUTTGART GE/TEL:DSN314-430-7160//

//

(U)

RMKS/1. ~~(S)~~ THE U.S. NUCLEAR MISSION IN EUROPE IS AN ENDURING ELEMENT OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND BURDEN SHARING.

OUTLINED IN THE NATO "STRATEGIC CONCEPT", NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (NSNF) ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN A CRITICAL MISSION AREA

THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION CONSISTS OF WEAPONS IN THEATER AND THE COMMITMENT OF DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, BASED BOTH IN THEATER AND IN CONUS.

// (U)

2. ~~(S)~~ THE U.S. AND NATO HAVE ALREADY MADE EVERY EFFORT TO MATCH FORCE LEVELS TO THE THREAT. AS A RESULT, U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS, BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN CONUS, HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS. WEAPON STOCKPILE LEVELS IN EUROPE ARE DOWN SOME 80 PERCENT FROM 1991 ALONE. U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED, DECLINING FROM 11 TYPES OF WEAPONS IN 1971 TO ONE SYSTEM - AERIAL BOMBS DELIVERED BY DCA - IN 1997.

// (U)

3. ~~(S)~~ THE STRATEGIC THREAT TO NATO TERRITORY HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED, BUT RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE

121705Z DEC 97

~~SECRET~~

Pg 1

UNCLASSIFIED

2-6

Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen
99-97

UNCLASSIFIED

M-T-V

~~SECRET~~

121705Z DEC 97

=====

DOCTRINE TO EMPLOY THEM REMAIN A THREAT TO NATO. RUSSIA MAINTAINS AT LEAST A 3 TO 1 ADVANTAGE IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS COMPARED TO THE U.S. AND A VASTLY GREATER ADVANTAGE OVER NATO. THE RUSSIANS ENJOY A NEAR 40 TO 1 ADVANTAGE IN DELIVERY SYSTEMS. SIGNIFICANTLY, RUSSIAN TACTICS HAVE EVOLVED TO LEAN MORE HEAVILY THAN BEFORE ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCE EFFECTIVENESS HAS DECLINED. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY STATES WITHIN THE EUCOM AOR/AOI AND THEIR ABILITY TO TARGET THE CAPITALS OF EUROPE IS OF GROWING CONCERN.

//

4.

// (u)

5. ~~(S)~~ CONSIDERABLE STUDY ON NSNF FORCE LEVELS HAS ALREADY BEEN CONDUCTED AND TODAY'S NUMBERS OF WEAPONS, AIRCRAFT AND READINESS LEVELS ARE A RESULT. THE PRESENT FORCE POSTURE IS BASED ON THE THREAT AND ITS EVOLUTION, THE MISSION AND LIMITED RESOURCES AVAILABLE TODAY. NO WEAPON SYSTEM IS MORE CAPABLE THAN DCA WITH REGARDS TO THE FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT, POLITICAL STATEMENT, YIELD DELIVERY AND ATTAINED ACCURACY.

// (u)

6. ~~(S)~~ THE U.S. IS COMMITTING DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO NATO.

// (u)

7. ~~(S)~~ PRESENTLY ASSIGNED NATO READINESS LEVELS FOR CONUS BASED DCA MUST BE MAINTAINED. USCINCEUR'S DCA REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT SHORT-LIVED CONTINGENCIES, BUT RATHER CRITICAL AND ENDURING ELEMENTS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE,

//

DECLAS/CLASSIFIED BY: MG MICHAEL J. MCCARTHY, USAF

REASON: 1.5 (A)

DECLASSIFY ON: X4.//

BT

#0438

NNNN

=====

121705Z DEC 97

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Pg 2

R-6