

THE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY POLICY:

Nuclear Diplomacy At Work

A Working Paper

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Introduction

This working paper is a chronological compilation of statements, documents, and events relating to the policy of the United States to neither confirm nor deny the presence (or absence) of nuclear weapons anywhere. The material is collected as part of on-going research into the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.

Because nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion are so closely related both in terms of policy and operations, the chronology also includes events relating to nuclear-powered warships. The information is derived from official U.S. documents (particularly those released under the Freedom of Information Act), reports and other publications, magazines, and newspaper articles.

The working paper is a living document, which means that it continues to be updated as new information becomes available. Incredibly, even after the U.S. Government confirmed the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines in 1992, the U.S. military continues to uphold the neither confirm nor deny (NCND) policy on its warships, aircraft, and bases, and the State Department continues to punish New Zealand for its non-nuclear legislation against nuclear weapons on visiting warships.

Quotation from this document is permitted only with clear reference to title and author. All questions should be directed to Hans M. Kristensen on phone 202-454-4695, fax 202-675-1010, or e-mail hkristensen@fas.org.

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1946: The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is written, forming the basis for the control of US atomic power and nuclear relations information.

17 February 1954: In a "Special Message" to the Congress, President Eisenhower argued that, "In respect to defense considerations, our atomic effectiveness will be increased if certain limited information on the use of atomic weapons can be imparted more readily to nations allied with us in common defense."¹

He recommended amendments to the Atomic Energy Act so "that authority be provided to exchange with nations participating in defense arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is essential to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic warfare," and added that "Amendments to the definition of 'restricted data' [...] will also contribute to needed administrative flexibility in the exchange of information with such nations concerning the use of atomic weapons."²

Eisenhower also said, "A large body of 'restricted data' under present law relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons. The responsibility for the control of much of this weapons information logically should rest with the Department of Defense rather than with the [Atomic Energy] Commission."³

Moreover, "Many administrative difficulties that are produced by a dual system of security would be eliminated by the removal of this weapons information from the 'restricted data' category and its subsequent protection by the Department of Defense in the same manner and under the same safeguards as other military secrets."⁴

Specifically, "This method of handling weapons information is not possible under the present law. 'Restricted data' can be removed from the statutory 'restricted data' category only by declassification, upon a determination by the Atomic Energy Commission that the publication of such data would not adversely affect the common defense and security. Declassification obviously is not the remedy. The remedy lies in reliance upon the standard security measures of the user, the Department of Defense."⁵

Eisenhower, "therefore (recommended) that the statutory definition of 'restricted data' be amended to exclude information concerning the utilization of atomic weapons, as distinguished from information on their theory, design and manufacture."⁶

"In addition to information which falls wholly within the utilization category," Eisenhower said, "there is information which concerns primarily the utilization of weapons but which pertains also their design and manufacture. In order to avoid difficulties in this marginal zone, I recommended legislation which also would authorize removal of such information from the 'restricted data' category. This would be done only when the [Atomic Energy] Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine that it relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons and that it can be adequately safeguarded as classified information under the Espionage Act as other applicable law."⁷

"In consistent with these changes," Eisenhower concluded, "I recommend that the Department of Defense join with the Atomic Energy Commission in any declassification of 'restricted data' which related primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons and which can be published without endangering the national security. Thus, the Department of Defense will

have an appropriate voice in the protection and declassification of such 'restricted data' and the responsibilities of the Commission will be clarified with respect to all other 'restricted data'."⁸ [NCND File]

30 June 1954: Bills were introduced in Congress on amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The new bills, H.R.9757 and S.3690, incorporated revisions made during executive meetings on the earlier H.R.8862 and S.3323, into which the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy introduced the resulting companion bills on April 15 and 19, 1954.⁹ [NCND File]

1954: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) established a new security classification system for atomic information, and the utilization of atomic energy. The Act specified that nuclear cooperation with other countries may take place, "Provided, however, [in part] that no such cooperation shall involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons."¹⁰

"The President," nonetheless, "may authorize the Department of Defense with the assistance of the [Atomic Energy] Commission, to cooperate with another nation or with a regional defense organization to which the United States is a party, and to communicate to that nation or organization such Restricted Data as is necessary to:

- 1) the development of defense plans;
 - 2) the training of personnel in the employment of an defense against atomic weapons;
- and
- 3) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons,

while such nation or organization is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security: **Provided, however** [in part], that no such cooperation shall involve communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons except with regard to external characteristics, including size, weight, and shape, yields and effects, and systems employed in the delivery or use thereof but not including any data in these categories unless in the joint judgement of the Commission and the Department of Defense such data will not reveal important information concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear component of an atomic weapon."¹¹ [NCND File]

During the JCAE hearings it was pointed out that information like external characteristics, including size, weight, and shape, yields and effects, and systems employed in the delivery or use thereof, "would permit our military personnel to show our allies an atomic or thermonuclear weapon and describe these external characteristics, also the explosive power in terms of equivalent tons of TNT, the blast effect in terms of square miles destroyed, and the degree of radioactive poisoning of land, water, and air in the vicinity. It would allow disclosure of methods of bomb delivery, whether by plane, artillery devise, guided missile, etc." Moreover, "American personnel would (apparently) be permitted to train allied personnel in attaching or installing such weapons in delivery vehicles or devices But they would not be allowed to instruct our allies as to how the weapons are constructed internally, how they are assembled or

disassembled, or how they are triggered for explosion. It is obvious," said the JCAE report, "that we do not intend to deliver any of these weapons to any military ally for their own use, as complete knowledge of the internal working would be necessary for such use or adjustment in case the weapon failed to 'work' just prior to release."¹² [NCND File]

A Navy briefing later described the Act as being "consistent with, but independent of," Executive Order 12356 of 2 April 1982, and that its protection of information concerning "the design, manufacture or utilization" of nuclear weapons is designated "Restricted Data." Moreover, the DOE is required to strictly limit public access, dissemination and declassification of such data "in such manner as to assure the common defense and security."¹³

According to the briefing, "Restricted Data" relates primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons, it cannot be released to the public unless the DOE and DOD jointly determine "that such data may be published without constituting an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security," or in the absence of agreement, such determination is made by the President.¹⁴

"Formerly Restricted Data", also according to the briefing, is information that the DOE and DOD "jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of [nuclear] weapons [...] and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information" by entrusting it to the care of the Defense Department.¹⁵

Through legislative and executive usage, according to the briefing, "utilization" came to include the location of nuclear weapons. The location of nuclear weapons is thus classified as Formerly Restricted Data.¹⁶

February 1955: Following a conference, HQ USAF Security Service office in San Antonio reported to the Director of Communications, HQ USAF in Washington that the USAF Security Service had been able to pin point the locations of Air Force nuclear weapons storage sites, the movement of nuclear weapons, and approximately the number and types of weapons at certain of the locations by monitoring unclassified messages and analysing special weapons traffic.

As a result the Service recommended communication be amended in order that nuclear weapons information be less readily accessible. Specifically, special address group and routing indicator assignments to special weapons units should be deleted and all messages should outwardly appear to originate from or be addressed to the senior organization on the base.¹⁷ [NCND File]

28 July 1955: An AP story reported that US nuclear forces were being sent to Japan: "The rockets are going to Japan under a heretofore secret agreement with the Japanese government. The Japanese Diet, which adjourns Sunday has not been informed of the move."

A telegram from the US Embassy in Tokyo informed the US Secretary of State that "This trouble-making observation is fortunately balanced somewhat by statements that atomic warheads are, however, not to be brought into Japan."¹⁸ [NAV.DIP.JAPAN File]

December 1957: A NATO meeting in Paris concluded that "the deployment of [nuclear weapons available for the defense of the Alliance] and missiles, and arrangements for their use, will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states

directly concerned."¹⁹ [NCND File]

2 January 1958: Eleven officials from the Administration, Intelligence, Navy, and AEC, met at State Department working out the first details of U.S. policy towards confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons.

"It is the policy of the United States Government concerning any public statements on [foreign government queries about nuclear weapons in their country] neither to confirm nor deny the presence of the nuclear component of nuclear capable weapons in any other country, and that this policy would be followed in the event that U.S. officials are queried with respect to any statement made by an official of a foreign country or by any other source."²⁰ [NCND file]

13 January 1958: Following up on the 2 January meeting, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs initiated the US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.²¹

"In the event that an official of any other country, desiring to make statements about the presence or absence in their country of the nuclear component of nuclear-capable weapons, queries U.S. officials about so doing, U.S. officials should respond that it is the strong desire of the U.S. that such statements be avoided.

The inquiring official should be informed that it is the policy of the United States Government concerning any public statements on this subject neither to confirm nor deny the presence of the nuclear component of nuclear-capable weapons in any other country, and that this policy would be followed in the event that U.S. officials are queried with respect to any statement made by an official of a foreign country or by any other source."²² [NCND file]

14 March 1959: According to an Instruction from the US Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), believed to be the first such regulation, "No authority exists to divulge or confirm the location of nuclear weapons."²³ However, stand-by response is, according to the document, that "In accordance with established policy, the US does not disclose the location of nuclear weapons. It has been repeatedly stated that US strategic bombers, US vessels (and other US forces) have a dual capability (i.e., high explosive and atomic), as do other modern weapons systems with which this country's military forces are equipped."²⁴

In case of incidents or accidents, however, "official confirmation of the presence of such weapons may be made when it will have significant value in conjunction with public safety programs and as a means of reducing widespread public alarm." In this case, plans "should, where feasible, be worked out in advance with the US Ambassador" to the location involved.²⁵ [The instruction includes a standard press release in case of a nuclear weapons accident.]

Still, the instruction warns, release of information in such cases "in no way vitiates the basic policy of seeking to avoid disclosure of the location of nuclear weapons,"²⁶ and "No question, hypothetical or otherwise, will be answered regarding employment of nuclear weapons in a particular situation."²⁷ All in all, "Use of such terms as `atomic' and `nuclear' should be avoided if possible in answering queries."

"That some US weapons systems have already been publicly identified as having nuclear capability," the Instruction states, "does not, in itself, provide authority to divulge or confirm the

location of nuclear weapons, or to release information concerning the details of storage, handling or transportation of nuclear weapons or components."²⁸ If questions about such systems cannot be avoided, "such responses will not infer, speculate regarding, or otherwise disclose, the presence or absence of nuclear warheads or other nuclear components."²⁹

In terms of command, the Instruction stipulates that "any contemplated release involving or inferring such specific information about United States nuclear capability will be referred to CHINFO [Chief of Naval Information], through established military channels, for decision by appropriate authorities."³⁰ And "Guidance in dealing with specific situations not covered by these instructions will be sought from CHINFO."³¹ [NCND File]

27 November 1962: A message from the State Department, presumably to the US Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, stated that, "It is US Government policy to avoid public statements confirming or denying information re location of nuclear weapons." It also advised that "Training aspects [deleted] should be stressed in rebuttal and general statements contained Deptel 67 of 25 August 1961 [deleted] should be helpful."³² [NCND File]

30 November 1963: In response to a JCS memorandum on the U.S. position on nuclear free zones, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara informed the State Department of the implications of the African states implementing the Addis Ababa resolution which calls for a denuclearized Africa and the removal of foreign bases.

"Obviously we could not ignore such a move and the US might find itself in the serious position of being denied nuclear weapons transit rights and being required to certify that our naval vessels do not have nuclear weapons aboard as a prerequisite for diplomatic clearance to visit ports of the area.... This aspect of the problem points up the need to develop at least tacit understanding with certain key African countries not to raise the nuclear question insofar as transit rights and ship visits are concerned."³³ [NCND File]

24 January 1964: In a Circular Note the Ceylonese [Sri Lanka] government reportedly informed foreign countries that warships and aircraft would no longer be given access to the country without prior assurance that they do not carry nuclear weapons and are not "equipped for nuclear warfare."

The government reportedly stated that its reason for taking this step was to oppose further spread of nuclear weapons and to support the creation of "atom free zones."³⁴ [NCND File]

26 March 1964: In response to action taken by the Ceylonese government (see 24 January 1964), a Secret "Joint State-Defense Message" Airgram from Washington reaffirmed to American diplomatic missions, Political Advisers to major military commands, and all American consular posts of US policy:

"It is firm US policy neither to confirm nor deny [the] presence [of] nuclear weapons on board any US warship or aircraft seeking entry [to] foreign ports or airports."

"This policy," according to the Airgram, "based on overriding operational and security considerations, has since 1958 been reaffirmed on several occasions, and remains basic US policy today."

The Airgram explained that, "Recent action of Ceylonese Government in issuing Circular Note of January 24, 1964, to diplomatic missions in Colombo, denying entry to its ports or airports to any foreign ships or aircraft without prior assurance that it is not carrying nuclear weapons and is not 'equipped for nuclear warfare' has again highlighted [the] need for reaffirmation [of] this policy and complete understanding of it."

It noted that the "Stated reason for [the] Ceylonese action is 'to oppose further spread of nuclear weapons and to support creation of atom free zones.'"

The Airgram further informed that the "Ceylonese requirement of assurances on nuclear weapons has already been strongly endorsed by [the] TASS News Agency, and ChiCom PriMin Chou In Lai [sic] joined with Ceylonese Prime Minister in final communique [on] February 29 at [the] end of [his] visit to Ceylon in exhorting other states [to] take similar action."

Moreover, it said: "Last summer Mexican President Lopes Mateon, in announcing Joint Declaration of five LA [Latin American] states on proposed formation of [a] nuclear free zone, stated that it was Mexican policy to deny national territory for transportation of nuclear weapons (although [the] declaration itself [is] silent on transport of nuclear weapons). [The Government of Mexico], however, is not known to have formalized this policy."³⁵ [NCND File]

31 October 1964: Japan formally notified the United States that US nuclear-powered submarines would be permitted to visit Japanese ports.³⁶ Two weeks later, on 12 November 1964, the USS Seadragon (SSN-584) arrived in Sasebo for the first ever visit of a nuclear-powered vessel to Japan. The visit lasted three days.³⁷ Three months later, on 2 February 1965, the Seadragon returned to Sasebo for the second-ever nuclear-powered visit to Japan.³⁸

During a subsequent visit to Sasebo on 6 May 1965 of the USS Swordfish (SSN-579), a radioactivity count 10 to 20 times higher than normal was reportedly taken by Japanese scientists. On 14 May, the Japanese government asked the United States to keep its nuclear-powered ships out of Japan until it could be determined if the Swordfish was responsible for the increase. The US denied the increase was in any way connected with the presence of the Swordfish and dispatched three nuclear experts from Washington to assist in an investigation.³⁹

On 22 October 1965, the US announced that an agreement had been reached with Japan to end a six-months ban on port calls of US nuclear-powered submarines and other atomic ships following the 6 May incident. The agreement included additional safeguards to be taken by US nuclear-powered vessels visiting Japan: The submarine will not discharge reactor coolant intentionally and the US will conduct monitoring tests for radioactivity while visiting Japanese ports.⁴⁰ The first submarine to visit Japan after this latest agreement was the USS Plunger (SSN-595) arriving in Sasebo on 19 December 1965.⁴¹

13 October 1965: "Because of problems that would be created elsewhere by US statement that nuclear weapons are or are not present [in the Panama] Canal Zone," the State Department instructed the Embassy in Panama to "inform FONMIN [foreign ministry] that US can neither confirm nor deny presence nuclear weapons in Canal Zone." The Embassy should "emphasize to FONMIN that US position this question not peculiar to Canal Zone but is long-standing US policy which is strictly adhered to throughout world."

The State Department explained that "US policy based on fact that no country able make

known details its defense arrangements which might be of value to potential enemy."

Specifically, the Embassy was instructed to "emphasize to FONMIN our hope that Assembly and public discussion this matter can be held to minimum," and that "[in] carrying [out] our [defense responsibility for Panama Canal] US must position such forces, material and weapons as are necessary to meet possible threats to Canal at any given time. Embassy should point out to FONMIN that it is Canal itself and its strategic importance which would possibly draw attack and not those defensive forces and weapons which US might have in area."⁴² [NCND File]

3 December 1965: In responding to claims that the Soviet Union had criticized the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan and Korea, the US State Department issued secret press guidance to its Embassies in Tokyo and Seoul:

"It is US policy neither to confirm nor deny presence of US nuclear weapons at specific locations anywhere in [the] world. With regard to Japan, we have made it quite clear that we are abiding by our agreement with [the government of Japan]."⁴³ [NCND File]

22 December 1965: Responding to German press reports about the presence of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) in West Germany, the State Department sent a message to the US Embassy in Bonn saying that the US position would "be guided by established policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in any particular location and not commenting on the operation of any nuclear system."⁴⁴ [NCND File]

24 February 1966: A State Department telegram to the Embassy in Tokyo referred to "confidential arrangements with the United States on the introduction of nuclear weapons under the 1960 Security Treaty."

The telegram reportedly was written in the context of a proposal by the Soviet Prime Minister at the time, Alexei Kosygin, that the nuclear weapons states would assure non-nuclear nations that they would not be attacked as long as they did not acquire or house nuclear weapons.

The US State Department subsequently warned that if Japan accepted the Kosygin proposal, "it was possible that the ambiguity the Government of Japan has accepted on the presence of nuclear weapons on United States vessels in Japanese ports and on transiting United States aircraft might no longer be accepted. This would drastically reduce the utility of United States bases in Japan."⁴⁵ [NCND File]

14 July 1966: During an informal visit of the aircraft carrier USS Randolph (CVS-15) to Copenhagen, Denmark on 14-18 July, the Commander was reported at a press conference to have "replied in accordance with directives regarding location all weapons he could not confirm or deny presence nuclear weapons on Randolph," though he confirmed that "all Navy ships [presumably in the Randolph task force] have capability to carry these weapons."

The press attache at the US Embassy in Copenhagen, however, reportedly "stated there were no weapons aboard Randolph which would violate well-known Danish policy concerning stationing of nuclear weapons."⁴⁶ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

Both the Danish Foreign and Defense Ministries admitted to the Danish press that though

neither of them had received an application from the US to bring nuclear weapons into Copenhagen, the Randolph could carry such weapons without them so knowing. If this was the case, a Foreign Ministry source said, Denmark would regard it as a breach of relations which could cause a diplomatic incident between the two countries. Moreover, the Defense Ministry revealed that there were no specific rules if operational naval units visiting Danish ports could bring nuclear weapons. It was said to be standard practice, however, that nuclear weapons could not come even briefly, and a eventual application to bring them would have been denied, said a Foreign Ministry source.⁴⁷ [DENMARK POL.-1988 File]

A subsequent Secret telegram from the US Embassy in Copenhagen to the US State Department reported that the Danish government had in fact inquired about USS Randolph's armament and that the standard US NCND-reply had been "unsatisfactory" to the Danish government.⁴⁸ [NCND File]

25 July 1966: Ten days after the Randolph incident surfaced, the State Department sent the Copenhagen Embassy a telegram in which it stated: "It is firm USG policy neither to confirm nor deny presence of nuclear weapons aboard US warships. This is the only acceptable response by any US spokesman to questions concerning nuclear armament or cargo of US naval ship, and any press attempts to induce anything beyond this statement should be refused."

Moreover, the State Department hoped Danish authorities would also execute a NCND-like response if asked questions about nuclear weapons on the US ships: "As far as host country spokesmen are concerned, we would hope they would take same line if queried, or some analogous line designed [to] cut off further inquiry cold."⁴⁹ [NCND File]

Although most of the 25 July 1966 telegram is 'Secret' and blacked-out in the FOIA response, another State Department telegram also released under the FOIA and dated 24 April 1967 reveal that the first telegram in fact authorized deviation from the NCND policy in that it "authorized alternative to [the] no confirm - no deny response, namely statement that US naval visits `in no way impinge upon Danish sovereignty or policies.'"⁵⁰ [NCND File]

24 April 1967: The US Embassy in Copenhagen informed the US Secretary of State that a "Danish Foreign Liaison Officer of [the] Ministry of Defense handed [the] US naval attache [a] letter approving five naval visits to Danish ports during June and July [1967]."

Moreover, "In handing over [the] written approval," the Embassy reported, the "Danish Naval Officer emphasized that no repeat no nuclear weapons are permitted either on Danish soil or aboard ships when in Danish territorial waters or harbors and that this has been [the Danish] policy since at least 1961."

The telegram also noted that "With [Danish Ministry of Defense] approval ship visits [are] now unclassified," listing date of first visit to be followed by others.⁵¹ [NCND File]

7 June 1967: During the attack on the Liberty in the Mediterranean, four F-4 Phantom jets were catapulted off the USS America (CV-66), cruising near Crete, in response to a distress signal from the Liberty. On direct order from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the bombers were called back allegedly because they carried only nuclear weapons. After landing again, the nuclear weapons were removed at the planes took off again after being rearmed with

conventional bombs and rocket pods.⁵² [NCND]

29 January 1968: Following the crash of a nuclear armed B-52 strategic bomber near Thule, Greenland, on 21 January 1968, the US State Department reacted to a Danish government statement which "confirms that there are no repeat no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no repeat no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons," by sending a press guide to all NATO capital representations saying:

"United States Government did not associate itself with this statement and will answer all queries concerning it by stating that it is general US policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons. All addressee posts should adhere strictly to this same answer in replying to any question they may be asked."⁵³ [NCND File]

8 February 1968: In reaction to the Thule crash, the Danish parliament passed a resolution "presuming that the Government by endeavoring to procure **absolute guarantees** that no nuclear weapons are store in Greenland and that Greenlandic airspace be maintained as a nuclear weapons free zone, will **secure** that Danish nuclear policy is **maintained** in all parts of the Kingdom and that Danish sovereignty be **respected**."⁵⁴ [NCND File]

1 March 1968: Following the Thule crash in January and reports that the US had abandoned SAC flights with nuclear weapons, the US State Department advised the Embassies in Denmark, England, and Iceland that the US would not identify the source of the reports. Moreover, "For defense reasons, it is our policy neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US aircraft."⁵⁵ [NCND File]

5 March 1968: Further to the Thule crash, the State Department sent the following message to the US Ambassador to Denmark:

The "U.S. Government is unable to identify the source of recent newspaper articles concerning purported discontinuance of Strategic Air Command flights with nuclear weapons aboard. For defense reasons it is our policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US aircraft."⁵⁶ [NCND File]

31 May 1968: Following talks between the US government and the Danish Ambassador to Washington in reaction to the Thule crash, as instructed in Danish parliament resolution of 8 February 1968 (see above), the Danish Foreign Ministry issued a statement which said:

"In the light of the plane crash at Thule, the [Danish] Government instructed our Ambassador in Washington to raise the question of **assurances** that the Danish nuclear policy is maintained with the Government of the United States, as stated in the Parliament resolution of 8 February 1968. During these talks, the Ambassador has confirm Danish nuclear policy as stated in the Parliament resolution, according to which no nuclear weapons can be stored in Greenland or any such weapons be flown through Greenlandic airspace. As announced already, no nuclear weapons are present in Greenland, and no flying over Greenland with such weapons is taking place. The result of the talks in Washington has established accordance between the defense agreement of 1951 and Danish nuclear policy and thus **assurance of international law that this**

policy is respected in Greenland."

The actual content of this "assurance of international law" remains classified to this date.⁵⁷

21 August 1968: Following questions by *New York Times* reporter Niel Sheehan to the Department of Defense about the Thule crash, the State Department issued a response to whether bombers still carried nuclear weapons:

"In line with the US Government's policy either to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons as they related to our operational posture, we are unable to comment on this question."

The State Department also rebuffed questions about what portions of the bombs were found and how much of it. "Because we are discussing nuclear weapons," the answer said, "you will understand that we cannot elaborate for reasons of classification."⁵⁸ [Thule]

Spring 1969: During talks with the newly formed Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler reportedly volunteered the names and countries in which nuclear weapons were stored.

Moreover, additional information was provided by both the Department of State and Defense including the type and location of nuclear weapons in a specific foreign country.⁵⁹ [NCND File]

24 October 1969: Following allegations made in Kyodo about nuclear-armed B-52 bomber flights from Okinawa, Japan, the State Department instructed its Embassy in Tokyo that "In response to further press inquiries we suggest you reaffirm that it has been long standing policy of [the US government] to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons in any particular location. Also we do not discuss the operational activities of our strategic forces."

The State Department authorized deviation, however, from the NCND policy in that the Embassy "may tell the [Japanese government] privately and not for public release that there is no basis for the various assertions made in the Kyodo story. [The High Commissioner or the Chargé d'Affaires] may in confidence so inform Yara if appropriate."⁶⁰ [NCND File]

29 January 1970: The German Magazine *Stern* reported that top secret US Air Force targeting plans included dropping nuclear weapons on West German cities in order to deny facilities to attacking Soviet forces. A guidance to all NATO capitals from the US State Department advised Embassies "not [to] comment on the matter other than to say that they neither confirm nor deny document's authenticity."⁶¹

Even when the Vienna Embassy requested "additional guidance," the State Department maintained that "'neither confirm nor deny document's authenticity,' is extent of our comment this matter regardless nature of inquiry."⁶²

The West German Embassy, however, advised the State Department that a response along the lines that the cited document was not a NATO document and therefore was not the basis for using nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO, was "much better suited to

dealing with German interest in this subject than refusing to confirm or deny authenticity of Stern report."⁶³ [NCND File]

10 February 1970: A State Department telegram to the Bonn Embassy noted in response to West German parliamentary question about the Stern nuclear targeting article, that "guidance contained [in] State [Department telegram] 018170 is classified and cannot be used as basis for reply to parliamentary questions."

Specifically, the "Only public statement authorized at present is that we can neither confirm nor deny authenticity of [the] document."⁶⁴ [NCND File]

September 1970: Two years after the B-52 crash near Thule, Greenland, a book published in Denmark claimed the U.S. -- contradicting statements by the Danish government -- had never given the Danish government assurances even privately that nuclear armed aircraft didn't overfly Greenlandic airspace. According to the author, the U.S. had directly denied to make such a statement, but told the Danish Government that it could say whatever it wanted to say about the accident, but that the U.S. would not deny.⁶⁵ [Hans: Denmark]

21 December 1970: During trips overseas by staff from the Senate Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad to investigate nuclear weapons deployed in foreign countries, "State and Defense Department officials [in every country visited] cooperated fully in answering questions with respect to the presence or absence of United States nuclear weapons."⁶⁶

During trips by the Subcommittee staff to the Mediterranean in spring 1969 and the Far East in Summer 1969, "The Executive Branch agencies cooperated fully in providing such information" [about the deployment of nuclear weapons in foreign countries]. "During those trips the staff had full discussions about those nuclear weapons and visited sites in several countries where these weapons were stored."⁶⁷

"In some countries," the Subcommittee noted, "not all ...[nuclear weapons] information was available at the Ambassadorial level. Even high-ranking military officers in certain countries," it added, "where such weapons were located did not have precise answers." In fact, "the ranking United States Army officer in [Taiwan] country testified he was unaware whether or not nuclear weapons were located there." Overall, "In more than one country, the American Ambassador stated that he professed not to know whether nuclear weapons were there."⁶⁸

"In almost every one of these countries [where US nuclear weapons were deployed]," the Subcommittee described how, "a veil of secrecy hides the presence of these weapons. Nowhere is this veil stronger than in the United States." For example, "during the hearings the Executive Branch refused to cooperate with the Subcommittee in its continuing attempts to have this matter examined in depth."⁶⁹

Because detailed nuclear weapons matters had been openly discussed during the Subcommittee's trips abroad, "It was with great surprise [...] that the Subcommittee found, when it began its hearings, that at the direction of the Executive Branch there was to be no discussion of nuclear weapons overseas."⁷⁰

The Executive Branch reportedly had argued that "this subject is of such high

classification it could not be discussed before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee under any circumstances."⁷¹ The Executive Branch reportedly also had claimed that "the Foreign Relations Committee security facilities were not satisfactory for the storage of such information."⁷²

"Only after many months did the Executive Branch justify its negative position on the grounds that initially such information was only to be transmitted from the Executive Branch to the Legislative Branch through the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.⁷³ Subsequently, the Subcommittee said, "the Executive Branch withdrew from that position and granted a single-day worldwide briefing to the full Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of tactical nuclear weapons abroad. The Executive Branch stipulated, however, that there be only one transcript; and that this one transcript be held by the State Department, and only made available to the Foreign Relations Committee upon specific request."⁷⁴

But the Subcommittee described that prior to its inquiry, "the question of the deployment abroad of nuclear weapons had been discussed in general terms with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in much freer fashion,"⁷⁵ and also referred to earlier Subcommittee reports showing that in the spring of 1969 detailed information had been provided about the location and types of US nuclear weapons in foreign countries.⁷⁶

Consequently, the Subcommittee concluded that "the Executive Branch decided to upgrade the classification of this type of information because it did not wish the Foreign Relations Committee to have information incident to this vital aspect of foreign policy,"⁷⁷ and deemed the Executive Branch's position as "absurd" and "used to cover up questionable policy and practice," describing it as "unconstitutional, and against the best interests of the United States."⁷⁸

Consequently, the Subcommittee advised that "Congress should now face up to the grave implications contained in this development of classification as a means and method of keeping the people and the Congress itself in the dark with respect to important aspects of our foreign policy and the implementation of that policy through military action."⁷⁹

The Subcommittee pointed out that it was clear that "many years had passed since the political implications of the placement of these weapons had been thoroughly considered, if, in fact, they had ever been so considered."⁸⁰ It observed that "Most people here are unaware of the fact that United States tactical nuclear warheads have been and are stationed in countries all around the world, a pattern of deployment which results in arousing deep concern in both the Soviet Union and Communist China."⁸¹

The Subcommittee concluded that "a thorough inquiry on the part of Congress is long overdue in this field," and recommended it "focus on unanswered questions raised by the Subcommittee's inquiries," and "also explore cases where nuclear warheads should properly be withdrawn from countries where their use may now have been overtaken by technology, or where political dangers involved could well make it desirable that the weapons be removed."⁸²
[NCND File]

1970: During House Appropriation Committee hearings the US Navy informed that "The carriers assigned to the 6th Fleet are maintained at a high level of readiness for combat. Even during in-port periods, the combat readiness posture is maintained."

The Navy also provided a complete and unclassified list of the all the attack carriers

assigned to the Sixth Fleet in 1968 and 1969 including when they had been at sea and when and where they had been in port.

The Committee was also provided with a list of SSBN assignments, although these were deleted from the published Committee report.⁸³ [NAV.DIP File]

25 April 1971: *The New York Times* reported a secret agreement had existed for years between Japan and the United States governments, permitting the U.S. temporarily to move nuclear weapons into Japan. The arrangement was referred to as a "transit agreement," allowing U.S. naval vessels, including nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships, to call at Japanese ports while armed with nuclear weapons.

Both the U.S. State Department and the Japanese Embassy in Washington denied the rumors, but Congressional sources said members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were aware of the agreement.⁸⁴ [Nav Dip Japan]

11 July 1971: Following a *Washington Post* story about US nuclear weapons going to Taiwan, the State Department said that the article is "sheer speculations and that we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in specific locations anywhere in the world."⁸⁵ [NCND File]

18 June 1971: In responding to a *New York Times* article on 17 June about nuclear weapons deployment, the State Department sent a press guidance to the Manila Embassy:

"In view of the nature of the subject, we do not believe we can comment on any aspect of the article. It is long standing US policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any location."⁸⁶ [NCND File]

28 October 1971: The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo reported back to Washington that Japanese papers were reporting the U.S. government had told Congress that the U.S. had agreed to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa in accordance with an reversion agreement. The Embassy said it had made no comments, but requested any background information Washington could send.⁸⁷ [Nav Dip Japan]

17 November 1971: Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda reportedly said that the United States had given Japan renewed assurance that no nuclear weapons were stored in Japan. This followed claims by a Socialist Diet member that nuclear weapons were stored at the US Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni.⁸⁸

1971: Australia's McMahon coalition government reportedly banned nuclear-powered vessels from entering Australian ports. There was no apparent US reaction or retaliation.⁸⁹ [Nav Dip Australia]

1972: India reportedly began requesting that nuclear-capable ships do not seek port clearance to Indian ports. However, only aircraft carriers, which Indian authorities assumed carried nuclear weapons at all times are banned outright.⁹⁰

7 March 1974: Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton Halperin told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the neither confirm nor deny policy "developed initially in a period in which nuclear weapons were looked upon with a kind of mysticism as something very different [...] and in which we were not going to talk about where these weapons are. It was a natural outgrowth of that and from fear, as I say, particularly in the Navy but also in other services, that if the word got out there were nuclear weapons in Germany or on Okinawa or other places, you might have a domestic opposition in those countries to the stationing of the weapons which would make it impossible to continue to store them there.

It is a subject which when I was in the Pentagon was not susceptible to review. It was one of those subjects about which it was well understood that the feeling of the military services was such that one opened this subject at one's peril and without any chance of success in changing it."

Halperin said he thought the reason for maintaining the policy "is sensitivity of countries in other parts of the world and the question of the calling of naval ships. I think if one could isolate the European problem that there would be much less opposition on the part of the American military to confirming there were nuclear weapons in European countries which indeed everybody knows and one can easily see these installations as one flies over Western Europe. Certainly the Russians know exactly where they are, having seen them presumably from their satellites, but the fear of the military is if you confirm there are nuclear weapons in Germany, tomorrow the Brazilians will be asking if the ship that is calling at your port has nuclear weapons on it. Once you have breached the line of saying we never confirm or deny anywhere, you must confirm or deny everywhere. And you remember we went to the ludicrous, when we had lost a nuclear weapon in Spain [the 1966 Palomares accident] and the whole world knew we were looking for a nuclear weapons in Spain, of not being able to admit that in fact what we had lost in Spain was a nuclear weapon."

The purpose of the policy, according to Halperin, was "certainly not to keep the Russians or the Chinese guessing. Rather, the policy is aimed at the public in allied countries, and at governments prepared to let the US store nuclear weapons on their soil, or to have ships with nuclear weapons call at their ports; provided that their people do not find out."

"Just take one example which will illustrate this," Halperin added, "which I think is probably the less kept secret of all our nuclear deployment, the deployment of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Everybody in Japan I spoke to, government officials, newspaper-men, or scholars, told me there were nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and I also told them I could neither confirm nor deny that fact. So it was certainly not a secret from them, not a secret from the Russians whose satellites took pictures of storage sites, but it is the case if the United States said publicly on the record there were nuclear weapons on Okinawa, there would have been increasingly domestic opposition in Japan and Okinawa to the stationing of those nuclear weapons. I think that we should not be storing nuclear weapons in countries where there will be domestic opposition if we admit we are storing, but the fact is we do store them. We do have ships with nuclear weapons calling on ports of such countries and as long as that is the case the military will resist confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere."⁹¹ [NCND File]

14 April 1974: US Secretary of Defense James Schlessinger told the Congress that "The 'neither confirm nor deny' policy is based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the guidelines contained therein that specific numbers, yields, and locations of nuclear weapons relates to the military utilization of nuclear weapons, that is, Formerly Restricted Data. This policy has been reviewed in the past and is currently being reexamined within DOD."⁹² [NCND File]

14 April 1974: Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke stated before Congress that:
"[A]s I understand the policy about failing to confirm or deny the presence of tactical nuclear weapons anyplace, it was motivated largely by fears of possible dissident groups in the allied countries, and it really steamed, I think, more from the Navy's apprehension than from any other source. The Navy of course has to have access to foreign bases, and I think they feared possible unrest and something close to rebellion, particularly in Asia, if it were known that the United States was bringing in naval vessels that had nuclear weapons aboard. So I suspect it was more to try to keep peace within allied countries and to avoid dissent there than it was for any other purpose."⁹³ [NCND File]

14 June 1974: An instruction from the Secretary of the Navy repeated the NCND policy.⁹⁴
[NCND File]

30 June 1975: In its annual report to Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated:
"In part, [the NCND] is at the request of the nations where the weapons are deployed, since in most nations the existence of US nuclear weapons within their borders is a difficult internal political issue. Thus they generally have requested that the United States not declassify the fact that US nuclear weapons are located in their specific nation - even though the evidence that they are there is obvious and generally known by their population."⁹⁵ [NCND File]

4 June 1976: The Australian Fraser government reportedly lifted the ban on nuclear powered ship visits, that had been installed by the McMahon government in 1971.⁹⁶ The ban probably was lifted immediately prior to the visit of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) to Tasmania. The government later revealed that a nuclear emergency plan was drawn up by the Labor government for the visit.⁹⁷ [Nav Dip Australia]

16 October 1976: A reported memo from the ammunition ship USS Kiska (AE-35) for 16 October 1976 (Fourth National Referendum in the Philippines since declaration of Martial Law) instructed all personnel that "The words 'Nuclear Weapons' should not even be mentioned ashore."

The memo also reminds crew how "ships have been refused entrance to Japan and required to get underway from Japan because of rumors that Nuclear Weapons were on board and because someone mentioned Nuclear Weapons on liberty one time. There is only one way to avoid trouble in this area," it said, "and that is by NOT TALKING about our cargo at all when you are ashore." In any case, the memo underlined, talking about nuclear weapons "is strictly **FORBIDDEN BY LAW**."⁹⁸ [NCND File]

1978: Presidential Executive Order 12065 concerning classification and release of information requires officials, before classifying information, to show that "identifiable" damage to national security would result from its disclosure. It also enjoined officials to balance the public interest against the need for secrecy, and provided that documents automatically be reviewed for declassification after they were twenty years old.⁹⁹ [NCND File]

April 1979: Prior to ending his assignment as U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Armistead Selden received a telegram from Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke cautioning him in light of the recent accident at Three Mile Island not to make remarks about growing opposition in New Zealand against nuclear powered ship visits:

"We all agree that your departure statement would provide an ideal occasion to establish clearly and authoritatively in New Zealand public record the link that must be made between [nuclear powered warship] visits and the viability of ANZUS.

In recent days, however, we have had to think very seriously about whether your planned remarks would move us closer to this long-term objective or produce a short-term setback because of current world focus on the Three Mile Island incident.

We believe that, at this time, the message we want to deliver about our common security interests is all too likely to be drowned out by the voices of those who would use your speech as a pretext to transfer current levels of concern over nuclear safety...into an attack upon the [New Zealand] government's policy of allowing [nuclear ship] visits."

Richard Holbrooke promised, however, that the United States would look for an opportunity to deliver such a message to New Zealand, "at a point when the fears an emotions generated by the Three Mile Island incident have receded somewhat."¹⁰⁰ [NAV DIP New Zealand]

2 June 1979: A New Zealand government official told *The New York Times*, that the U.S. government had implied that there must be a link between the defense umbrella of ANZUS and New Zealand's cooperation in receiving nuclear powered warship visits, but that this had not yet been made explicit publicly. "Nuclear propulsion is not much of an issue," the official considered. "From a political point of view," he added, "we don't see any real problem."¹⁰¹ [NAV DIP New Zealand]

November 1979: A new Navy document warns against transportation of nuclear weapons on vessels outside ports, stating that "The transfer of nuclear weapons at sea presents one of the most hazardous of all shipboard operations. It contains all the dangers found in conventional ammunition transfer plus the grave consequences of accidental loss or contamination."¹⁰² [NCND File]

1979: Early in the year, New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon reportedly asked the United States to send a nuclear powered warship to New Zealand.¹⁰³ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

1970s: A report in the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* on 28 May 1993, quoted a member of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) describing how environmental concerns had clashed with

the wishes of the Israeli government to have U.S. warships -- including nuclear powered ones -- to visit Israeli ports. Tzvi Kimmel, who was a member of the IAEC Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee in the 1970s, said the Committee decided to monitor the vicinity around the ships, but the government was against that.

"The politicians sent us packing when we tried to press for checks aboard the ships," according to Kimmel, who heads the Committee in 1993. "Even if we had been allowed aboard the ships and had inspected them, it would have made no difference, because the Americans would not have divulged to us any secret technical specifications or safety precautions. Some committee members argued that if we were not allowed to inspect them, the ships should not come, but the politicians decided otherwise."¹⁰⁴ [Nav Dip Israel]

January-March 1980: "Nuclear News" from the Military Airlift Command carried "a reminder from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force: 'The public affairs guidance on neither confirming or denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in any specific location remains valid.' If anybody asks, give them the party line. If they press for more, direct them to the local public affairs officer (PAO)."¹⁰⁵ [NCND File]

Early 1980s: A "Welcome Aboard" crew folder on the U.S. Navy frigate USS Bowen (FF-1079) informed:

"BOWEN is a nuclear-capable ship like most Naval ships. That fact is unclassified. The actual presence of nuclear weapons is highly classified, known only to a few persons. If you are asked by anyone, BOWEN crewmember or visitor, whether we are carrying nuclear weapons, you only proper response is:

'I can neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons.'¹⁰⁶

11 August 1980: US Ambassador to Iceland Richard A. Ericson, Jr., issued a local statement in which he maintained that "US Government policy is in accord with the decision taken by the NATO Heads of Government in 1957 in Paris, wherein it was announced that "the deployment of these stocks (referring to stocks of nuclear warheads available for the defense of the alliance) and missiles, and arrangements for their use, will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned."¹⁰⁷ [NCND File]

18 February 1981: In anticipation of a Stern magazine report the following day about 160 US cruise missiles to be based in West Germany, the US Embassy in Bonn informed the State Department that it "plans to follow the 'neither confirm nor deny' public policy and we request that military public affairs officers do the same."¹⁰⁸ [NCND File]

18 March 1981: The Pentagon told the House Appropriation Committee that the nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile "will be in the NATO countries; yes, sir," and later confirmed that:

"Negotiations with potential host countries to support B-52 staging rights **without** nuclear weapons have been and remain controversial. Forward basing nuclear armed B-52s in other countries other than the United States is much more politically sensitive. Agreements, even

if expedited, would require considerable negotiations, Congressional review and approval and time.

This provides additional warning/reaction time to counter the Soviet threat. [Deleted] severely diminishes warning/reaction and the resultant survivability of that weapon system."

In fact, "The Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) was specifically designed to operate as a theater nuclear weapon system in the European scenario. The GLCM offers the advantage of a cruise missile without the political disadvantage of a B-52 carrier aircraft."¹⁰⁹ [NAV.DIP. File]

June 1981: In response to Australian debate about the overflight of B-52 bombers, the US Embassy Canberra issued a statement in which it stated, that "it remains the policy of this Government neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on particular missions."¹¹⁰

Mindful of the explosive nature of the issue in relation to naval port visits, U.S. diplomats in Tokyo and naval officers at Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii reportedly had been appalled when U.S. Air Force representatives told the Australian Fraser government that B-52s transiting Australia on training missions would not carry nuclear weapons.¹¹¹ [NCND File]

2 November 1981: Following reports of an accident onboard the ballistic missile submarine tender USS Holland (AS-32) in Holy Loch, Scotland, where a nuclear-armed Poseidon missile was dropped and fell for about 17 feet, US Navy officials in London reportedly refused to confirm nor deny if there were nuclear warheads on board the Poseidon submarine.¹¹²

4 November 1981: The U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, reported back to the State Department of a parliamentary debate that had been provoked by nuclear-capable warships visiting Vancouver during a UN-sponsored disarmament week. When asked whether or not the ships were armed with nuclear weapons, Canadian Minister of National Defence Lamontagne replied, according to the Embassy:

"As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the defence policy of the Canadian government is well known. We are against any nuclear weapons whatever they are. We do not like to have them on our land and we do not like to have them on our soil. But if someone comes to our country as a NATO ally, as a friend, and being one of our allies, some of whom are nuclear powers, we rely on them for the best credible deterrents that are possible against war. As such, without saying whether they have or have not nuclear weapons, they are always welcome."

Curiously, when the Embassy's interpretation of the Minister's statement was reported back to Washington, the summary was that "a visit from a friend and NATO ally, with or without nuclear weapons, is welcome."¹¹³ [Nav Dip Canada]

1981: The Hawaii (Big Island) County Council passed an ordinance which banned the introduction of nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons on the island.¹¹⁴ [Nav Dip US]

18 March 1982: The Chief of Naval Operations issues an instruction (OPNAVINST 3128.3P)

with guidelines for US Navy port calls to foreign countries.

According to the instruction, "member nations of NATO have agreed, on the basis of reciprocity, to the use of simplified procedures for arranging clearance for informal and routine visits by ships of NATO navies to their respective member nation ports."¹¹⁵

"When arranging clearance or making notification," the instruction says, "US clearance activities and agencies must *ensure compliance* with the US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board US Navy ships."¹¹⁶

The instruction, which "does not apply to ships involved in special exercises inside foreign waters,"¹¹⁷ stipulates that "All MSC [Military Sealift Command] ship visits and those which require notification only should not be classified unless the nature of the operation or visit is such that classification would be appropriate." For example, the instruction says, "it would be appropriate to classify communication regarding a visit to a country where the visit would be politically sensitive."¹¹⁸ [NAV DIP-US File]

25 May 1982: Following a New Zealand debate over the USS Truxtun (CGN-35) visit to Wellington arguing that "both Norway and Denmark refuse to accept visits by U.S. NPW's, the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen informed the U.S. Embassy in New Zealand (with a CC to U.S. State and Defense) that "The Danish MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] provided us with a copy of a pro-memoria which was also given to the Embassy of New Zealand here." The Danish note read:

"Before a nuclear-powered ship is granted permission to enter a Danish port or Danish internal waters the following documents must be available:

- a. A safety report, approved by the authorities responsible for the vessel, providing a technical description of the nuclear plant onboard the ship which will enable the Danish authorities to evaluate the safety-related standards of the ship;
- b. An emergency plan, approved by the Danish authorities, which specifies what measures to be implemented for the protection of the population in the event of its exposure to radiation, radioactive substances or other nuclear dangers;
- c. A satisfactory liability agreement between the Danish authorities and the authorities responsible for the vessels, which covers such nuclear incidents as might be caused by the vessel and provides for objective liability and a high ceiling on the amount of damage.

As fast as warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons are concerned it has been the constant policy of Danish governments to ban the presence of nuclear weapons on Danish territory in time of peace, including nuclear weapons onboard ships. This policy is well-known to our allies within the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Danish government takes it for granted that warships which visit Danish ports respect this policy."¹¹⁹ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK]

2 April 1982: Presidential Executive Order 12356 "prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information" and provides that "[i]nformation may not be classified under this Order unless disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security."¹²⁰

Section 1.1(a) of the Executive Order requires that "[n]ational security information ... shall be classified" as either "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," depending upon the

degree of threat to the national security. "'National security information' means information that has been determined pursuant to this Order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated."

The Order is subject to provisions in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and provides that "[n]othing in this Oder shall supersede any requirements made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 'Restricted Data' and 'Formerly Restricted Data' shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act."¹²¹

The Order defines that "[i]nformation shall be considered for classification if it concerns:

(1) military plans, weapons or operations;
(2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

...

(6) scientific, technological or economic matters relating to national security;
(7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

... or

(10) other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the president or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by the president..."

The Order also states that "[i]nformation that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in [the above 1-10 points] shall be classified when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security."

Finally, the Order mandates that "[a]gencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information."¹²² [NCND File]

25 May 1982: Following a New Zealand debate over the nuclear powered cruiser USS Truxtun (CGN-35)'s visit to Wellington during which it was claimed that "both Norway and Denmark refuse to accept visits by U.S. NPW's, the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen informed the U.S. Embassy in New Zealand on 25 May 1982 (with a CC to U.S. State and Defense) that this was not correct. "The Danish MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] provided us with a copy of a pro-memoria which was also given to the Embassy of New Zealand here," The embassy said. The Danish Danish note read:

"Before a nuclear-powered ship is granted permission to enter a Danish port or Danish internal waters the following documents must be available:

a. A safety report, approved by the authorities responsible for the vessel, providing a technical description of the nuclear plant onboard the ship which will enable the Danish authorities to evaluate the safety-related standards of the ship;

b. An emergency plan, approved by the Danish authorities, which specifies what measures to be implemented for the protection of the population in the event of its exposure to radiation, radioactive substances or other nuclear dangers;

c: A satisfactory liability agreement between the Danish authorities and the authorities responsible for the vessels, which covers such nuclear incidents as might be caused by the vessel and provides for objective liability and a high ceiling on the amount of damage."¹²³ [Nav Dip Denmark]

11 June 1982: A press guidance to the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia, from the U.S. State Department provided U.S. response to debate over nuclear powered ship visits.

Radio Australia had reported the Premier of the State of Victoria, John Cain, had told the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Robert Brand, that the Victoria government planned to impose a ban on nuclear activity in that state, including a ban on visits by U.S. nuclear powered and nuclear capable warships. Mr. Brand had said he disagreed with the plan.

"We believe this issue is a domestic one," the State Department press guide said, "in which U.S. intervention would be inappropriate. However, quite apart from the present dispute, it should be clear that access to allied ports and airfields for U.S. ships and aircraft is critical to our efforts to maintain a strategic deterrence. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to carry out its responsibilities to assist effectively in the defense of its allies if it is denied the use of their ports."

On the question of why the U.S. refuse to disclose the armament of its warships, the press guide said:

"We do not intend to ease the problem of identification [of nuclear-armament] for any potential hostile power."¹²⁴ [NAV.DIP.AUSTRALIA File]

15 June 1982: The U.S. Embassy in Canberra reported to the U.S. Secretary of State on "heavy coverage" in Australian media over local government debate regarding the policy on visits to Australian ports by nuclear powered and nuclear armed warships.

Labor party leader Hayden was said to oppose nuclear armed ship visits but would allow nuclear powered ships. Deputy leader (and shadow foreign minister) Lionel Bowen was reported to have said Labor policy allowed visits by nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships provided they are not staging operations from Australia. Labor Party President and Premier of New South Wales, Neville Wran, was said to have discouraged visits by nuclear powered ships but would allow other warships to visit NSW ports without inquiring whether they carry nuclear weapons. And Victoria Premier John Cain was reported to be against visits by both nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships.¹²⁵ [Nav Dip Australia]

18 June 1982: In a coordinated State-Defense message, the State Department saluted the Canberra government's initial NCND response to questions by Australian Labor Party Deputy Leader Bowen about nuclear weapons on ships during port calls and further advised (with a copy of the telegram going to US Embassy Madrid):

"US policy is neither to confirm nor deny publicly the presence of nuclear weapons abroad particular ships or aircraft, or their storage in particular locations. You should restate this in responding further to the query."

Further, "On ship visits, you may state that the US has no agreement with any country

which abridges this policy."

Moreover, "If you are pressed for additional information relating to US aircraft, you should restate that the neither confirm nor deny policy applies worldwide to US aircraft, including overflights."¹²⁶ [NCND File]

22 June 1982: In a joint communique with the United States issued at the ANZUS meeting Australia and New Zealand "noted and accepted that it is not the policy of the United States Navy to reveal whether or not its vessels are armed with nuclear weapons."¹²⁷ [NCND File]

28 September 1982: In a message to the US Embassy Oslo, the State Department instructed: "It is longstanding US government policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US Navy ships."

The Oslo Embassy apparently had proposed another answer, but the State Department instructed that "you should not [repeat] not use second sentence in proposed answer para 3."¹²⁸ [NCND File]

27 December 1982: The Department of Energy issued new guidelines for the safeguarding of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI). The Order (DOE 5639.8) was effective until 31 July 1990, when it was replaced with DOE 6530.8A.¹²⁹ [NCND File]

7 February 1983: A new DOD Instruction gives guidelines for a news media release confirming the presence of nuclear weapons in the case of nuclear weapons accidents and incidents.¹³⁰ [NCND File]

January-March 1983: An Air Force publication informed that "the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Thayer, [recently] issued new guidelines for the release of information concerning nuclear accidents and incidents. The new instructions set forth exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. If an accident or incident causes a public safety hazard or public alarm, the on-scene commander should promptly confirm the presence of nuclear weapons, components, or radioactive materials to public authorities."

Moreover, even "If nuclear weapons are not present in the mishap," according to the guidelines, "the on-scene commander can so state. The key words in the new regulation are public hazard/public alarm."

The guidelines, according to the Air Force publication, cautioned that "Information about nuclear accidents or incidents which do not cause a public hazard or undue public alarm must not be released without OASD/PA approval."

In general, "The on-scene commander, as the local expert who knows the territory, must make the determination. The emphasis is on making the decision and getting the word out to the public. The credibility earned will, in many cases, make the job of containment and cleanup much easier."

The guidelines, however, seemingly did only apply to US based forces, since "overseas locations should follow their unified command's guidelines on release of information about

nuclear mishaps."¹³¹ [NCND File]

22 March 1983: The Chief of Naval Operations issued *OPNAV Instruction 3128.10C* on clearance procedures for visits to U.S. ports by foreign naval vessels. Nuclear powered vessels were in a special category, and requests for visits "must be processed by the Chief of Naval Operations on a case-by-case basis." At least 60 days advance notice is required. Entry or extension of visit without clearance specifically does not apply for nuclear powered vessels.¹³² [Nav Dip United States]

June 1983 The Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued new forms for ship and aircraft visits which, in the view of the U.S. Embassy there, "resolved" the long-standing question of nuclear/non-nuclear declaration "in favor of the United States" and "opened the way" for possible resumption of U.S. naval visits to the country. The form only required logistical and technical information about the ship and a declarative statement at the bottom said: "In accordance with its long standing policy the government of the Republic of Seychelles does not desire visits of vessels which are carrying nuclear weapons on board nor by vessels which are powered by nuclear means."

The U.S. embassy noted that the form had "adopted the U.S. suggested language in toto, with only a phrase added at the beginning of the statement." According to the 1983 CINCPAC history, the form no longer required a declaration "nor prejudiced" the neither conform nor deny policy.¹³³ [CINCPAC 83 Hist]

Fall 1983: An Air Force journal reported a revision of AFR [Air Force Regulation] 55-14 (AR [Army Regulation] 95-27/OPNAVINST [Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] 3710.31D) operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials to be underway having received "joint military service coordination" and expected to be published and distributed within "the next few months".

It reportedly "expands the responsibilities of MAJCOM [major command]/Service-level commanders and base commanders" and provides three separate sections pertaining to nuclear, chemical and hazardous biological cargo."

Being aware that "nuclear airlift missions require support that is second only to Presidential and Joint Chief of Staff-directed missions," the base commander are responsible for establishing "a written plan" that requires in part:

* "Priority support [being] provided to aircraft carrying nuclear cargo in accordance with DOD Directive 4540.5." Moreover, "During arrival and departure at airfields under US military control and, when feasible, at civilian or non-US military airfields, this support must include: priority air traffic and ground handling, ground servicing and maintenance, security support, aircrew transportation, and villeting and messing.

...

* A single point of contact [...] as a focal point for information and to facilitate coordination of support concerning nuclear weapon movements. [...]

* Checklists will be established to insure that hazardous cargo information is passed by the base single point of contact to the coordinator and all affected base support agencies."

Moreover, the revised section on nuclear cargo lists the following requirements, in part:

* The Central Point of Contact will "inform the unit that sent the hazardous cargo advisory message of any activities or restrictions which would adversely impact the mission. (Local activities will be rescheduled to avoid conflict with nuclear airlift operations and ground convoys.)"

Specifically, the revision cautions that "Aircraft commanders (including tanker aircraft commanders during air refueling operations of nuclear-laden cargo aircraft) will adhere to restrictions published in the USAF SWOG [Special Weapons Overflight Guide] for overflight of foreign areas with nuclear cargo aboard."¹³⁴ [NAV.DIP. File]

1983: According to US Navy directives applicable to a US nuclear weapon involved in an accident or incident in the Philippines, "official confirmation of the presence of such weapon may be made when it will have significant value in conjunction with public safety or as a means of reducing or preventing wide-spread public alarm."¹³⁵ [NCND File]

January 1984: A secret Joint DOE/DOD Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide describes that information relating to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at specific locations or specific ships with limited exceptions, is classified "Confidential-Formerly Restricted Data." (CFRD)

Likewise, the guide provides generally that information that a specific US location or specific naval ship actually has nuclear weapons is classified "CFRD" (Confidential-Formerly Restricted Data).¹³⁶ [NCND File]

January 1984: Responding to Japanese press reports about US nuclear weapons policy, the State Department instructed the US Embassy Tokyo to pass a letter to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials reiterating that "The details on US nuclear weapons deployed in any one country are closely held on a bilateral basis between then nations involved." Moreover, the letter said, "As you know, the US has always honored, and will continue to honor, its obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements.

All in all, the State Department said, "US policy remains that we can neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons in any particular location."¹³⁷ [NAV DIP Japan]

13 March 1984: The visit of the nuclear capable frigate USS Bronstein (FF-1037) to the Solomon Islands in late February, provoked a shift in the country's policy. Following queries by the Solomons Islands Peace Committee, and several church and union peace activists, the Foreign Minister was reported to have stated that in the future any foreign power whose warships plan to berth there or transit through Solomons' territorial waters will have to give written assurances that the vessels are not nuclear armed or nuclear powered. The Solomon Islands National Union of Workers had refused to provide any labor for the berthing.

The U.S. Embassy in Port Moresby, said no assurances were given during the USS Bronstein visit, but the Solomons government maintained verbal assurances were given by Ambassador Virginia M. Schafer.¹³⁸ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

March 1984: The Maui County Council in Hawaii passed an ordinance that prohibits the introduction, shipment, storage or siting of nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons, and nuclear material within the country. The Mayor subsequently vetoed the decision but the Council overruled this in April.

Although the ordinance was not binding on the U.S. government because of the supremacy clause of the U.S. constitution, Admiral William Crowe complained to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that it was "most distressing when the 'not welcome' sign is hung in Hawaiian ports."¹³⁹ [Nav Dip US]

8 May 1984: According to instructions issued by the US Pacific Command, "confirmation [of the presence of nuclear weapons] will be made promptly when protective actions in the interest of public safety must be taken."¹⁴⁰ [NCND File]

June 29, 1984: In response to the disclosure by the OASD/PA on June 27, that the nuclear version of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile had become operational a few days earlier onboard some U.S. Navy combatants, the American Embassy in Tokyo complained that the announcement had been made without coordination with the Embassy. This made management of public relations "extremely difficult," the Embassy explained, and would have the effect of continuing to draw adverse attention to port calls by U.S. Navy ships, making such port calls the focus of demonstrations and sniping by opposition party Diet members and local officials. The Embassy requested that "any further major announcements – if indeed any are necessary at all – regarding SLCM deployments be coordinated well in advance with the Embassy" in order to better enable it to work with the Japanese to minimize adverse effects on the operations of U.S. forces in Japan.¹⁴¹

10 July 1984: In his quarterly report to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Admiral William Crowe (USCINCPAC) reported that "A termination of all USN ship visits (unless Washington amends its neither confirm nor deny policy) is a central ingredient of the Labour platform. If adopted by the elected government and accepted by Canberra and Washington, such a step would have a far reaching impact on our military alliances in other regions [deleted] and offer anti-nuclear groups worldwide a rallying point and encouragement."

Admiral Crowe recommended that the United States "should decide now what it will do in the event of a Labor victory and be prepared to communicate directly and candidly to the Labour Party leaders its position."¹⁴² [NAV.DIP.NEW ZEALAND File]

27 July 1984: Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 5721.1D was issued to "update regulations concerning release of information about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities if US Forces, in order to implement the policy of the United States Government neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board any ship, station, or aircraft."¹⁴³

According to the Instruction, service men "shall not reveal, purport to reveal, or cause to be revealed any information, rumor, or speculation with respect to the presence or absence or nuclear weapons or components on board any ship, station, or aircraft, either on their own

initiative or in response, direct or indirect, to any inquiry."

It warns that, "The spreading of inaccurate or distorted information with respect to the location of nuclear weapons or components may be as damaging to the United States as revealing of accurate information."

In case of claims or information of nuclear weapons being present, the Instruction states that the non-disclosure of nuclear weapons shall be maintained "without regard to the accuracy of such information, rumor, or speculation, and without regard to the belief of such a member of the naval service as to the accuracy of such information, rumor, or speculation."¹⁴⁴

No "information or assurance" about nuclear weapons is to be provided by members of the naval service except "that it is the policy of the United States Government neither to confirm nor deny."¹⁴⁵

Moreover, "notwithstanding the fact that certain weapons systems have been publicly identified as having a nuclear capability, and notwithstanding any discussion in the press or in other media with respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board any ship, station, or aircraft, or in any general location," the NCND remains in force.¹⁴⁶

If confirmation or denial of onboard nuclear weapons is to be released, it "shall be submitted - via appropriate military channels - to CHINFO for clearance. Such referral," the Instruction states, "does not constitute violation of this instruction."¹⁴⁷

Specifically, the Instruction describes that "in the event of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident [all members of the naval service who are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice] may [...] officially confirm the presence of the weapon or component involved."¹⁴⁸

The above requirements, the Instruction states, are "regulatory and mandatory"¹⁴⁹ but "shall not apply to any disclosures required by higher authority."¹⁵⁰

According to another Navy document, this Instruction is "consistent with and authorized by Section 1.3(d) of the [Presidential] Executive Order [12356] which provides that [i]nformation classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of the identical or similar information."¹⁵¹ [NCND File]

July 1984: A bill was passed in the Hawaii (Big Island) County Council amending the 1981 ban on nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons to specifically exempting the U.S. military from the law.¹⁵² [Nav Dip US]

9 August 1984: In a letter to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, eight members of Congress "strongly urged" a reconsideration of the NCND in relation to homeporting of the Iowa battle group in New York. The letter argued that "Precedents have been set by the US government's acknowledgement that ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles will be deployed in "specific European locations," and that "the public and its elected representatives be fully informed on such serious matters of health and safety."¹⁵³

11 August 1984: The command ship USS La Salle (AGF-3) arrived in Victoria, Seychelles, as only the second U.S. naval visit to that country since port restrictions were eased in 1983. There

had been no visits for five years because of a demand by the Indian Ocean republic's government for a declaration if nuclear weapons were aboard. The local government was reported dropping the ban on nuclear port visits, apparently to help the sagging-tourist-dependent economy. U.S. Ambassador David Fisher said goodwill visits by U.S. warships would probably become more frequent, with another expected in September.¹⁵⁴ [Nav Dip General]

2 October 1984: In his response to a letter from Representative Theodore S. Weiss (NY-D), John Lehman explained that the NCND policy "is an absolute security requirement. In a world increasingly exposed to state-sponsored and fringe group terrorism we cannot risk public advertisement of the specific location of these sensitive weapons." Moreover, Lehman argued, to deviate from the NCND "would only substitute a real threat in place of the totally unsubstantiated danger you purport to alleviate by such disclosure."¹⁵⁵

15 October 1984: The U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece, reported back to Washington, that according to press reports, the Greek government had decided "that visits of NPWS [nuclear powered warships] to Greece would continue and that, since the use of nuclear power for vessel propulsion was increasing internationally, banning such vessels would be impossible."

The message also reported a Greek government spokesman saying that nuclear powered warships "had been entering Greek ports for the past 20 years without the slightest trace of possession having been noted." Greece, however, set three conditions for nuclear powered warships:

1) nuclear powered warships would not enter Greek ports "without a previous inspection by scientists from the 'Democritos' nuclear research center" to guard against leaks of nuclear material;

2) at least three weeks of advance notice, in order to prepare for appropriate measurements would be taken during and after the visit; and

3) that "The governments concerned would have to submit the security measures taken on their vessels."¹⁵⁶ [Naval Nuclear Propulsion]

23 October 1984: The visits of the nuclear-capable destroyers USS Cushing (DD-985) and USS Waddle (DDG-24) to Australia, according to a message from the US Consulate in Sydney, Australia, to US Commander-in-Chief Pacific, "served the important purpose of reminding (and reassuring) Australians that ship visits are an important part of the ANZUS relationship." Domestic reports "included the Commander's correct response ("Neither Confirm Nor Deny") to the ritual question of whether the ship was carrying nuclear weapons."¹⁵⁷ [NAV.DIP.AUSTRALIA File]

6 November 1984: *The Washington Post* reported Egypt had allowed the nuclear powered cruiser USS Arkansas (CGN-41) to transit the Suez Canal the previous weekend. The transit was the first ever transit of a nuclear ship, and was described by one U.S. official as a "breakthrough" for U.S. diplomacy. The cruiser moved from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean to shadow the Soviet conventionally-powered helicopter carrier *Leningrad*.

The USS Arkansas, however, had to transit at night, allegedly because of Egyptian

sensitivity on the issue. No Egyptian statement was made and *The Washington Post* said attempts to obtain comment from the Egyptian Embassy in Washington went unsuccessful. Opposition to nuclear powered ships reportedly had been strongest in the Suez Canal Authority rather than in the government, U.S. officials said. Several U.S. officials, including U.S. Ambassador Nicholas A. Velipetes in a recent cable, had warned that public discussion on the transit could embarrass the Egyptians and set back U.S. efforts to win a permanent policy change. "Right now, we're all very sensitive because they are," one official said. "They've done something nice and we don't want to spill it."¹⁵⁸ [Nav Dip Suez Canal]

1984: A US Defense Nuclear Agency manual dealing with nuclear weapons accidents cites a DOD directive stating that "in general, it is DOD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a specific location. The on-scene commander is authorized to invoke two exceptions. First, confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon is required when public safety is endangered. Second, the on-scene commander may confirm or deny the presence of the weapon, as necessary, to allay public alarm. No other variations from DOD policy are authorized."¹⁵⁹

More specifically, the Manual specifies that "the public must be notified [of the presence of nuclear weapons] immediately in the event their safety of welfare is endangered" by a nuclear weapons accident.¹⁶⁰ [NCND File]

Mid 1980s: A Navy White Paper on Nuclear Weapons Safety stated the reasons for maintaining the Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy: "Our policy has been followed to [a] maximize the military deterrence value of having nuclear weapons deployed by naval components and [b] to prevent potential adversaries from identifying weapons deployment patters for the Fleet. Our policy also [c] contribute to the security of weapons and [d] reduces the potential for release of any classified technical information relating to nuclear weapon design, stowage and handling."¹⁶¹ [USS IOWA]

10 January 1985: In his quarterly report to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, USCINCPAC Admiral Crowe pointed to the "continued concern regarding the New Zealand and Labor Government's policy on NPW/nuclear armed ship access [deleted]."

Specifically, Admiral Crowe reported that the New Zealand government "continues to publicly espouse a policy of denying port access to nuclear armed or powered vessels [deleted]. As you are aware, a number of other countries with nuclear sensitivities, notably Japan, Australia and our NATO allies, are watching closely how we handle this situation. Necessarily....out ultimate objective is unfettered port access while maintaining our NCND policy."¹⁶² [NAV DIP NZ]

31 January 1985: Just prior to the official New Zealand turn down of the 17 January US request for a visit of the destroyer USS Buchanan (DDG-14) to Wellington on 23-27 March, the U.S. formally issued its warning:

In a prepared Press Guidance from the State Department, the U.S. warned that "the denial of port access would be a matter of grave concern which goes to the core of our mutual

obligations as allies. Should the visit of the ship we have requested be denied, we would have to reconsider our participation with New Zealand in the March ANZUS Sea Eagle exercise. More broadly, we would also have to reconsider the implications for our overall cooperation with New Zealand under ANZUS."¹⁶³ [NAV.DIP.NEW ZEALAND File]

4 February 1985: New Zealand formally denies a U.S. request for port call by the nuclear-capable destroyed USS Buchanan (DDG-14).¹⁶⁴ [On Shelve]

14 February 1985: Former Assistant Secretary of State Leslie Gelb, stated in the *New York Times* that "Unless we hold our allies' feet to the fire over ship visits and nuclear deployments, one will run away and then the next."¹⁶⁵ [NCND File]

23 February 1985: In response to New Zealand's ship-ban policy, a US State Department Press Guidance reportedly pointed out "that such a ban goes to the core of effective deterrence capabilities of the ANZUS alliance. Our ability to exercise with New Zealand forces in fulfillment of the ANZUS Treaty obligations is to a very great extent dependent on port access in New Zealand."¹⁶⁶ [NAV.DIP.NEW ZEALAND File]

22 February 1985: The USS Buchanan arrived in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, for a five-days visit. USCINCPAC reported to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that the visit was well received, "and served as a valuable counterpoint to the [government of New Zealand] ship visit policy."¹⁶⁷ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

26 February 1985: The U.S. announced it was cancelling military exercises, orders a sharp reduction in defense and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand because of its refusal to allow the USS Buchanan (DDG-14) access to its ports.¹⁶⁸ [On Shelve]

16 February 1985: The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo reported the Japanese government had rejected parliamentary proposals to question the U.S. about nuclear weapons onboard naval vessels. The government argued that under the Japanese-U.S. defense treaty, only the U.S. could seek prior consultation, and for this to change, the treaty would have to be renegotiated. The proposals had been prompted by New Zealand's stand against nuclear port visits.¹⁶⁹ [Nav Dip Japan]

28 February 1985: A US Defense Nuclear Agency instruction on nuclear weapons accidents listed:

"Exceptions to the Basic [neither confirm nor deny] Policy

Confirm the presence of nuclear weapons when:

1. There is clear danger to public safety
2. There is public alarm

And do it as quickly as possible!"

The material also quoted an unnamed "European Ambassador, 1985" as saying: "What you say, and how you quickly you say it, are crucial to maintaining your credibility in an emergency situation like this."¹⁷⁰ [NAV.DIP.AUSTRALIA File]

8 March 1985: In response to suggestions that Tomahawk cruise missiles should be able to have its nuclear warhead replaced with an interchangeable conventional warhead while at sea, Admiral Steven Hostettler, commander of the Cruise Missile Project, warned that such a capability would come at high cost:

"The current cruise missile is a highly complex vehicle," Hostettler told the Senate in March 1985, "which was not designed for field maintenance. Each missile is thoroughly tested before it leaves the factory and remains intact until it is fired or returned for recertification in 30-36 months. During the period the missile is in the fleet, electronical continuity is maintained. To change a variant from conventional to nuclear or vice versa would require replacement of the entire front one-third of the missile. Nuclear surety requirements would dictate a complete retest of the missile requiring each ship to be outfitted with highly sophisticated test equipment and highly trained technicians to interpret the results. Clearly this is beyond the scope of normal Navy maintenance concepts, and will be performed only at shore-based depots. The capability to modify variants in the fleet is not planned for Tomahawk."¹⁷¹ [NCND File]

22 March 1985: The USS John Young (DD-973) arrived in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, for a two-day visit. USCINCPAC reported to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that the visit was well received, "and served as a valuable counterpoint to the [government of New Zealand] ship visit policy."¹⁷² [Nav Dip South Pacific]

March 1985: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James A. Kelly told the Congress that "it would be unreasonable to expect the United States to ease an adversary's tracking and targeting problem by [dropping the NCND policy] identifying which of our ships have the greatest capability."¹⁷³ [NCND File]

10 April 1985: When asked if U.S. warships scheduled to visit China for the first time would be permitted to carry nuclear weapons, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang hinted Washington had agreed the ships would not be carrying nuclear weapons. Asked if the United States had actually assured China that the ships would be non-nuclear, Hu said:

"That is already understood between China and the United States. There is agreement. As they will enter Chinese territorial waters, that is our sovereignty, so they have to give their consent."¹⁷⁴ [Nav Dip China]

11 April 1985: The U.S. State Department denied Chinese statement that it should have promised not to be carrying nuclear weapons on warships scheduled to visit Shanghai. "We have given no assurances to the Chinese, as reported in the press, that the proposed US ship visit to China would be by non-nuclear armed vessels." Reiterating the general provisions of the policy, the spokesperson said: "No US ship visits can take place anywhere in the world except under this policy." The visit subsequently was cancelled.

One official in Washington, however, told *The Washington Post* that since the port call to Shanghai would be largely ceremonial it was "logical" that the vessels would be conventionally armed.¹⁷⁵ [Nav Dip China]

16 April 1985: The Chinese Embassy in Canberra, Australia, issued a statement saying "U.S. conventionally powered naval vessels may call at a Chinese port on a informal, ceremonial visit." Seen to seek to ease U.S. maneuverability in the light of a controversy over nuclear weapons armed ships visiting China, the message added: "This is a matter solely between China and the United States, and there are questions remaining to be settled between the two sides."¹⁷⁶ [Nav Dip China]

17 April 1985: The Icelandic Foreign Minister recalled that "It was agreed at a 1957 meeting of NATO leaders that nuclear weapons would not be transported to or stored in any NATO country, except with the permission of the country in question".¹⁷⁷ [NCND File]

18 April 1985: Following an Icelandic government statement on 16 April that nuclear-armed ships are banned from entering Iceland, the US State Department issued the following Press Guidance to all European Diplomatic Posts:

"[L]ongstanding US government policy on nuclear weapons overseas remains fully in accord with existing bilateral agreements, in conformity with NATO defense plans, and in agreement with the states directly concerned. There has been no change in US policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard US naval vessels."¹⁷⁸ [NCND File]

18 April 1985: A subsequent telegram from the US Embassy in Reykjavik to the Secretary of State reported that comments made by the Icelandic Foreign Minister on 17 April "clarify that Iceland is expressing the `Norwegian response' on nuclear-armed ship visits."¹⁷⁹ [NCND File]

19 April 1985: In responding to the Icelandic announcement that nuclear-armed warships are barred from entering Icelandic waters, a State Department Press Guidance concluded that, "The difference between these policies [of Iceland and other countries] and those of New Zealand is that only the Government of New Zealand requires the US to violate its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons."¹⁸⁰ [NCND File]

9 July 1985: In his quarterly report to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, CINCPAC pointed to the concern over New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance:

"A worrisome aspect is the increased pressure from left wing members of the Labor Party who are calling for legislative action. While PM Lange continues to delay legislation, this vocal minority could eventually force him to introduce a bill in fulfillment of his previous promises to make his anti-nuclear policy into law. Such legislation would drastically change the nature of the port access situation and incite the [Australian Labor Party] left wing and others to raise a cry for similar legislation in Australia. Such a step would dictate a U.S. counter reaction and we would need to take a hard look at our response. I believe New Zealand's nuclear allergy was a factor in the [People's Republic of China] cancelling our ship visit."¹⁸¹ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

15 July 1985: U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz meets with Australian Foreign Minister Bill

Hayden in a one-day substitute session for the annual ANZUS alliance talks. New Zealand is excluded because of its turn down (4 February) of the USS Buchanan (DDG-14) visit to Auckland.¹⁸² [On Shelve]

17 July 1985: In defending the NCND policy, Secretary of State George Schultz said during a speech at the East-West Center in Hawaii, the US "did not challenge New Zealand's right to choose its own policy."¹⁸³ [NCND File]

23 July 1985: A visit by the US nuclear-powered submarine USS Sea Devil (SSN-664) to Zeebrugge, Belgium, was canceled following anti-nuclear protests, the port authority was reported as saying.¹⁸⁴

Later, Pentagon spokesman Fred S. Hoffman denied that the visit had been canceled because of local anti-nuclear protests. The scheduled visit, he claimed, was canceled for "operational reasons" but refused to specify what they were though a major Soviet exercise reportedly was being conducted in the area at the time.¹⁸⁵ [NAV.DIP. File]

29 July 1985: According to a General Accounting Office report, United States "Navy ships have operated with nuclear weapons capabilities for nearly 30 years. Our review of defense records show that the Navy has had three nuclear weapon accidents. None of these resulted in severe damage to the weapon or release of radioactive material. Further, these accidents did not occur on ships in port or where civilian population or property was endangered."¹⁸⁶ [NCND File]

10 August 1985: *The Toronto Star* reported a port call of the American frigate USS Stark (FFG-31) provoked local debate over the ship's armament and the city's status as a nuclear weapons free zone. Lieutenant Commander Rick Wright of U.S. Navy public affairs was quoted saying that though it was U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons onboard the USS Stark, he admitted the frigate was "capable" of carrying nuclear warheads.

Toronto Mayor Eggelton, who had declared the city a nuclear weapons free zone, said he was convinced there were no nuclear weapons on the ship. "I've spoken with the U.S. consul general's office and with the Canadian ministry of national defense and I don't believe there are any nuclear weapons on board," he said.¹⁸⁷ [Nav Dip Canada]

Fall-Winter 1985: According to an Air Force publication, "a new Nuclear Security Classification Guide for Air Force Nuclear Weapons states that the presence of nuclear weapons at certain SAC bases is not classified. However," the guide says, "the introduction of nuclear weapons (e.g., the transportation/movement in or out) at these bases is classified."

The publication also described how "We've recently experienced two PNAF [Prime Nuclear Airlift Force] mission compromises when the words PNAF, 1A4, and nukes were mentioned together with a specific Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) mission number and location during a conversation on a non-secure phone."

Consequently, the publication said, "As a result of these careless COMSEC violations MAC DOOMS had to cancel both of these missions. Fortunately," it added, "the cargo deadline delivery dates were not critical or the mission impact would have been more severe. But, these

missions had to be recut and rescheduled."

"The bottom line," the publication concludes, "is to use only the SAAM number when discussing nuclear airlift missions on unsecured lines."¹⁸⁸ [NCND File]

17 September 1985: The United Nations General Assembly published a report on the naval arms race which, in part, pointed out:

"While accepting that because a ship is nuclear-weapon-capable it does not necessarily mean that such weapons are on board, the wide availability of tactical nuclear weapons that now appears to exist, and the custom of certain nuclear-weapon States neither to confirm nor deny the presence on board of nuclear weapons, will raise very deep misgivings on the part of non-nuclear weapon States when requested to allow such vessels to pay port visits or enter their territorial waters."

Moreover, in terms of verification of arms control agreements, "significant problems will have to be addressed concerning such aspects [...] the identification of which ships are, or may be, carrying nuclear weapons."¹⁸⁹ [Naval Arms Race File]

19 September 1985: After a meeting in Washington between New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Palmer and US Secretary of State George Schultz, Palmer reportedly told Radio New Zealand that, "The American position is that a process which calls upon the New Zealand authorities to make their own assessment as to whether United States ships are carrying nuclear weapons is not acceptable. In the American view it compromises the purpose of their neither confirm nor deny policy."¹⁹⁰ [NCND File]

27 September 1985: "New Zealand had to face up to the practical implication of an unmodified neither confirm nor deny policy [which] was that at some stage nuclear weapons will be brought into New Zealand," David Lange said in a major speech to the Labor Party's regional council. "This has been the real sticky point," he added that "We have been seeking a formula which will not require the nuclear powers to breach NCND."

"It was clearly not appropriate to put responsibility on to the Captain of a visiting warship," said Lange, "as this would automatically exclude all the vessels of those powers which maintain a neither confirm nor deny policy in respect of weapons, and it is not the Government's wish to do that. The conventionally armed and powered vessels of our allies are welcome here and the law must allow for their admission."

In adopting the proposed legislation, Lange said, "the old defence relationship which allowed nuclear weapons to be brought into New Zealand is at an end."¹⁹¹

27 September 1985: The CINCPAC history remarked on the nuclear port visit issue: "The record should show that there was more traffic through Headquarters USCINCPAC on the ANZUS/ship visit issue than any other subject since the U.S. withdrawal from Southwest Asia in 1975."¹⁹²

12 October 1985: Australian press reported the government had requested the U.S. Navy disperse its port visit to more harbors than those in Western Australia. Defense Minister Beazley

said the request did not necessarily mean there would be an overall reduction in the number of visits to Australia or even to Western Australian ports. He said the reduction in the proportion could be achieved by increasing visits to other ports, and added that nuclear-powered ships could not use the congested Sydney Harbor but "Port Phillip Bay could take the full range of US vessels" including nuclear powered ones.¹⁹³ [Nav Dip Australia]

4 December 1985: An internal Navy briefing paper on the NCND concludes that as a result of the Atomic Energy Act, Presidential Executive Orders, the joint DOE/DOD Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons (1984), and OPNAV Instructions, "it is United States national security policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board any ship, station, or aircraft."

The paper identifies seven reasons for why the NCND is necessary:

- Enhance the deterrence value of having nuclear weapons deployed on ships and aircraft;
- Impede potential adversaries from identifying weapons deployment patterns, and determining distribution and numbers of weapons;
- Withhold from a potential enemy information that could be used against U.S. forces in the event of a conflict;
- Complicate an enemy's tactical problem by forcing all nuclear capable platforms to be treated as if they were fully nuclear armed;
- Contribute to security of weapons especially against terrorist and saboteur threats;
- Reduce potential for release of classified technical information relating to nuclear weapons design, stowage and handling;
- Avoid handing adversaries data of intelligence value which would permit re-channeling [intelligence] resources to other targets.

The paper also states that in case of breach of policy:

- Press reports and other unofficial publications do not constitute disclosures attributable to the Navy or Department of Defense;
- Retired Navy officers, Congressmen and other public officials are not authorized to speak for the Navy or Defense Departments;
- Any disclosure of classified information by such individuals would be in breach of their security agreements, in violation of our national security policy, and would be illegal, unauthorized and not attributable to the Navy or Department of Defense;
- Any authorized disclosures would have no effect on the Navy and Defense Departments' obligation to continue to safeguard such information.
- The NCND rule applies "notwithstanding the fact that certain weapons systems have been publicly identified as having nuclear capability, and notwithstanding any discussion in the press or in other media with respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components onboard any ship, station, or aircraft, or in any general location."

According to the briefing, both the Presidential Executive Order 12356 and OPNAV Instruction 5721.1D "recognize that there can be a valid national security interest in continuing to classify information despite inadvertent or even deliberate security breaches."

One reason for this was "If each security breach were allowed to be viewed as

invalidating the [NCND], this would invite endless pressure to vary the policy elsewhere and could result in presumption that nuclear weapons are present whenever a [NCND] response is given."

The paper finally pointed to "Those very few exceptions [where a decision had been made to bypass the NCND policy], which have been made after very careful deliberation" and warned that they must not be permitted to proliferate.¹⁹⁴ [NCND File]

5 January 1986: The nuclear powered attack submarine USS Portsmouth (SSN-707) sneaked into Suva harbor early in the morning, as the first nuclear ship to visit Fiji after the government reversed a non-nuclear weapons policy in 1984. The U.S. Embassy had issued a brief statement only late night before the arrival, but the Fiji Secretary for Home Affairs said the government had known about the visit for three or four weeks but was on no position to announce it.

This was confirmed by a statement made by Commanding Officer on board the USS Portsmouth, commander Ron Gumbert, who allegedly said the Fiji government was not "at liberty" to give out information about the arrivals of U.S. submarines. The U.S. Embassy later denied Gumbert should have made such a statement.

According to *The New Zealand Herald*, the nuclear ban had been dropped after pressure from the U.S. Ambassador and followed up by offers that will make Fiji the first Pacific Island country to receive direct U.S. aid.

The USS Portsmouth anchored in the quarantine section of the harbor and the government announced no craft was to approach within 200 meters from the submarine. A demonstrations march was denied on the grounds that it would interrupt busy Saturday traffic, although demonstrations reportedly had been allowed at such time before. A police and Fiji Navy cordon was put around the submarine, but several small crafts, including a boat carrying placard-waving protesters, were allowed to approach close to the submarine earlier.

Editorials of both local newspapers sharply criticized the government's failure to announce the visit of such a controversial ship and the short notice of the submarine's arrival.¹⁹⁵ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

13 January 1986: In his quarterly report to U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, USCINCPAC called attention to the anti-nuclear sentiments in the South Pacific. "It is pervasive, deep seated, and emotional," he said and added, "The U.S. must recognize the importance and potential difficulty of this phenomenon."¹⁹⁶ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

January 1986: Stephen Solarz, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee East Asian Subcommittee stated:

"The Japanese constitution prohibits the presence of nuclear-armed ships in their waters. We recognize their constitution and at the same time we maintain a schedule of ship access to their ports which we deem to be compatible with their interests while maintaining our principle of neither confirming nor denying."¹⁹⁷ [NCND File]

8 February 1986: A Chief of Naval Operations Instruction reportedly "directed new procedures for release of nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion related information in response to

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests."¹⁹⁸ According to the Instruction itself, it "amplifies existing procedures for reprocessing and release of nuclear related information under FOIA."

"Currently," the Instruction said, "naval activities are authorized to release information concerning nuclear weapons and propulsion under FOIA, if it does not fall under one of the nine exemptions, without coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations."

"On occasion," however, "information has been released which should not have been. This can happen when a requester has sent similar requests to a number of activities or has submitted numerous requests to the same activity within a short period of time. The uncoordinated release of documents containing nuclear related information can, if compiled, reveal data detrimental to national security.

To correct this situation, the following procedures are effective immediately:

A. All FOIA requests for information concerning nuclear weapons will be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09B) for action within 10 working days and the requester will be informed of this action as required by [SECNAVINST 5720.42C (A change to this instruction reportedly was forthcoming)]. The requested documents and a recommendation to release or withhold will accompany each request.

B. All requests for information concerning naval nuclear propulsion matters will be processed in accordance with existing directives which require notification of the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (OP-OON) who will determine what actions are needed to ensure proper coordination and review."¹⁹⁹ [NCND File]

21 February 1986: The U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen reported back to the U.S. State Department that Danish daily *Land og Folk* carried an article, that said nuclear powered warships would need permission from the Minister of Environment to enter Danish ports.²⁰⁰ [Naval Nuclear Propulsion]

28 March 1986: In his quarterly report to U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet listed his principal concerns to the area. Second only to the Soviet threat, the Commander listed "New Zealand Prime Minister Lange's ship visit policy and his unhelpful discussions of that policy with, for example, Japanese newsmen and the Indonesian Foreign Minister."²⁰¹ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

7 April 1986: China gave the go-ahead to Britain to send two warships to Shanghai in July. The Chinese Foreign Ministry would not say whether China had asked for assurances from the British as to whether the ships would carry nuclear weapons. *The Washington Post* reported it appeared China had sought no such assurances. "We have discussed this matter extensively with the Chinese," British minister of state for defence procurement Norman Lamont told the paper. "They understand our position, we understand their position, and the visits are going ahead."²⁰² [Nav Dip China]

8 April 1986: In a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reportedly stated that in

terms of nuclear deterrence, "the risk to an attacker will evidently be greater if we also possess shorter range nuclear weapons [in addition to strategic nuclear weapons]. Some of these are based on our ships at sea. They are not, of course, on all our ships. Hence it is obviously crucial that we should make it as difficult as possible for a potential enemy to know which ships are involved."

"This," she said, "gives rise to our NCND policy. If we indicated that a particular ship was not carrying nuclear weapons at a particular time, we would help a potential enemy narrow down his choice of targets: hostile forces could build up a precise global picture of which ships should be their priority targets. This would much reduce their deterrent effect," she asserted.

Moreover, "Nor could we agree to other governments making assessment of the nuclear status of a particular ship and acting on that assessment for instance by accepting or declining a visit by that ship. That would be tantamount to telling potential enemies whether it was carrying nuclear weapons."²⁰³ [NCND File]

12 April 1986: A State Department briefing paper for National Security Advisor Adm. John M. Poindexter on New Zealand's nuclear policy, for use by President Reagan during the working visit of Prime Minister Hawke of Australia, 15-18 April 1986, identified that "current ship/air entry criterion appears to compromise 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) by labelling entering ship/aircraft as non-nuclear-armed."²⁰⁴ [NCND File]

15 April 1986: In a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in Wellington, former US Ambassador to New Zealand Paul M. Cleveland stated:

"For reasons of deterrence and operational security we, the British and the French never confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships: such a declaration would make a potential adversary's targeting task easier and could set a precedent that would complicate worldwide port access, that is anti-nuclear movements elsewhere could seize on New Zealand's example to argue for similar law and practice."

The NCND policy also cannot accept others making judgements about ships' nuclear capabilities, Cleveland said, because, "By requiring the [New Zealand] Prime Minister to satisfy himself that a ship has no nuclear explosive devices before admitting it, legislation as now drafted would lead us for the first time in the history of our alliances to an acceptable dilemma: either we would conform to the law and render NCND useless or we must deliberately flout the laws of New Zealand."²⁰⁵ [NCND File]

28 April 1986: The U.S. State Department announces the United States will formally discontinue its military commitment to the 35-year old ANZUS defense agreement if New Zealand enacts legislation barring nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships from entering its ports.²⁰⁶ [On Shelve]

16 May 1986: The U.S. Embassy to Canberra, Australia, reported to the U.S. Secretary of State, that "at least one Australian government minister, in conversations with his American counterparts, has asked the U.S. to gradually scale back ship visit requests." The Australian government officials were reported saying "U.S. warship visits 'stir up the left' and threaten to

jeopardize 'more important aspects' of the U.S.-Australian alliance."

The Embassy said it would respond to press inquiries that it was "unaware of any GOA request to 'gradually scale back visits,'" and say that visits "thus far in 1986 is understandably reduced as a result of the division of the Enterprise carrier battle group to the Mediterranean."²⁰⁷ [Nav Dip Australia]

27 May 1986: According to *Defense Week*, the Australian Labor government was privately discouraging port calls by U.S. warships in order not to "stir up the [political] left" and threaten to jeopardize "more important aspects" of the U.S.-Australian alliance.

U.S. officials told the Australians that they were prepared to accede to the request, although they were concerned about the trend. In 1982, there were 75 port calls to Australian ports; in 1983, 67; in 1984, 61; and in 1985, there were 55.²⁰⁸ [Nav Dip Australia]

29 May 1986: A senior Pentagon official was reported to have told *The Australian* that the United States wanted more ship visits to Australian ports and the South Pacific "if they will accept us". The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard Armitage, was reported to have told *Defense News* that the U.S. would shortly be "reinvigorating our own discussions with Australia" about allowing more warship visits.²⁰⁹ [Nav Dip Australia]

15 June 1986: The arrival of the nuclear-capable destroyer USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) and frigate USS Rathburne (FF-1057) to Sydney, Australia, set off local demonstrations.²¹⁰ [Nav Dip Australia]

27 June 1986: "It is essential from the standpoint of the United States," said Secretary of State George Schultz following a meeting in Manila with NZ Prime Minister Lange, "that the policy of no confirm nor deny the presence -- is something that the Government of New Zealand doesn't feel it can live with, so we part company as friends, but we part company."²¹¹ [NCND File]

27 June 1986: U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz meets in Manila with New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange. Shultz reportedly informs Lange that the U.S. is not terminating ANZUS obligations, but that it is no longer obligated to defend New Zealand.²¹² [On Shelve]

30 June 1986: The New Zealand *Evening Post* reports George Schultz had told David Lange at their Manila meeting, "that being within the [ANZUS] alliance meant that from time to time the reality was that in the run of things, we would have to accept there were going to be vessels with nuclear weapons on board visiting New Zealand."²¹³ [NCND File]

2 July 1986: In response to statements by David Lange in Manila following the meeting with George Shultz on 27 June, the US State Department issued a press briefing reportedly "regretting that the US position had been misconstrued by Lange." It said in part:

"The United States maintains a world-wide policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. Implicit in this policy is a requirement for ambiguity about the nature of the armaments of our ships. It is on this point that the policy of the

Government of New Zealand differs significantly from that of our other allies.

If New Zealand maintains its intention to say no to ships operating under the ambiguity of NCND, or to nuclear-powered ships, then it is not possible for us to send Navy vessels into New Zealand's ports. This vitiates the principal contribution that New Zealand makes to the [ANZUS] Alliance."

The United States, the statement made clear, "understand fully the New Zealand government's position. Unfortunately, the New Zealand government has not yet put forward any proposal to restore normal port access compatible with our global NCND requirements."²¹⁴ [NCND File]

3 July 1986: Western diplomats in Egypt told the *Reuter* news agency that Egypt recently had turned down a U.S. request to allow the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) to sail through the Suez Canal. The accident on the Soviet nuclear power plant at Chernobyl had prompted Egypt to review its transit rules. Heading home from the Indian Ocean, U.S. officials said the USS Enterprise instead had to sail the much longer route around South Africa.

At a coinciding press conference, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger refused to discuss Egypt's motivations for barring the USS Enterprise. Pentagon and State Department spokesmen told *The Washington Post* nuclear ships had passed through the Canal in the past without incident.²¹⁵ [Nav Dip Suez Canal]

10 July 1986: Two Royal Navy warships began a five-day visit to Changhai, China. The visit was the first to China by a nuclear-capable ship. A planned U.S. visit was cancelled in 1985 over the issue of whether the U.S. had assured China the ships were not carrying nuclear weapons. The Chinese declined to say whether they asked assurances from the British as to whether they ships visiting Shanghai would carry nuclear weapons. But *The Washington Post* said it appeared the Chinese had sought no such assurances. Instead, China stated its policy of barring foreign ships with nuclear weapons access, and Britain reiterated its policy that it would neither confirm nor deny. And so, the visit went ahead.²¹⁶ [Nav Dip China]

10 July 1986: Australian Prime Minister Hawke's Labor Party was reported to have defeated an attempt to left wing members to have Australia ban U.S. nuclear warships from its ports. A resolution tabled at the Party's biennial policy-making conference, would have alligned Australia with New Zealand's policy, but Prime Minister's Hawke's dominant right-wing faction of the party defeated the proposal at the conference of 99 delegates on a simple show of hands. No formal vote was made.

Left-wing delegate Joan Coxedge, said an accident on a U.S. nuclear vessel in an Australian port could "make Chernobyl look like a Sunday school picnic." But Foreign Minister Bill Hayden defended the government's policy saying U.S. warships used a different type of reactor from the one at Chernobyl.²¹⁷ [Nav Dip Australia]

15 July 1986: *The Washington Post* reported the U.S. intended to send three nuclear powered warships into the Australian port of Freemantle near Perth, despite the possibility of demonstrations there. The flotilla included the USS Enterprise (CVN-65), USS Arkansas (CGN-

41), and USS Truxtun (CGN-35).

The Reagan administration was said to be trying to keep Australia from catching what diplomats term the "New Zealand disease." Laurence W. Lane, jr., U.S. ambassador to Australia, was quoted saying the U.S. could not heed New Zealand's ban on nuclear ships without encouraging Australia to follow suit. The left wing of Prime Minister Hawke's Labor Party was pressing for a ban on nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships.²¹⁸ [Nav Dip Australia]

16 July 1986: The Chinese Embassy in Canberra, Australia, stated China's official policy regarding nuclear ships visits, saying that it welcomed visits by foreign ships but with the understanding that they do not carry nuclear weapons. "China does not allow port calls by foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons," though apparently no questions would be asked.²¹⁹ [Nav Dip China]

23 July 1986: During a meeting in Edinburgh, Scotland, New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Palmer reportedly portrayed that Denmark's and New Zealand's policies on visits by nuclear powered warships were identical.²²⁰ [Naval Nuclear Propulsion]

24 July 1986: The Danish Embassy in Australia responded to questions from New Zealand about Denmark's policy on nuclear matters:

"Denmark has a policy of not admitting nuclear weapons on Danish territory, including Danish harbours and waters, in times of peace.

Foreign powers are conversant with this policy and Denmark expects it to be respected by ships entering Danish territorial waters.

Nuclear powered- or armed vessels are, however, entitled to harmless passage of Danish international straits.

Under existing Danish legislation, nuclear-powered vessels are not prohibited from making visits to Danish ports. However, such visits are subject to stringent rules concerning i.a. a safety-report, approved by the authorities responsible for the vessel, providing a technical description of the nuclear plant on board the ship, which will enable Danish authorities to evaluate the safety-related standards on the ship, and an emergency plan, approved by Danish authorities which specifies the measures to be implemented for the protection of the population in the event of its exposure to radiation, radiation, radioactive substances or other dangers. Experience has show that countries that have expressed a wish for visits to Danish ports of their nuclear-powered vessels have not in practice felt able to meet the necessary conditions.

Consequently, since the visit of "M/S Savannah" in 1964, no nuclear-powered vessel has visited Danish ports."²²¹ [Nav Dip Denmark]

25 July 1986: The U.S. Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, reiterated the differences between New Zealand and Danish non-nuclear policies. "In light of the Deputy Prime Minister's statements on 23 July in Edinburgh and subsequent media reports, the Embassy wishes yet again to affirm that Danish and New Zealand policies regarding port access vary substantially. Denmark allows ship visits; New Zealand does not."

[Ironically, in essence both of the last two sentences are in error: New Zealand does allow ship visits -- just not nuclear ones; and Denmark does not allow nuclear ship visits -- only non-nuclear ones; while there are differences in the way the two countries enforce their policies, in peacetime their policies with regard to nuclear weapons are the same -- they don't allow them]

The Embassy statement also compared the issue of visits by nuclear powered vessels to the two countries:

"As regards nuclear powered warships, Denmark does not ban them, as does current New Zealand policy and the pending draft legislation. Owing to a lack of operational need and the ready availability of alternate ports in the area, U.S. nuclear powered warships have not visited Danish ports in many years."²²² [Nav Dip Denmark]

28 July 1986: New Zealand press reportedly carried statement made by Danish Foreign Minister in response to question in Danish Parliament that Danish and New Zealand non-nuclear policies were identical.

28 July 1986: "Neither confirm nor deny is a worldwide policy which is universally applied," said US State Department press guidance issued to all European diplomatic posts. "The United States has not made an exception in this policy for port visits to Denmark or any other country."²²³ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

24 August 1986: During a public meeting in New York discussing the homeporting of ships at Staten Island, Captain James Bush (retired), stated: "We carried nuclear weapons to many foreign harbors, sometimes illegally."²²⁴ [NCND File]

24 August 1986: Port visits to Japan by nuclear-capable and nuclear powered warships provoked demonstrations across the country, as protesters accused the U.S. of bringing in nuclear weapons in violation of Japanese policy. "We appreciate the sentiments of the Japanese people with regard to nuclear weapons," said Rear Admiral R. A. K. Taylor, commander of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) battle group. But he added, "We do not discuss the weapons load, conventional or nuclear, that our ships have."²²⁵ [Nav Dip Japan]

28 August 1986: In a speech to the Labor Youth Council, David Lange said that "the United States made a genuine attempt to satisfy the New Zealand's government that they were sending a vessel to New Zealand which at the time it visited New Zealand would not be carrying nuclear weapons" but "[a]s the time for the visit approached, two points became obvious," Lange said.

"The first point was that whatever undertaking the Americans gave in private, whatever information they provided in confidence, in public they would be silent and they would require the New Zealand government to be silent. The New Zealand government would not be allowed to assert that the Buchanan was not armed with nuclear weapons. The vessel would remain cloaked in ambiguity. [...] When the New Zealand government asked the Americans to a ship which was unambiguously free of nuclear weapons," Lange said, "the Americans refused. The Buchanan, whatever its armament was at the time of its visit, was a vessel whose presence would inevitably destroy public confidence in New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy."

"The second point which emerged about the Buchanan was this. The visit of the Buchanan was to be the first in a series of visits which would culminate in visits by ships which were nuclear powered and certainly nuclear armed. That was the American price for the visit of the Buchanan."²²⁶ [NCND File]

29 August 1986: The US State Department reacted strongly to Lange's statements maintaining "there was no departure from [the neither confirm nor deny policy] at any time in the case of the USS Buchanan."

Over the past two years, the State Department added, "the New Zealand government consistently sought to label ships as being nuclear armed or not. This contradicted our NCND policy, which is necessary to avoid providing potential adversaries with valuable intelligence and targeting information."²²⁷ [NAV.DIP.NEW ZEALAND File]

13 September 1986: The U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia, informed the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State of waterside and dockworkers unions preparing to demonstrate against nuclear-capable U.S. and U.K. warships during the upcoming Australian Navy's 75th anniversary celebrations.²²⁸ [Nav Dip Australia]

19 September 1986: An internal U.S. State Department memorandum reported on the Australian Waterside and Dockworkers unions' protesting the "possible entry of nuclear weapons under our neither confirm nor deny policy." The memorandum assured, however, that on this point "the unions are in a distinct minority. The Australian government, local business and civic leaders have been pressuring them to change their position, so far without effect."²²⁹ [Nav Dip Australia]

24 September 1986: Prior to the arrival of the USS Missouri (BB-63) and HMS Ark Royal (R07) to Sydney, Australia, Admiral David Martin of the Australian Support Command said on television:

"Well, inevitably some of these ships will be carrying nuclear weapons."²³⁰

Martin later retracted his remark saying: "I'm not used to being on television early in the morning. I blew it. It was a stupid mistake by someone who should have known better."²³¹ And "Any member of the media who can help me clarify this without getting me any deeper in the ---, I'd be grateful."²³²

In trying to explain Martin's statement, Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley told the Parliament:

"The Rear Admiral has released a press statement through the Department of Defence in which he says that what he intended to say and what he thought he had said was that it was not inevitable that some of the ships would be carrying nuclear weapons..."²³³
[NAV.DIP.AUSTRALIA File]

1 October 1986: Retired Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque told Dagens Nyheter in Sweden that "Not once in my naval career have I heard of nuclear weapons being removed prior to a port visit. We did not even remove the nuclear weapons from the ship when entering Japanese harbors, despite

Japan making the same demand for nuclear weapons freedom as Sweden".²³⁴ [NCND File]

4 October 1986: More than 900 people protested the arrival of the USS Midway (CV-41) to Yokosuka, Japan. The carrier was to be homeported there, at the demonstrators said the USS Midway may be equipped with nuclear weapons.²³⁵ [Nav Dip Japan]

10 October 1986: U.S. officials told *The Washington Post* that the U.S. had settled a controversy with China over the armament on board U.S. Navy warships scheduled to visit Qingdao on 5-11 November. China doesn't allow foreign nuclear weapons on warships visiting its ports, and the United States refuses to reveal whether its ships carry such arms. According to U.S. government officials, the two nations "had agreed to a mutual recognition of the two policies," but declined further explanation.²³⁶ [Nav Dip China]

13 October 1986: In his quarterly report to U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the USCINCPAC in Honolulu reported the recent visit of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) battle group to Sasebo, Yokosuka, and Kure in Japan was the first visits of Tomahawk-capable surface ships to that country. "The visit went better than anticipated," the commander said, "and set a precedent for future visits of similarly capable ships."

USCINCPAC also continued "our earlier discussion" on the U.S. position on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and explained that "My position in favor of the Treaty and its Protocols was based on the reasoning that in wartime, the treaty would have little meaning." CINCPAC added, moreover, that "In peacetime, all our basic operating rights within the theater were protected and signing on would pay handsome dividends in our relations with South Pacific nations." Weinberger disagreed, however, and CINCPAC acknowledged this but recommended "we be in no hurry to announce a position of non-support."²³⁷ [Nav Dip South Pacific]

18 October 1986: Upon arriving in Sydney, Australia, the Commander of the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63), Captain Al Carney, was reported refusing to comment on whether the ship was carrying nuclear weapons. He did, however, admit that the ship had nuclear capability and said:

"There is an agreement between Australia and America that we neither confirm or deny nuclear weapons and I have nothing else to say on this matter." ? [NAV DIP AUSTRALIA]

23 October 1986: In response to reports in *The Kyodo* that two of three U.S. warships scheduled to visit China were capable of carrying nuclear weapons, a Chinese Foreign Ministry Public Affairs spokesman reiterated China's policy, saying foreign warships with nuclear weapons on board are not allowed to call at Chinese ports.²³⁸ [Nav Dip China]

24 October 1986: The Major of the City of Victoria, Canada, Gretchen Brewin, sent the Canadian Prime Minister a letter in which she quoted the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, for stating that there is a "long-standing arrangement ... for submarines carrying nuclear weapons to visit ports, and these submarines are occasionally given the opportunity to dock at Canadian ports."²³⁹ [NAV DIP Canada]

8 November 1986: *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported a scheduled U.S. Navy visit to Qingdao, China, later in the week was expected to proceed, despite disputes over the ships' possible nuclear armament. The Navy refused to discuss the subject, the magazine said, "but apparently has met Chinese objections."²⁴⁰ [Nav Dip China]

15 November 1986: The US Embassy in New Zealand reportedly denied that the United States had given Denmark assurances in 1968 following the B-52 nuclear bomber crash in Greenland, that Danish nuclear policy was being respected. A Danish Member of Parliament disputed this saying that the assurance remained classified in Denmark.²⁴¹ [NCND File]

10 December 1986: In response to questions about U.S. neither confirm nor deny policy and Canadian authorities being informed by the U.S. of logistic movements of nuclear weapons through Canada, the Canadian Ministry of National Defence responded to Project Ploughshares in Ontario, indicating that NCND served *public* purposes:

"Unfortunately, there appears to have been some confusion regarding your area of concern...The naval vessels of Canada's allies may carry nuclear weapons. For security reasons, it is the policy of NATO nuclear powers owning such vessels neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board the vessels. The Canadian Government respects that policy."²⁴² [Nav Dip Canada]

15 December 1986: A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on "Proposed US Policy for Release of Information on the Presence or Absence of Nuclear Weapons and Components," stated that:

"No unified unclassified policy is currently available to US personnel" concerning statements on the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. "Unclassified national policy guidance would provide a more uniform understanding and application of the NCND policy and help prevent the periodical problems that result from inconsistent US responses to queries" about the location of nuclear weapons.

An appendix attached to the memorandum [classified] reportedly provided "a proposed DOD policy concerning the release of information about the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, commonly known as the neither confirm nor deny (NCND) policy. Because the NCND policy affects activities of many Government agencies, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this proposed policy be used as a basis for a coordinated national policy and that it be issued as an Executive order."²⁴³ [NCND File]

16 December 1986: An Australian Senate hearings on safety procedures relating to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ship visits to Australian waters, touched on secrecy and NCND issues:

Ross K. Thomas, Special Adviser, Strategic and International Policy Division, Australian Department of Defence, told what happened when, during the mid-1970s, questions were asked about naval propulsion safety: "By examining information that was held in the Department of Defence we could answer either yes or no, or 'We do not know', in which case we would go to

the United States to ask for the information, some of which it would provide and some of which it would not."²⁴⁴

Thomas also said that, "We have in the past taken this matter up with the United States authorities and received a response from them but, as the precise details of their response were classified by the United States, unfortunately, I cannot indicate in open session what they were."²⁴⁵

Asked about retired US Captain James Bush's claims that the NCND policy could not be justified on the basis of denying information to the Soviet Union and that they already pretty much knew, Thomas responded:

"He was clearly offering a personal viewpoint; it is certainly not the US Government's viewpoint. I accept the validity of the arguments that the US Navy makes for maintaining its policy of neither confirming nor denying."

The Committee Chairman then asked:

"Can you detect if nuclear weapons are on board a ship?" to which Thomas responded: "I think that in some circumstances it might be possible, but we do not go around trying to do so ourselves."²⁴⁶

The Chairman also asked "if a nuclear weapons accident did occur and the neither confirm nor deny policy were maintained, how would this affect [Australian] emergency operations?" In referring to a DoD document Thomas said:

"...in general, it is DOD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a specific location. The on-scene commander is authorized to invoke two exceptions. First, confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons is **required** when public is endangered. Second, the on-scene commander may confirm or deny the presence of the weapon, as necessary, to allay public alarm."

Thomas explained his understanding to be:

"In the event that a major mishap occurred involving, let us say, a fire on a US warship in Australia, I think whether or not weapons were on the vessel would certainly be likely to arouse a degree of public alarm. In that situation we would very quickly be told what was the actual situation."²⁴⁷

Thomas also called attention to two international agreements that Australia had signed; the early notification of nuclear accidents (CENNA) and the convention of assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (CANARE). The latter, according to Thomas, is "relevant to visits by ships that might be carrying nuclear weapons" because its provisions "oblige the visiting government to co-operate with the Australian Government to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences, and to make plain that, unless otherwise agreed, the overall direction and control of the assistance within our territory would be the responsibility of Australia."²⁴⁸

Concerning the difference in sovereignty between a civilian and a military vessel, Thomas speculated that "foreign warships are given a diplomatic clearance to enter. While they comply with the terms of the diplomatic clearance they would have immunity."²⁴⁹

In terms of nuclear-propulsion, Thomas commended, "the United States has, in part of its standard statement of assurances, said that it does not make technical information on the design or operation of nuclear-powered warships available to host governments in connection with port

entry and the United States Government cannot therefore permit the boarding of its nuclear-powered warships for the purpose of obtaining technical information concerning their propulsion plants or operational instructions."²⁵⁰ [NAV.DIP.AUSTRALIA File]

29 December 1986: Secretary of the U.S. Navy John Lehman said the Chinese ports of Qingdao and Shanghai would now become regular ports of call for the Navy. In the future, "whenever battle groups are in the area we'll out in a *pro forma* request" to make a visit. "I would say you'll see a steady flow of ship visits."²⁵¹ [Nav Dip China]

1986: A report from the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs concluded, in part: "There would appear to be considerable interest on the part of many States in the limitation of the deployment of nuclear weapons. Given that the present policies of nuclear weapon States are neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons, one of the major difficulties to be overcome is the matter of identifying which ships, submarines or naval aircraft are carrying nuclear weapons at a particular time."²⁵² [NCND File]

16 February 1987: During a U.S. Congress hearing on the naval nuclear propulsion program, a recent refusal of the Turkish government to let the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) enter the port of Istanbul prompted a debated on foreign reservations towards nuclear powered warships. "We have been dealing with this potential problem for 30 years," Director Naval Nuclear Propulsion Admiral McKee acknowledged.

Admiral McKee described the U.S. problem with the Egyptian government over transit of the Suez Canal, and said:

"The *Enterprise* and *Arkansas* have gone through, but we have had a running argument with the Egyptians for 8 years, starting before I came to Naval Reactors, and it really gets down to the question of accepting our assurances that we will take the same precautions overseas that we do in our own country. Dealing with foreign nuclear sensitivities is getting harder and harder. Chernobyl restarted the clock on the argument with the Egyptians."

In describing his understanding of why Egypt has a problem with nuclear transits of the Canal, Admiral McKee said:

"Part of it is money, pure and simple. They say, we will let you come through if you will pay a premium for nuclear ships and give us money to build hospitals, so in case you have an accident, we can take care of the casualties. The bill gets very, very large."²⁵³ [Nav Dip Suez]

24 February 1987: A Chief of Naval Operation (NAVOP) Instruction outlined regulations and instructions on the subject of "Safeguarding nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion information" in connection with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

The instruction said that "To protect against inadvertent release, strict compliance with [OPNAVINST S5513.9B NOTAL; JOINT DOE-DOD CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (CG-RN-1) NOTAL; OPNAVINST S5513.5A NOTAL; NAVSEAINST C5511.32A NOTAL; OPNAVNOTICE 5510 of 12 Nov 85; and OPNAVINST 5510.1G] is essential to ensure proper classification, control, dissemination, marking and handling of nuclear related information. This," the instruction warned, "is particularly important in the creation of international

documents which are subject to FOIA but may not receive the scrutiny afforded material sent outside the Command."²⁵⁴

Further, "When considering protection for information concerning nuclear weapons or operations, it is especially important to ensure that data which are of no security concern per se are protected when associated with other information which may reveal the location, use, security procedures, reliability, capabilities or other sensitive information concerning nuclear systems or operations. If classification of such compilations is considered appropriate, the provisions of [OPNAVINST 5510.1G on Department of the Navy policies for marking and handling of classified information] require a written explanation to be included with the material. Such information must be included when forwarding material for action as required by [CNO WASHINGTON DC 980055Z FEB 86 NAVOP 016/86 on new procedures for release of nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion related information in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests]."²⁵⁵

Moreover, "For nuclear propulsion matters, requests for information will continue to be processed in accordance with existing directives requiring notification of CNO (OP-OON), who will ensure proper coordination and review."²⁵⁶

Also, "Classification or reclassification of information following receipt of a FOIA request may be accomplished only by an original Top Secret classification authority under conditions prescribed by [OPNAVINST 5510.1G on Department of the Navy policies for marking and handling of classified information]. To ensure this is done correctly and appropriately, complete justification for such action must be forwarded to CNO (OP-09B30) when involving a FOIA request for nuclear related information."²⁵⁷

Finally, "While this message focuses on requests for information under the FOIA owing to its statutorily mandate deadlines and actions, addresses should keep in mind that there are other mechanisms through which material can be solicited, such as discovery proceedings during litigation, which warrant comparable care to ensure no classified or sensitive unclassified information is divulged without proper authority."²⁵⁸ [NCND File]

27 March 1987: In a letter to the organization 'No to Nuclear Weapons' in Oslo, Norway, the Soviet Embassy stated:

"In case of requests, the Soviet Union is ready to tell Norwegian Authorities that there are no nuclear weapons on board Soviet military vessels, when calling in Norwegian ports."²⁵⁹ [NCND File]

7 April 1987: A Navy briefing paper on the NCND first produced 4 December 1985, was released, stating that "Due to the perishability of intelligence information, a security breach at a specific location at a specific time does not vitiate our national security interest in protecting information as to that location at other times."²⁶⁰ [NCND File]

20 April 1987: In a prepared briefing on the NCND policy sent to all diplomatic and consular posts, the US State Department observed that the policy was "often misunderstood or misconstrued" and advised that the prepared message was "precise" and should not be deviated from:

"The United States maintains a longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, including aboard any U.S. military station, ship, vehicle, or aircraft."

In terms of the justification for the NCND, the State Department explained that "This policy, which is common among the western nuclear allies, has as its fundamental purpose the military security of nuclear weapons."

Concerning terrorism, "by neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, those who would threaten the weapons, including terrorists and saboteurs, are denied important information. Potential adversaries therefore find it more difficult to attack U.S. forces effectively."

In terms of foreign powers, "By denying a potential adversary accurate information on our military forces, we complicate his military planning and reduce his chance for a successful attack. The greater the uncertainty an aggressor faces, the greater the risk in preemptive attack, and the more likely deterrence will be sustained."

Moreover, according to the statement, "The western policy of deterrence is based on a strategy of flexible response. By reducing a potential adversary's chances of differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear units, we have greater flexibility in deploying all units and a greater chance of successfully employing them if the need should ever arise."

Consequently, Secretary of State George Schultz wrote, "NCND is thus an essential component of our policy of deterrence."²⁶¹ [NCND File]

9-10 May 1987: Captain James Bush, Center for Defense Information, stated during an interview in Sweden:

"As far as I was concerned, I had a nuclear powered ship that had nuclear missiles onboard and nuclear torpedoes. And that was about the order of safety that accompany those three weapons, or those three potential accident areas.

The training and safety emphasis on the nuclear reactor was extremely high. Admiral Rickover stressed safety as the number one requirement for operating nuclear powered submarines. He realized that were there ever an accident, it would be difficult to bring submarines into ports. So we took all the precautions and we did not take those ships into all ports. As a matter of fact, there was a very small number of ports we could take those ships into.

The second level was the missiles. And in the missile area the training was not nearly as high. In fact, I was often concerned about the lack of safety training amongst our missile people. Specifically, I was concerned about the fact that I would get a weapons officer assigned to my ship who in theory was supposed to be in charge of loading the missiles on the ship, but had never seen -- never seen -- a missile loaded on a ship. Now, in comparison with the engineering plant, by the time I got an engineer he was not only extremely well qualified, he had been through all operations, he had spent his last three months with Admiral Rickover before coming to the ship, and he was prepared to do anything, and I knew that. But now I get a weapons officer in an as equally dangerous area as far as I was concerned, who has never even seen a missile loaded on a ship. And he was supposed to be in charge of it. And I feel that those were the times when the weapons were in the most dangerous position -- when they were being loaded or offloaded from the ship.

I myself...when I heard that I was getting a weapons officer who had never seen a missile loaded but had to be the executive officer in charge of loading missiles...but I was only one captain among many. And the nuclear power program was oriented towards not allowing, quite frankly, an individual captain to have a different say as far as safety was. I mean, safety was a very big thing in the 1960s. Safety came from Admiral Rickover. The ship couldn't vary, you had to do it this way.

Now, I had various safety on my ship to make it better. I'm having my executive officer who had seen many missiles loaded, being in charge of loading missiles rather than allowing my weapons officer to be in charge of loading missiles. But some other captains might not have done the same thing. In fact, they haven't over the years. And from time to time there have been some very closely significant accidents. There was one in Holy Loch where a missile was swinging against the side of the ship tender. The alarms went off everywhere. That missile could very easily have been dropped, could very easily have had the accident we described with a cloud of pollution 2½ miles wide, 28 miles long extending downwind with toxic levels of radiation under that plume. It could easily have happened from that accident when that missile was banging against the side. I as a person, when I look at this, would like to know how well trained was that weapons officer before he was loading those missiles. Now, I know how well trained the chief engineer was. I didn't know how well trained the weapons officer was.

Final thing: the torpedoes. God! I mean, the torpedoes. An old system. A torpedo always looks like a torpedo, always was. So we loaded them the same way we would always load. Nothing new about it. We loaded them by hand, and we offloaded them by hand. We had those little things with little wires. We would stand there padding the torpedoes going down making sure they go down right. And the torpedoes often fell during those loading operations. I mean, I was terrified with reference to those torpedoes. Now the nuclear torpedoes, they have gotten rid of them on the ships.

They no longer carry nuclear torpedoes. They were carrying nuclear torpedoes in my days though, and as far as I was concerned, the safety that surrounded the nuclear torpedoes were totally unsatisfactory; the safety involving the missiles was unsatisfactory; the safety involving the reactor plant was satisfactory."

Concerning nuclear weapons on ships, Captain Bush said "the best I can give you on this is the experience of Admiral LaRoque, Admiral Carroll, and myself at Center for Defense Information. We spent many years at sea. Of my 26 years in the Navy I spent 18 years at sea. I was always on -- mostly always -- on ships that had nuclear weapons. Certainly my missile submarines had nuclear weapons onboard. My last two years in the Navy, I was the operations and readiness officer for the Second Fleet. And almost of those ships had nuclear weapons. Admiral LaRoque, Admiral Carroll, and myself never know of a single instance where the Navy has offloaded nuclear weapons for the purpose of making a port visit. Therefore it is our belief that most of the time when these ships are -- well all of the times, when these ships are deployed in forward areas away from the U.S., they will have nuclear weapons onboard, because we make these ships war-ready when they leave the U.S., and they have a war complement of weapons. They will have nuclear weapons onboard, and they will not be offloaded when they go into port.

Now, that is sort of in space as it were when it comes to submarines, because you can't offload nuclear weapons or any weapons from a submarine at sea. You can't do it. It's

impossible to do. The loading hatch is essentially under water, so if you open the loading hatch you're gonna flood the submarine. There is no procedure existing to offload nuclear weapons for submarines at sea. In port, yes, but not at sea.

Certain areas, like Japan, that have visiting submarines, I think it is very clearly that these submarines have nuclear weapons onboard. Several have deployed from the U.S. with nuclear weapons onboard. Also, in the North Atlantic, here, as I say, when I was the operations officer in the Second Fleet and the Strike Fleet Atlantic, which is the NATO hat of the Second Fleet Commander, we used to have NATO exercises in the fall and every year, and when the exercises were over all of our ships made port visits. We never ever thought about whether they had nuclear weapons on or whether they were the proper weapons for the ports. That wasn't even one of the considerations we made when when we were asking for port visits. We never offloaded a nuclear weapon in order to make a port visit."²⁶² [NCND file]

4 June 1987: The New Zealand Parliament formally approves legislation banning nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships from visiting the country's ports, putting into law government policy adopted near three years earlier causing a political crisis with the United States.²⁶³ [On Shelve]

14 June 1987: The press spokesperson at the US Embassy in New Zealand was reported telling the *Sunday Star*:

"You can attribute this to the United States Embassy. For the conspiracy theorists who postulate there are [nuclear] weapons on them, they [U.S. aircraft landing at Christchurch, New Zealand] are unloaded by Kiwis [New Zealanders]. If there was anything sinister about them, it would have come out years ago."²⁶⁴ [NCND File]

September 1987: A lengthy formulation of the NCND policy was provided in a 1987 US Information Agency publication booklet which stated:

"The United States maintains a longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard any U.S. military station, ship, vehicle, or aircraft (NCND). This policy, which is common among the Western nuclear allies, is a practical one based on genuine national and allied security concerns. As such, it is the result of a complex mix of national and allied interests. One of the most basic of these interests is enhancing deterrence, the strategy of common defense which has been instrumental in preventing major war for over three decades.

Clearly, a basic purpose of the policy is to withhold from a potential enemy information that could be used against U.S. forces in the event of a conflict. By forcing a potential enemy to treat all stations and units as if they were fully nuclear armed, the U.S. can complicate its tactical and strategic problems. By treating all units in the same way, the U.S. enjoys added security for the actual weapons, especially against terrorists or saboteur threats.

The NCND policy originally took shape in the 1950s in order to prevent information related to atomic energy and nuclear weapons from being divulged to the Soviet Union. After the Soviets developed their own nuclear arsenal and the Western Allies adopted the strategy of deterrence, the NCND policy became doubly important. As deterrence came to be understood by both sides, NCND became an integral part of the success of the strategy. Without accurate

intelligence on the specific location of allied nuclear weapons arrayed against it, the Soviet Union could not adopt a strategy of preemptive attack without incurring overwhelming losses.

Successful as NCND has been to date, the basic requirement for its success has not altered from its inception - it requires consistency in application in order to be credible."²⁶⁵
[NCND File]

1987: After initially denying the existing of a list of port visits conducted by the US Navy to foreign ports during 1986, a FOIA appeal including copies of such official lists for previous years eventually prompted the US Chief of Naval Operations Office to admit the existence of a similar document for 1986. The Office, however, stated that this CNO document is "classified under Executive Order 12356 [see 2 April 1982] in the interests of national security." An appeal was denied.²⁶⁶ [NCND File]

1987: The Swedish Parliament instructed that "The Swedish Government shall work internationally for the abandoning by the nuclear weapon powers of the principle of not clearly declaring whether nuclear weapons are present or not when visiting Swedish ports and, if that is not successful, consider other measures for removing the uncertainty now frequently connected to visits by ships of nuclear weapon powers."²⁶⁷ [NCND File]

Early 1988: Following an appeal to the US Information Security Oversight Office (General Service Administration) in late 1987 and early 1988, further enquiries by US Congressman Tom J. Downey (NY-D) reportedly evoked the response that "at one time port visit information was treated as unclassified and routinely released. Unfortunately the instruction which permitted its release was later determined to be in direct conflict with more specific security classification guides that required the information to be classified 'confidential'."²⁶⁸ [NCND File]

Early January 1988: When handing over a leased nuclear powered Charlie class submarine to India, the Indian television reported the submarine was not carrying nuclear weapons.²⁶⁹
[NCND File]

13 April 1988: In a report from the US Embassy in Copenhagen on the Danish port call debate prior to an upcoming vote in Parliament on a controversial resolution, Ambassador Terrence Todman was reported reiterating the main points of the US "objection to any change in the current procedure that undermines or implies an undermining of the NCND policy".²⁷⁰
[NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

14 April 1988: The Danish Parliament adopted a resolution which said: "As the Folketing notes that throughout 30 years it has been Danish policy not to accept nuclear weapons in Danish territory, including in Danish ports, the Government is enjoined to notify visiting warships of this."²⁷¹ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

15 April 1988: In responding to a resolution adopted in the Danish Parliament instructing the government to inform visiting of long-standing Danish non-nuclear policy, the U.S. State

Department "issued at the request of the Danish government,"²⁷² the following statement:

"The United States Government is deeply distressed over the implications for NATO unity and cooperation of the resolution passed April 14 by the Danish Folketing. That resolution requires the Government of Denmark to inform visiting naval vessels specifically of Denmark's policy of not accepting nuclear weapons on Denmark's territory, including harbors. The U.S. has a longstanding policy of neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its ships. This policy is central to the US ability to fulfill its NATO commitments. We are not going to change that.

Implementation of the Folketing resolution approved April 14 in a way which is inconsistent with the US NCND policy would undercut the nuclear deterrence policy on which NATO's security is based. It would have extremely serious consequences for U.S./Danish defense cooperation. This is not only or principally a U.S./Danish issue. It goes to the very heart of the meaning and interlocking nature of our mutual commitments within the NATO alliance. Therefore, the U.S. will wish to review together with the Government of Denmark and its other NATO allies the implications of this development for the NATO alliance and continued defense cooperation with Denmark."²⁷³

At this point, according to the U.S. State Department, the "British, so far, [had] not responded to a Danish request for similar public statement," because British Foreign Minister "Howe intends to talk to [the Danish Foreign Minister] on how [the] Danish Government intends to proceed before considering a public statement."²⁷⁴ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

15 April 1988: In a Press Guidance message the US State Department further explained its concerns with the Danish resolution, saying that the problem wasn't so much the resolution itself, but that "Implementation of the resolution may require procedures that would create the assumption that a visiting ship does not carry nuclear weapons. This assumption would compromise the 'neither confirm-nor-deny' policy."

NOTE, that official Danish government statements, that it has "no reason to assume Danish policy is not being respected", already create the assumption that visiting U.S. ships do not carry nuclear weapons when visiting Danish ports. This, however, has not led the U.S. government to deem Danish non-nuclear policy compromising the NCND policy.

Though the US statement of "deep distress" had been "issued at the request of the Danish Government," (see above) the Press Guidance portrayed independence in U.S. and Danish statements saying that "The [US] Secretary's statement [was not interfering in internal Danish politics but] only expresses our concerns on the issue and the possible implications for NATO unity and cooperation. The same concerns have been expressed by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Denmark."

Furthermore, the Press Guidance repeated the justification for the NCND policy making the following points, in order:

-- "This policy, which is common among the Western nuclear allies, has as its fundamental purpose the military security of nuclear weapons.

-- By neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, those who would threaten the weapons, including terrorists and saboteurs, are denied important information. Potential adversaries therefore find it more difficult to attack U.S. forces

effectively.

-- By denying a potential adversary accurate information on our military forces, we complicate the military planning and reduce his chance for a successful attack. The greater the uncertainty an aggressor faces, the greater the risk in a preemptive attack, and the more likely deterrence will be sustained.

-- The Western policy of deterrence is based on a strategy of flexible response. By reducing a potential adversary's chances of differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear units, we have greater flexibility in deploying all units and a greater chance of successfully employing them if the need should ever arise.

-- NCND is thus an essential component of our policy of deterrence."²⁷⁵
[NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

15 April 1988: In coordinating a NATO response to the Danish resolution, a State Department telegram to all NATO Capitals emphasized: "It is important that public statements from other allies convey [George Shultz's] message (see above) as well."

Therefore, all Embassies were directed "immediately [to] provide host governments with copies of [Shultz's] statement."

In fact, the State Department directly instructed "All [Embassies] except Athens [to] **request that host governments make a similar statement,**" but cautioned that "If in Embassy's judgement, it would be inopportune to make such a request, [the] Embassy should report that fact and await further guidance."²⁷⁶ At a meeting the same day with Prime Minister Thatcher, the US Ambassador "raised with her our concerns over the Danish Folketing's resolution."²⁷⁷

Also on that day, the US Ambassador to Portugal met with Foreign Minister Deus Pinheiro and handed over a copy of the U.S. State Department's statement of concern and "Encouraged the Foreign Minister to make the Government of Portugal's views known to the Danes."²⁷⁸

On 18 April the US Ambassador to Canada conveyed the same concerns to External Affairs Associate Under Secretary Joseph Standford.²⁷⁹ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

Finally, on 20 April, West German Foreign Minister Genscher was reported by the US Embassy Bonn to actually have sent a letter of concern to the Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen:

"The fundamental basis of our Alliance is the obligation of its members to share the risks, burdens and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of our common efforts. These common Alliance positions have made it possible, up to now, to respect the policy of the Danish Government on nuclear weapons questions in time of peace. However, the change in this policy which is now under discussion could have the most serious consequences for common Alliance positions.

In this connection the Federal Government, which in all questions touching on our common security has always laid weight on particularly close coordination with the Danish Government, wishes to make clear its concern over a development which could impinge on the credibility of our deterrence strategy and, in the final analysis, also on our efforts in the field of arms-control and disarmament."

According to the Bonn Embassy, "The Germans plan to circulate the letter in NATO and

[deleted]sive it to the press here in Bonn."²⁸⁰ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

15 April 1988: The US Embassy London reportedly also "suggested that [NATO Secretary General Lord] Carrington made a public statement on the issue and that we would recommend that he convene a NAC [North Atlantic Committee] meeting next week on the Danish resolution and its implications for NATO security."²⁸¹ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

Carrington subsequently approved the following statement:

"If the Folketing resolution were implemented in such a way that it interfered with the longstanding cooperation and interlocking defense interests of the Alliance, this would have extremely serious consequences. We shall therefore be watching events with concern, and will be meeting further on the matter in the coming week."²⁸² [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

19 April 1988: A telegram from the US Embassy Oslo informed the Secretary of State that "[deleted] an April 16 editorial in the Oslo Labor Party paper Arbeiderbladet was sent to Copenhagen [deleted] and was used effectively [deleted]."

The editorial was highly critical of the Danish resolution and "regret the unilateral action taken by the majority in the Danish Folketing." Furthermore, "Unilateral action of this type serves no rational purpose. In Norway it is presumed that foreign ships which visit Norwegian ports know and follow Norwegian rules. Period. This should have been enough also for Denmark. This demands respect for Norwegian nuclear policy at the same time that it gives no vital information to the enemy."²⁸³ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

19 April 1988: Immediately following Danish Prime Minister Schlüter's call for a general election on 10 May, US Ambassador Todman reportedly hosted a lunch.

"[Deleted] in the course of the discussion which followed Schlüter's announcement, the clear message conveyed by the guests was, with elections called, that a period of quiet regarding NATO and Allied comment on the April 14 ship visit resolution would contribute to resolving the problem in the post-election period. In other words, the Danes would be able to reach an agreement themselves if free of any perceived 'outside pressure'. Any strong statements from NATO or the individual Allies would be intentionally misinterpreted as 'pressure' and meddling in internal affairs [deleted]."²⁸⁴ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

19 April 1988: A telegram from the US Embassy Copenhagen to the Secretary of State said that "On the questions of the presence of nuclear weapons in Denmark during crisis in war time, we note that [the Social Democratic Party] defense spokesman clarified to the press on April 16 that 'the resolution [on port visits] should be understood as applying only in peace time."²⁸⁵ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

20 April 1988: A statement during a White House press briefing revealed that its press spokesman apparently had not even been briefed on the Danish situation.

When asked by a journalist to comment on the Danish move, Fitzwater did not even have Schultz's statement in his package and desperately flipped through the papers mumbling, "Denmark, Denmark," replying to laughter that, "Danish means breakfast to me," in a reference

to the Danish pastries that many Americans eat with their morning coffee.²⁸⁶ [DENMARK POL 88 File]

The statement made headlines in Denmark and Fitzwater later apologized after the US Copenhagen Embassy in a telegram to Schultz had suggested that "Mr. Fitzwater might wish to bear in mind the reaction [in Denmark] and use the opportunity to correct any misunderstandings that could result from the first off-hand remarks." Furthermore, fearing Fitzwater's statement might undermine the perception in Denmark of U.S. concern, the Embassy suggested that, "He might also wish to clarify and reiterate the United States' very serious concerns about the April 14 resolution."²⁸⁷ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

26 April 1988: "The subsequent transfer of the NATO's Nuclear Planning Group's meeting (April 26-27) from Kolding, Denmark, to Brussels," the US Embassy Copenhagen reported to the State Department, "the strong concern about the ship visit resolution issued after the [North Atlantic Committee] meeting in Brussels on April 20, and the announcement that [Secretary General] Lord Carrington had postponed his farewell visit to Denmark all assured that the NATO angle stayed on the front pages and on the voters' minds during the first week of the [election] campaign."²⁸⁸ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

27 April 1988: In a guidance telegram to all US Embassies about the Danish election, the State Department said:

"In applying the NCND policy, the US does not provide assurances explicitly or implicitly, that it complies with anti-nuclear policies or prohibitions of host-countries. Implementation of the Folketing resolution [of 14 April 1988] in a manner inconsistent with the NCND policy would make ship visits impossible with extremely serious consequences for US/Danish and cooperation."²⁸⁹ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

29 April 1988: An article in Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende quotes "a centrally placed source in NATO" saying:

"We are talking about a new situation if the matter only concerns the resolution passed by Parliament and does not entail requiring ship commanders to response... NATO can therefore live with the resolution if it is implemented in a manner that does not impact on the Allies' nuclear weapons policy."²⁹⁰ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

30 April 1988: Responding to questions about allegations that nuclear weapons have been brought into Denmark, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke ridiculed the debate and said:

"There is no sense in it. The reactions you are receiving are what you have been asking for. It won't change United States policy, and could not be expected either. The choice the United States is confronted with is either: stay away - or tell untruths. We do not want to do either."

"Your government knows perfectly well that we have brought the [nuclear] weapons in," Warnke said and explained: "You don't change the armament [of a ship] just because of a port visit. What should you do? Place them [the nuclear weapons] on a barge in the meantime? Or

first deliver them in the United States and then collect them again. Of course you don't want to do that."

Asked if that meant the United States has violated the Danish non-nuclear policy which has been in force for 30 years, Warnke stated: "That is correct, and you have accepted it."

Warnke thought it was silly to seek to stress Danish policy: "You have a policy against stationing of nuclear weapons. American warships have no bases in Denmark. This a frivolous matter."²⁹¹

1 May 1988: Former Deputy Commander of the US Sixth Fleet, retired Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, described the origin of the NCND policy:

"In the late '50s and early '60s, when there was still a very radical socialist movement, even including participation with communist party factions, there were inherent difficulties for a conservative government if our warships arrived armed with nuclear weapons. A convenient formulation was concocted that satisfied the needs of the host government. The United States Navy just said that it never confirmed nor denied the presence of the weapons. It dehorned the radical movement, which no longer knew whether they were there or not."²⁹² [DENMARK POL 88 File]

4 May 1988: According to retired Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, "It is required that the ships carry nuclear weapons so that they can demonstrate their readiness. It is highly unlikely that they will be deployed from the USA without nuclear weapons. It is doubtful that they will be sent into areas where there are Soviet submarines without nuclear weapons."

Moreover, Carroll added, "Nuclear weapons are never removed from ships as part of exercises. It only happens in ports. Replenishment ships with ammunition can receive and deliver [at sea], but it is a much too risky procedure when dealing with nuclear weapons."

In fact, the conditions for arrival of a nuclear-capable U.S. Navy ship in a foreign country, according to Carroll, is "based on the neither confirm nor deny policy -- not on the no-to-nuclear weapons policy" of the country involved.²⁹³ [DENMARK POL 88 File]

7 May 1988: At the height of the Danish election, which was provoked on the issue of nuclear port visits, two retired US Navy Admirals, who had both commanded nuclear-capable vessels, told the paper *Land & Folk* that such ships have carried nuclear weapons into foreign ports:

Retired Admiral Gene LaRoque said that, "American warships, which routinely carry nuclear weapons, (don't) remove them when arriving in foreign ports, including Japanese and New Zealand. [...] As you may know, an American warship which is described as nuclear-capable routinely has nuclear weapons onboard."²⁹⁴

"The experience we had in the Navy," added former ballistic missile submarine commander James Bush, "was that if a ship was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, it carried them. And we did not have knowledge of a single case where a ship offloaded these weapons to enter a port. So the conclusion here is without doubt, that any ship which is nuclear-capable and enters your ports, undoubtable has nuclear weapons onboard."²⁹⁵ [DENMARK POL 88 File]

10 May 1988: An anonymous Western diplomat was quoted saying about the non-nuclear

resolution passed by the Danish Parliament:

"We will not accept an implicit condition for visiting a port if that condition, even by implication, undermines the NCND policy."

Emphasizing that he was choosing his words carefully, the diplomat continued:

"If there is a de facto condition implied, if there is a letter to a ship's captain stating the policy of non-nuclear weapons, even without an answer required, if that letter would imply a condition which the act of visiting would convey acceptance of, then we would not make the visit."²⁹⁶ [DENMARK 1988 ELECTION File]

22 May 1988: A letter in the *Guardian Weekly* airmail edition from US serviceman, T. Konola, reportedly recently stationed at Thule air base confirmed that there were no nuclear weapons at the base now and that "the nuclear bomber forces pulled out at Thule some years ago."²⁹⁷ [NCND File]

31 May 1988: On the Danish situation, the US Embassy Copenhagen informed George Schultz that it had "informed Defense Minister Collet at an informal gathering on May 27 that the US does not intend to submit requests or conduct visits until the ship visit policy issue is resolved."²⁹⁸

Embassy said Danish media reported Schlüter putting forward a "policy basis" which would include: "The rules for visits by foreign naval vessels to Danish ports should be based on the Danish policy against nuclear weapons in peacetime and should be formulated in a way that is consistent with the views of Denmark's Allies."²⁹⁹

The Embassy predicted that "Schlüter's solution to the issue will probably involve conveying the Danish position on nuclear weapons along the lines of his April proposal." At any rate, the Embassy informed, it would "stress to [the Danish Prime Minister] that, if he cannot avoid a change from present policy, and change must not constitute a challenge to NCND and should, at any rate, be discussed with the Allies in advance."³⁰⁰ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

1 June 1988: The Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlson, said in his speech to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament about the neither confirm nor deny policy:

"[I]t causes the increasing and legitimate concern of public opinion when nuclear capable ships call at ports. The secrecy traditionally surrounding the deployment of nuclear weapons at sea does not build confidence. On the contrary, it is confidence blocking. Therefore the nuclear weapon powers should abandon their outdated policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time."

Moreover, "In Sweden we do not permit visiting warships to carry nuclear arms and we will work internationally for a new policy where assurances against such visits would be given."³⁰¹ [NCND File]

7 June 1988: Following the general election, Danish Prime Minister Schlüter explained in Parliament that:

"It is the intention in the individual [port call] clearances, which as previously will be

forwarded by Danish authorities to the particular country's diplomatic representation, to include the following: 'It is assumed, that the visit of vessels takes place in accordance with the rules laid down by the Danish government.'³⁰² [DENMARK POL 88 File]

Though the word "nuclear" does not appear in the port clearance letter, it did appear in the "circular note" the government sent to all foreign diplomatic representations the same day.³⁰³ [DENMARK POL 88 File]

"Against the background of the debate concerning visits in Danish ports by foreign warships the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to draw the attention to the well-known fact that it is Danish policy not under the present circumstances, i.e. in peacetime, to accept nuclear weapons on Danish territory, including Danish ports.

...
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests that the contents of this circular note be communicated to appropriate national authorities."

The Prime Minister explained to the Parliament that, "In the opinion of the government this procedure respects the Danish policy of nuclear weapons freedom as well as the views of our allies."³⁰⁴ [NAV DIP DENMARK File]

7 June 1988: Following the Danish election and Danish government statements, the US State Department spokesman made the following statement:

"We have noted the June 7 statement in Parliament by Prime Minister Paul Schlüter on the question of ship visits to Denmark.

We have also noted the related statement by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen that 'the Danish Government considers that this procedure respects the policy of our Allies neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on their naval vessels.'

After reviewing these two statements, and after consultations with the Government of Denmark and with key Allies, we have concluded that the Danish handling of the ship visit issue does not infringe upon the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US naval vessels."

All in all it concluded that "the situation has been worked out in a way that is satisfactory to all concerned. The US policy on NCND has not been changed." And since "The Danish Government is not challenging the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons onboard naval vessels, US naval visits can continue their visits to Denmark under long-established procedures."³⁰⁵ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

9 June 1988: Upon receiving a "circular note" from the Danish government on 8 June reiterating Danish non-nuclear policy, the State Department instructed its Copenhagen Embassy to forward a response to the Danish Foreign Ministry.

Though referring to the circular note, however, the response avoided addressing the main point in the note; that Danish policy does not allow nuclear weapons on its territory -- including ports. Instead it referred the Ministry's attention to the previous statement made by the State Department on 7 June (see above).³⁰⁶ [NAV.DIP.DENMARK File]

Consequently, in its response to the Danish government, the United States never responded to Denmark reiterating that nuclear weapons are not allowed in its ports but only to it

accepting the neither confirm nor deny policy.

17 June 1988: In responding to the Philippine Senate passing a bill by an overwhelming majority prohibiting nuclear weapons and nuclear powered ships from the Philippines, US Secretary of State, George Schultz, warned:

"If a friendly country such as the Philippines should pass legislation or take some action that says, as New Zealand did, that a ship that might have a nuclear weapon on it is not welcome, then we have to part company."

Schultz said the United States would not change its NCND policy which is an "essential ingredient" of the U.S. deterrence strategy and said the Philippines would have to recognize that "those who benefit from freedom and democracy" must "realize they have to take part in defending it. Deploying ships with nuclear weapons was an "essential ingredient" in the U.S. deterrence of war, he added.³⁰⁷ [NAV.DIP. File]

16 June 1988: The Irish Minister of State, Mr. Calleary, indirectly told the Irish Parliament that Irish procedures for clearing foreign ships for port visits seemingly conflict with the NCND policy:

"On receipt of an application the Department [of Foreign Affairs] have consultations with the appropriate Irish authorities to **ensure** that the conditions [i.e. Irish policy], which, as I have said, have been conveyed in clear terms to those countries which propose visits by their naval vessels to Irish ports, are **respected**". He added that the granting of clearance to visit Ireland is "dependent" upon the visitor respecting Irish policy.³⁰⁸

Moreover, according to the Irish Foreign Minister, "The Government take steps to ensure that these requirements are met and, accordingly, permission has not been granted for any such visits",³⁰⁹ strongly hinting that the Government has had information about ships carrying nuclear weapons.

But "Senators will appreciate", the Minister of State added, "that it is not the practice to disclose details of these consultations [...] or of the verification procedures employed in reaching decisions in individual cases."³¹⁰ Still, the Foreign Minister maintained, "Strict controls already exist in relation to [...] visits to Irish ports by foreign naval vessels."³¹¹

In case of aircraft overflights, the Foreign Minister later explained, foreign countries "must provide information such as identification numbers and aircraft types and must state whether the aircraft comply with certain conditions, the most important of which are that they are unarmed, carry no arms, ammunition or intelligence-gathering equipment and do not form part of military exercises or operations."³¹²

Consequently, in the three-year period October 1985 - October 1988, the Minister revealed, "ten requests for authorization for overflights by military aircraft were refused, because they did not meet the condition [set by Ireland] for overflights."³¹³ [Greenpeace 1990 report]

30 July 1988: Australian press reported a secret report on the effects of a nuclear accident involving a nuclear powered ship in the port of Darwin could endanger the entire Darwin district. Disclosure of the report prompted Darwin port union to meet to discuss bans on visits by all nuclear nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships from Darwin harbor. A spokesman for

the local Chief Minister Marshall Perron said the government had no comment to make, but Perron appealed to the dock workers not to shut down the harbor during an upcoming visit by the USS Berkley (DDG-15).³¹⁴ [Nav Dip Australia]

30 July 1988: Following leak of a secret nuclear emergency plan, Australian Senator Irina Dunn told *The Canberra Times* of a near accident in 1981 in Fremantle, Australia, when a nuclear powered submarine "was buffeted on to rocks and only rescued by a tug which answered another tug's call for help when it couldn't reach the sub. It happened seven years ago, but until now it's only been on the books. What's the point of having the plans if they're kept secret from the very people who ought to know of them," Dunn said.³¹⁵ [Nav Dip Australia]

17 August 1988: Scheduled visit to Melbourne, Australia, by nuclear-capable warships provoked local anxiety over the threat posed by potential nuclear weapons accidents. The United Firefighters Union stated the city was unprepared for an accident.³¹⁶ [Nav Dip Australia]

7 September 1988: The arrival of the nuclear-capable frigate USS Brewton (FF-1086) to Albany, Australia, provoked anti-nuclear demonstrations. After the crew had responded by hosing down the demonstrators, the Western Australian Senator for Nuclear Disarmament, Jo Vallentine, came onboard the USS Brewton to meet with the ship's commander to ask for an apology. Commander Kraig Kennedy, however, responded "absolutely not," and said he would take the same action should the situation arise again. Senator Vallentin labelled the Navy's actions "totally unacceptable," and said she would raise the issue with the Australian Defense Minister and ask him what steps could be taken to protect people making democratic and peaceful protests.³¹⁷ [Nav Dip Australia]

7 September 1988: The Tasmanian government agreed to publish a brochure on plans "in the unlikely event of an accident involving a nuclear-powered warship in Tasmania."

The move had been provoked by the scheduled visit in October of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) and HMS Edinburgh (D97) to Hobart, Tasmania. Members of parliament had obtained information under the Freedom of Information Act showing the U.S. Navy had experienced 381 nuclear weapons accidents and incidents between 1965 and 1977, and challenged the local authorities to make any emergency plans public.³¹⁸ [Nav Dip Australia]

10 September 1988: The arrival of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) to Fremantle, Australia, created local demonstrations against nuclear weapons. A survey of 1,300 people showed that while 67 percent favored Australian being a member of the ANZUS alliance, 73 opposed nuclear weapons in Australia.³¹⁹ [Nav Dip Australia]

17 September 1988: *The Courier Mail* reported the nuclear-capable destroyer USS Ingersoll (DD-990) had been denied tug-boat assistance for its arrival in Newcastle, Australia. The Fireman and Deckhands Union said it had been the union's policy for 10 years not to accompany nuclear armed vessels into the port. Without tug help, the spokesperson said it was questionable whether the USS Ingersoll would be able to enter the port in the rough seas.³²⁰ [Nav Dip

Australia]

20 September 1988: The scheduled visit of the nuclear-capable frigate USS Brewton (FF-1086) to Burnie, Australia, prompted the formation of a local anti-nuclear organization. The group said it demanded that local State and Federal Government state publicly the safety procedures set down to protect the health and safety of local people from a nuclear weapons accident.³²¹ [Nav Dip Australia]

27 September 1988: The arrival of several nuclear-capable warships in Sydney Harbor in Australia sparked numerous local anti-nuclear demonstrations with protesters attempting to block the ships from berthing.³²² [Nav Dip Australia]

September 1988: The visit of USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) to Fremantle, Australia, provoked questions about safety in case of a nuclear accident. *The Sunday Times* interviewed the Pentagon, and was told by Lieutenant Brian Cullin:

"We have a lot of people calling us from different navy ports around the country asking what they should do in the event of such a crisis...

The navy has its own contingency plans for handling such a crisis but we cannot give out any information that relates to nuclear weapons and vessels. It's ironic but that is navy policy. It is primarily for security reasons, of course."³²³ [Nav Dip Australia]

12 October 1988: HMS Ark Royal (R07) and RFA Fort Grange (A385) were unable to dock at Melbourne, Australia, due to a Seamen's Union ban on tug services. Also, the USS Ingersoll (DD-990) was protested but managed to dock.³²⁴

Commander Joe Franck of the Ingersoll was reported in the press to be "quite open" about the nuclear weapons the Ingersoll is capable of carrying, though he "sticks unflinchingly to the official US Government line that 'we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board our ships'."

Still, the press reported: "Commander Joe Frank readily reels off the list of defensive and offensive weapons, which include Tomahawk missiles. The missiles came in capsules, and may be located on each side of the ship's forecabin area, he said. There were three different types - one anti-ship, one designated for land attacks, and one nuclear."

Frank said he had previously invited anti-nuclear protesters aboard his ship but "concedes that given the official veto on commenting on the presence of nuclear weapons, the protesters will 'probably not' change their views [about us], even after an inspection of the ship."

In terms of security, the press said Frank seemed "embarrassed about the tight security the Victorian Police and Port of Melbourne Authority have mounted over public visits to the warship in Melbourne.

'It is the tightest security we've experienced in Australia,'" he was reported saying. He also was reported saying that "the demonstrators he has met in Australia have been very courteous and had posed no security threat to the ship.

'My only real concern has been for their safety when they have come close to the stern because the screws extend beyond the ship and they could be sucked under,' he said."³²⁵ [NAV

DIP AUSTRALIA File]

18 October 1988: The Australian government intervened in the nuclear port visit dispute. Prime Minister Hawke told the parliament the Seamen's Union ban on tug-service to nuclear warships had been the result of a misunderstanding and the acting State secretary of the Union later confirmed the ban had been imposed following "a mix-up" in the union. The government intervention happened shortly before British Navy ships with Royal passengers were expected to arrive in Adelaide, thus avoiding an international incident. The ban had angered British defense chiefs which reportedly had begun a review of Britain's military cooperation with Australia.³²⁶
[Nav Dip Australia]

1988: In his book *Command of the Seas* former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman described the political value of keeping the presence of nuclear weapons secret: "One could not help noting with irony that while at the same time NATO was paralyzed with debate over deployment of the ground-launched versions to England, the Netherlands, and Italy, the battleship *New Jersey* came right into the Mediterranean and stayed for many months, loaded with the very same missile, and received not a single comment. Today we have submarines cruising all over the world with the Tomahawk, creating absolutely no political problem. We have destroyers and cruisers deployed globally in their routine pattern with the Tomahawk aboard, again without any political fuss."³²⁷ [NCND File]

March 1989: The city of Kobe, Japan, reportedly celebrated its 14-year practice of requiring foreign warships to declare themselves nuclear free before calling at the port. Since 1975, the city has relayed this request through Japanese Foreign Ministry, and while the Japanese government itself had been loath to challenge visiting warships, it has dutifully passed on Kobe's request to foreign powers.³²⁸ [Nav Dip Japan]

12 April 1989: In a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Dunedin Branch, Paul M. Cleveland, former U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand spoke of the acceptance of the neither confirm nor deny policy:

"The NCND policy is in turn firmly supported as essential to nuclear deterrence by leaders in both [U.S.] political parties and by an absolute majority of Americans." Though ships with no nuclear weapons are not barred from entering New Zealand's ports, Cleveland stated that the policy "has been carefully constructed and applied worldwide *to protect our Navy's port access* and strategic maneuverability, and the policy has been successful."

Moreover, according to Cleveland: "Despite occasional New Zealand news media reports to the contrary, no other ally has abridged our and the British and the French NCND policies; all our allies support it. On the other hand, major neutral nations like China, Sweden, India, and Yugoslavia, plus smaller ones like the South Pacific Island nations have adapted to it and regularly admit our ships on an NCND basis."³²⁹ [NCND File]

27 April 1989: In a response to Greenpeace Germany about a scheduled visit to Kiel of two nuclear-capable Soviet ships (a Sovremenny and a Krivak II), the Soviet Bonn Embassy stated

in part:

"I would like to inform you that both ships have no nuclear weapons on board and are not nuclear propelled."³³⁰ [NCND File]

May 1989: A Greenpeace report on the loss of a nuclear bomb from the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga (CV-19) while enroute to Japan in 1965 provoked excessive press reports in Japan. The issue fueled speculations that Japan's nuclear weapons free legislation had been routinely breached by the United States. Former crew members of the USS Ticonderoga said the ship had other nuclear weapons on board when it reached Japan.

In response to the reports the U.S. provided the Japanese government with information about the accident. According to a U.S. State Department memorandum, the Japanese was "very appreciative for the added information and has stressed the importance of strictly maintaining NCND."³³¹ [NAV DIP JAPAN]

Japanese law requires prior consultation with the Japanese government by the United States if nuclear weapons are to be introduced into Japan. Unable to refute the fact that the USS Ticonderoga visited Japan following the accident -- and presumably carried other nuclear weapons as well unless the one lost at sea was the only nuclear weapons on board -- Japanese officials stated to the press, according to a U.S. State Department Report, that "since there were no consultations called for by the U.S., the [government of Japan's] view is that there was no introduction of nuclear weapons."³³² [NAV DIP JAPAN]

26 May 1989: Following a Greenpeace release of information relating to the collision and subsequent fire on two nuclear armed vessels in the Mediterranean in 1975, the U.S. Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, released a statement "Pentagon Rejects Greenpeace 'Nuclear Accident' Claim." The statement reiterated the Navy's point that it had never had an incident in which there was a nuclear hazard to the population, and argued that since nuclear weapons were not damaged in the fire, the collision could not be characterized as a nuclear weapons accident. The message, however, refused to confirm or deny if the ships had carried nuclear weapons, as documented by Greenpeace.³³³ [NCND File]

30 May 1989: The U.S. Navy denied a Greenpeace report that it had covered up a reactor leak in one of its submarine. The accident was not listed in the submarines log book. "We did not try to cover anything up. Everything about this incident was properly reported through Navy channels."

But the commander of the submarine at the time, Willis S. Rich, told *The New York Times* that had he noticed there was nothing in the log about the accident, he would have told the navigator to add the information. "It was a minor mishap," he said, "Nobody was injured, but it was a primary coolant leak and you can't take that lightly."³³⁴ [NCND]

May 1989: The United Nations Disarmament Commission meeting referred for the first time to the NCND policy in its reporting documentation reflecting the suggestion:

"...by several delegates that the current practice of nuclear weapon States of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons onboard any particular ship at any

particular time should be abandoned."³³⁵ [NCND File]

May 1989: During a meeting between Greenpeace Germany and the naval attache at the Soviet Bonn Embassy about a scheduled visit to Kiel of two nuclear-capable ships the attache said:

"You are right, normally these ships do carry these weapons. But it is our policy not to bring these weapons with us when we visit foreign ports."

Asked when the nuclear weapons were removed the attache replied that "You can imagine that it's a major procedure to remove the warheads. You can be sure we don't just throw them overboard. But I can't tell you whether we remove them one or two weeks or even earlier before the visit."

The attache also confirmed that a Greenpeace action against Soviet nuclear-capable ships in the Mediterranean had been reported in the military paper "Red Star", "And you were right - these ships do carry nuclear weapons."³³⁶ [NCND File]

6 July 1989: The former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V. P. Karpov, was reported saying that "We suggest that the whole cycle, starting with production up to deployment on surface ships or submarines, would be controlled. In principle, our Navy is prepared to open their ships for inspections. There will be no problem."³³⁷

29 July 1989: Carl Ford, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was reported in the New Zealand Herald as saying:

"The Pentagon objects in particular to a protocol in the [South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone] Treaty barring the permanent stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment of nuclear arms in the Treaty area. We may have no intention of ever doing that, but we don't want to confirm it."

Ford reportedly also called the Treaty's language on nuclear weapons deployment "so restrictive and so much of a precedent that it becomes a slippery slope that could lead to compromising our NCND policy."³³⁸ [NCND File]

2 August 1989: In a letter to Greenpeace, the US Navy stated that "[t]he U.S. maintains a longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, including aboard any U.S. military station, ship, vehicle or aircraft. This policy which is common within the Western alliance, has as its fundamental purpose the military security of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, U.S. Navy policy is not to discuss the weapons carried on board its warships."

Furthermore, the Navy said, "Consistent with these policies, the U.S. does not discuss nor inquire about weapons carried on foreign warships visiting U.S. ports."³³⁹ [NCND File]

August 1989: The New Zealand Embassies of four nuclear powers were asked to supply detailed statements about each of their NCND policies, its origin, justification, and why it is still in operation since there appear to be good reasons why countries might consider abandoning them, in peacetime at least, relating to safety, confidence building, and naval arms control.

The United States Counsellor for Public Affairs, W. J. A. Barnes, reportedly referred to

the September 1987 USIS publication (see above) and suggested that "some research in American Center libraries might be rewarding".

The Soviet Union Ambassador to New Zealand, Y. Sokolov, replied that "our own position, especially on the implication of such a policy, has not been clarified in detail so far. The Soviet Union has once officially declared its preparedness to abandon it provided that the USA does the same."

The Acting British High Commissioner, S. I. Soutar, stated only that, "It is a global policy the purpose of which is to ensure that any potentially hostile power should have no help in identifying which of our ships should be selected as priority targets." The Commissioner added that though his reply "was certainly brief. It was also comprehensive."

The Press Secretary of the French Embassy replied that "they have no documentation as such on the point asked, but it seems to be contained implicitly in France's conception of nuclear dissuasion."³⁴⁰ [NCND File]

1 September 1989: During the visit of the STANAVFORLANT to Oslo, Norway in early September, the Commander of the group, Admiral Klaus-Dieter-Laudien, West German Navy, reportedly said:

"I can say it as it is: There are no nuclear weapons on board any of the ships in the fleet."

The STANAVFORLANT visit included the nuclear-capable destroyers USS Mahan (DDG-42) and HMS Edinburgh (D97).³⁴¹ [NCND File]

16 September 1989: The visit of the frigate USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG-60) to Nagasaki, Japan, provoked demonstrations by 1945 nuclear bombing survivors, who reportedly objected to the ship possibly carrying nuclear weapons. The visit was the first to Nagasaki since the city decided in 1974 not to allow port calls by navy vessels from countries that possess nuclear weapons.³⁴² [Nav Dip Japan]

24 October 1989: The Mayor of Nagasaki, Japan, was reported to have apologized to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan for the incident on 16 September, where nuclear weapons protesters had disrupted a memorial ceremony by crew from a visiting U.S. warships because the ship's possible nuclear armament. The Mayor said the Ambassador had understood the situation but declined to comment when asked to clarify that U.S. warships visiting Nakasaki do not carry nuclear weapons.³⁴³ [Nav Dip Japan]

28 October 1989: The Congress of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions agree that foreign warships and aircraft arriving at Norwegian ports and airfields must declare whether or not they have nuclear weapons with them. The decision signaled a break with Norwegian government practice which does not demand assurances about nuclear weapons, and went against the recommendations of the chairman and the secretariat.³⁴⁴ [Nav Dip Norway]

3 November 1989: Prior to the Soviet-US Summit onboard two nuclear-capable Lt. Cdr. Ken Satterfield, a Pentagon spokesman, was reported telling the *Chicago Tribune* that if any questions come up about the presence of nuclear weapons onboard the U.S. ship, the standard

NCND policy will be issued. "There have never been any exceptions to this policy," he said.³⁴⁵
[NCND File]

29 December 1989: The Japanese Foreign Ministry reportedly said it had decided not to press for more explanations about a nuclear weapon lost from a U.S. aircraft carrier in 1965 enroute to Yokosuka in Japan. It had made the decision following U.S. Department of Defense claims that further queries on the accident could endanger U.S. military policy.³⁴⁶

1989: A United States disarmament negotiator who visited New Zealand in 1989 reportedly said that he suspected that nuclear weapons went into Danish ports on United States warships sometimes, that the Danish government knew this and that they wanted things to stay that way.³⁴⁷ [NCND File]

January 1990: An article in *Proceedings* about the NCND commended:

"Whatever the tough stand against New Zealand might have accomplished, it certainly has not prevented the spread of antinuclear movements. Challenges to the NCND policy have grown intensively. Perhaps more than at any other time in the policy's 30-year history, convincing evidence suggests that it is time to reexamine the unaltered adherence to NCND by the United States."³⁴⁸ [NCND File]

21 July 1990: During a visit to Trinidad of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), the ship was criticized by unions to pose an unacceptable threat to the country's environment in case of an accident.

The island's External Affairs Minister, Sahadeo Basdeo, reportedly dismissed the charges saying that he "had received assurances from the United States government that there would be no adverse effect to the area."³⁴⁹

31 July 1990: A new Order from the Department of Energy established guidelines for safeguarding of naval nuclear propulsion information. The purpose of DOE 5630.8A was "To promulgate the official definition of naval nuclear propulsion information (NNPI), to outline disclosure policies and general safeguarding requirements for such information, and to establish requirements for disposal of material which contains NNPI."

The new Order replaced the previous Order from December 1982 (DOE 5630.8), and covered all aspects of the nuclear propulsion program, including all departments, contractors, subcontractors, and consultants in connection with the program. "Since the naval nuclear propulsion program and naval nuclear-powered ships are of critical importance to the defense of the United States," DOE reminded, "the technology used to design, build, and support these ships is an obvious target for hostile intelligence organizations." The Order defined naval nuclear propulsion information as:

"information, classified or unclassified, concerning the design, arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair, of the propulsion plants of nuclear powered ships and prototypes, including the associated nuclear support facilities. Information concerning equipment, components, or technology which

are applicable to both Naval Nuclear and conventional propulsion plants is not considered to be NNPI when used in reference to conventional applications only, provided no association with naval nuclear propulsion can be directly identified from the information in question. In cases where an association with naval nuclear propulsion can be directly identified from the information in question, designation of the information as NNPI is mandatory. More specific guidance on what constitutes NNPI will be provided on a case basis by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors, or delegate, upon request by those Departmental Elements requiring it to properly and effectively implement the provisions of this Order."

No document containing NNPI, or the information therein, can be made without the advance approval of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors.³⁵⁰ [NCND File]

4 September 1990: At a public hearing in Sweden, Eugene J. Carroll, former Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and Chief of U.S. Military Operations in Europe and the Middle East, said about the origin of the NCND policy:

"Recall that in the 1950s as the U.S. Navy received its earliest tactical nuclear weapons it regularly visited a number of friendly and allied nations with conservative governments. These governments were often under pressure from large, radical political elements including active Communist Parties. For all of the obvious reasons we wanted to maintain strong military relationships with these conservative governments without stimulating opposition by the radical elements. In order to eliminate one major incitement, the presence of nuclear weapons was concealed with the NCND policy. Our closest friends and allies happily accepted this decision as a clever way to disarm the radical opposition.

Thus, the original purpose of the NCND policy was political -- not military. One senior civilian official of the Department of Defense who later became a critic of NCND said it was a means 'to keep things secret in a democratic society for the purpose of preventing a debate in another democratic society.'"

Carroll added, however: "I should not leave you with any impression that in the beginning NCND was an insidious U.S. plot to deceive anybody. It was a political action in the mutual interests of all participating parties, a tactical agreement between consenting adults.

Now things have changed. All parties are not consenting. Not everyone is behaving like adults. New Zealand has formally rejected ship visits under NCND and Iceland and Denmark have made it clear that **NCND is not a license to bring nuclear weapons into their ports.**"

Carroll also said he believed the NCND actually weakened deterrence because it casts doubt on the nuclear readiness of U.S. Navy ships. He believed that "any nuclear capable ship in attack range of Soviet forces or territory at the outbreak of war would be a first priority target at H-Hour regardless of whether or not the ship had declared nuclear weapons on board at its last port call."

NCND did also not seriously complicate Soviet counter-measures since the Soviets "has always known which U.S. warships are nuclear capable, the types of weapons carried, and even the approximate number of weapons. They are aware of weapon deployment policy and certainly have the intelligence collection capability to monitor deployment practices."

Carroll also rejected the claim that NCND was needed to counter terrorist actions against nuclear-armed warships: "Warships are inherently strong in terms of defense. Nuclear weapons

are stored under continuous armed guard. The magazines are equipped with sensitive intruder defense systems. The weapons are stored in unarmed and unarmable conditions so that no intruder could create a nuclear explosion."

"In short," Carroll concluded, "the U.S. shift to claim that NCND is essential for military security reasons is simply an effort to justify the continuance of NCND not that the original basis of mutual political interests is disappearing in many countries. It is also supposed to justify petulant and destructive punitive measures directed against friends and allies who dare to question NCND."³⁵¹ [NCND File]

26 September 1990: The US Embassy in Manila, Philippines, said the US would not change its NCND policy even if a possible treaty agreement allowing the bases to operate beyond 1991.

"We have to hold on to that policy," said Stanley Schrager of the Embassy, but in terms of the provision allowing "unhampered military operations", he said "We're willing to give up that provision. It never suggested that we can do whatever we want."

The "unhampered military operations" provision reportedly had been criticized by anti-bases advocates as allowing the United States to store nuclear weapons in the Subic base without telling the Philippine authorities.³⁵² [NCND File]

1 November 1990: Following accusations from Chile's Disarmament and Anti-Nuclear Committee that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) was carrying nearly 100 nuclear weapons during a visit to Puerto Valparaiso some 130 km northwest of the capital, the Lincoln's Commander, William Hayden, reportedly said: "I cannot confirm or deny that possibility."³⁵³ [NAV.DIP. File]

While the Lincoln was in port, a bomb was set off at the local square injuring sailors from the carrier. The Lincoln was on a six-days visit on its way from Norfolk, Virginia, to Hawaii.³⁵⁴ [NAV.DIP. File]

1990: Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jørgen Holst describes the Norwegian government's approach to nuclear armed ship visits:

"Norway maintains the qualification that foreign naval vessels must not carry nuclear weapons during visits to Norwegian ports. A general reference is made to Norwegian qualifications when clearing such visits. Similarly, the nuclear-weapon state allied of Norway adhere to the qualification of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board their naval vessels; the main reason being one of security. They are unwilling therefore to issue declarations concerning their weapon loads. In accordance with international law, naval vessels have immunity and cannot be subjected to mandatory inspection. Hence, we have a situation which is characterized by a 'double qualification', one is maintained by the flag state and the other by the port state. It is situation which is acceptable to both parties."

In essence, Holst describes how a condition has been developed by which two different policies can continue parallel, without affecting the other.³⁵⁵ [Nav Dip Norway]

26 July 1991: During the annual South Pacific Forum held in the Federated States of Micronesia, crewmembers onboard the U.S. Navy tank landing ship USS Racine (LST-1191)

were ordered not to visit the small New Zealand Navy hydrographic ship RNZN Tui (A05) which was docked alongside. The prohibition to visit the ship, which ironically is an ex-U.S. Navy vessel on loan from the U.S. since 1970, had been issued because of New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation.³⁵⁶ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

24 September 1991: New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger met at the United Nations with President Bush, in a rare occasion following U.S. breaking off ties with the country following New Zealand's refusal to allow nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships to visit its ports.

The meeting was described by New Zealand's Foreign Minister Don McKinnon as "an important development". He described New Zealand's previous government, lead by David Lange, "having put its anti-nuclear legislation in place, was then told by the rest of the world -- 'don't you try exporting that kind of thing' -- so they said they were only interested in the South Pacific and drew in on themselves."

Prime Minister Bolger said his meeting with Bush could be a first step for top-level meetings with the U.S. "I don't want anyone to pretend it'll be easy because the two positions have been very firmly staked out...We've got to make progress slowly in this area," he said, adding the opportunity to meet Bush was the main reason he had agreed to speak at the United Nations.³⁵⁷ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

27 September 1991: President Bush announced the withdrawal of all American land-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases as the offloading of tactical nuclear weapons from all surface ships and attack submarines. The announcement did not include land-based air-launched nuclear strike bombs.

28 September 1991: Following President Bush's announcement on 27 September to offload nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said:

"With respect to sea-based systems, the proposal is to bring home and deploy here at home in storage, our currently deployed tactical nuclear systems at sea -- those on submarines and on surface ships. In addition to that, a certain portion of these systems will be destroyed or dismantled as well. Approximately 50 percent of those that are being brought home will, in fact, ultimately be destroyed. These are older systems that we believe can safely be eliminated. So in the area of sea-based systems, everything gets withdrawn and stored at home. Some of it will be destroyed."³⁵⁸ [NCND File]

28 September 1991: Following President Bush's announcement on 27 September to offload nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said:

"As the Secretary noted, we'll remove nuclear weapons from sea. This will amount to some 500 nuclear weapons that are usually at sea, aboard surface ships and attack submarines. Then there is another category of nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval air. They will also be destroyed."

"Moving to the Navy tactical systems that the Secretary mentioned, the nuclear

Tomahawk missiles is a variation of the Tomahawks you saw used during Operations Desert Storm. There are routinely about 100 such missiles deployed at sea. They will all be removed, brought back to the United States, put in storage, but retained should a need ever arise for them to be put back at sea. The capacity to use this kind of weaponry for all of the weapon systems that are being put in storage will be retained in the force structure, so should it be necessary to reverse this process we will have trained men, women, and crews together who could put these systems into operation.

With respect to nuclear bombs, the Navy has aboard its aircraft carriers Mark-57's and Mark-61's. [...] Also, as was noted, the nuclear depth bombs that are located on shore and are associated with land-based naval P-3's, will go out of the structure. There are also a number of nuclear depth bombs that are on S-3s located on aircraft carriers that will also come back to shore and, in effect, those nuclear depth bombs, the older ones, will eventually be eliminated."

Asked about the Initiative's impact on the Navy's operations, Powell answered that, "I think it gives the Navy a lot more flexibility, for one thing. It removed quite a management and control problem from the commanders of ships at sea. It provides space to carry additional conventional munitions which are much more effective than they had been in the past. Frankly, the utility of nuclear weapons delivered from sea-based platforms has quite deteriorated in recent years as a result of the changes we have seen in the Soviet Union and our own warfighting concept. So frankly, I think it will give the Navy greater flexibility to respond to the kinds of missions that we see arising in the future, and for which our new strategy is designed."

When asked precisely how many Navy nuclear weapons would be destroyed, Powell responded: "We really don't know yet. As they are withdrawn from the fleet and put back into storage, the Navy will make a determination of which ones no longer have any potential future requirement and will be dismantled and phased out of the structure, but we don't have the specific number yet. Principally, it relates to the depth bombs."³⁵⁹ [NCND File]

1 October 1991: Following President Bush's announcement on 27 September to offload nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines, Assistance Secretary of Defense Pete Williams informed that, "from Saturday [28 September 1991] on, no U.S. Navy surface ships or attack submarines have deployed from their ports with any tactical nuclear weapons on board. [...] So for those ships that were about to deploy or from now on will deploy, they won't have tactical nuclear weapons put on them as they might have in the past."

Moreover, Williams said, "For those ships still at sea that have tactical nuclear weapons on them, they will finish their cruises, their scheduled deployments. When they return to their homeports, then those weapons will be removed. So I don't think there's an extraordinary plan to send ships or airplanes out to remove the tactical nuclear weapons from the ships at sea. We want to do this in the safest possible way and the safest possible way is for them to get back to their ports where there's the right kind of equipment to offload these materials."

When asked if the U.S. had started to unload any of the weapons from any the ships, Williams responded: "Not that I know of. I'm unaware of any." He later added:

"Here's what's going to happen on the neither confirm nor deny policy, and let me just walk back through this for everybody's benefit, including my own, so that I get it right. We have a neither confirm nor deny policy for all military facilities and ships. We neither confirm nor

deny the presence or absence of nuclear materials from those ships or installations. We are in the process, under the President's initiative, of removing tactical nuclear weapons from our surface ships and attack submarines. So what we're doing is taking all the nuclear weapons that would normally be on an attack submarine or a surface ship. Once you do that, and that will take several months to accomplish because we're not going to remove the weapons from the ships until they get back to their homeports, once you do that then the surface ships and attack submarines will no longer carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is no need for a neither confirm nor deny policy since we're making clear up front that we don't intend to put tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships and attack submarines.

The neither confirm nor deny policy will remain in affect for the Trident submarines, We will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on those specific submarines, or whether they have them on or not, even though obviously, that's where they're there for. But we will be pure and chaste and keep to the policy.

We will also maintain the neither confirm nor deny policy for the bases at which nuclear materials are stored, for obvious security reasons. We don't want to advertise the presence of nuclear weapons at facilities for security reasons. So we won't discuss the presence of Air Force bombs, which will remain forward deployed as the Secretary and the Chairman said here on Saturday. [...] We still believe that nuclear materials remain an important part of our deterrence, so we're not going to discuss where they are at specific installations.

So we're not totally doing away with the neither confirm nor deny policy, but for the Navy soon for most of the submarines -- certainly all the attack submarines and surface ships, it will be a moot point. We won't have it any more."

Asked if this meant the U.S. would reexamine its nuclear relationship with New Zealand Williams responded:

"That would not be the first step, we would not go knocking on the door with a ship and say it is time to reinstate the relationship because we'd certainly like to call on your port. I think we all believe the President's initiative puts a new light on the U.S. defense relationship with New Zealand, but that is something that both nations are going to reexamine. I would suspect that there will be some follow-on discussions to look at that issue, but it's a complicated one, and we would not test the policy by sending ships out there. It would be something that we would have discussions over first."

Concerning the U.S. planes going to the Christchurch Base and whether it would still be under NCND, Williams said: "To the extent that the neither confirm nor deny policy puts a new light on our relationship with New Zealand, we would be happy to discuss that, but I can't predict the outcome for you today." Asked if the planes were still under NCND, Williams said "That's right. This doesn't change it for the Air Force."³⁶⁰ [NCND File]

3 October 1991: Following President Bush's 27 September initiative to offload tactical nuclear weapons from the Navy, Pete Williams explained when asked how long the offload would take:

"Months. The secretary said yesterday that he has not seen a final time line from the Army on how long it's going to take to get all the warheads and all the Lance missiles back here, or indeed, for now long it's going to take the Navy to get all the B-57 depth bombs off their naval air bases. I think we've decided that it's going to be about eight months [end-May 1992] to get

all of the tactical nuclear weapons off surface ships and attack submarines. You let the ships go ahead and complete their cruises; you'll stop putting them on any ships that are about to leave. But rather than interrupt their cruises and have them come back to be unloaded, we'll let them finish their cruises and then unload them when they come back."³⁶¹ [NCND File]

16 October 1991: A message from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger had announced the formation of a special committee to assess the safety issues related to nuclear powered vessels. The intent was to give the government an "up-to-date reading on international studies and experience with nuclear propulsion."

Said DIA, "The decision to form a committee is part of a continuing effort by Bolger to weaken or skirt antinuclear laws that have strained US-New Zealand relations," and added that Bolger "hopes information supplied by the special committee will swing support his way."³⁶² [Nav Dip New Zealand]

4 November 1991: New Zealand news media carried extensive reports about a leaked telex from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, which asserted the New Zealand Prime Minister was trying to reverse New Zealand's ban on port calls by nuclear armed and nuclear powered vessels.³⁶³ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

17 December 1991: [insert Danish nuclear scandal].

January 1992: Asked if the Bush tactical nuclear weapons initiative nullifying the NCND policy was a gain or a loss, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Crowe said:

"I think it's a gain. I don't see how you could sustain the policy. This seems to be a logical follow-on to the decision made by President Bush. He did not make it for this reason, but certainly it will now be easier for foreign countries to approve U.S. ship visits. Our political-military relationship with Japan -- where this has always been a source of considerable confusion, if not argument -- should improve. 'Confirm nor deny' is not the problem in North Korea, but certainly the President's policy should put us in a much better position to influence Kim Il Sung not to produce nuclear weapons."³⁶⁴

1 February 1992: New Zealand Defense Minister Gerald Hensley told *Jane's Defence Weekly* that President Bush's decision to offload all nuclear weapons from ships and attack submarines "open the way to reconcile the ANZUS dispute." Hensley added, however, that "There has to be clear evidence that our nuclear-free status is respected. But for the first time, the opportunity is there."³⁶⁵ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

6 April 1992: Canadian press reported local opposition against nuclear powered ship visits. The report quoted a local peace group for saying nuclear powered ships and submarines conducted 45 visits to Halifax, Esquimalt, and Nanoose during 1991, an alleged increase from 18 such visits the year before.

Canadian Justice Department lawyer Harry Wruck dismissed the statistics as misleading

saying the local population was in no danger. "There's a complete disagreement between the two sides on this issue," he said. "Radioactive releases are monitored and are environmentally insignificant."³⁶⁶ [Naval Nuclear Propulsion]

25 April 1992: Lt. Jerry Pash, public affairs officer with the Canadian Maritime Naval Pacific Headquarters, told a Victory radio station on 23 April that an American warship berthed in Victoria, Canada, was not carry nuclear weapons. "The USS Camden is a turbine-powered supply ship similar to our own HMCS Provider. It carries moderate weapons, absolutely none of which is nuclear in nature."³⁶⁷

2 July 1992: President Bush announces completing tactical nuclear weapons offload from the fleet and abroad. Bush was quoted in New Zealand press acknowledging the move had solved the port visit issue:

"It seems to me that it might clear the way for resolution of the difficulties we've had with some countries but that's up for them to decide. I'm thinking of New Zealand and other countries where we've had...great difficulties on this," Bush said.³⁶⁸ [NAV DIP New Zealand File]

3 July 1992: Following President Bush's announcement that all tactical nuclear weapons had been offloaded from U.S. warships, New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger welcomed the announcement and said:

"There is no reason now why non-nuclear powered vessels cannot come here," adding that Bush's announcement was "good news not only for New Zealand and the Asia/Pacific region but for the world at large."

Former Prime Minister David Lange, who was the architect of New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation, said New Zealand would still be kept ignorant if the weapons were suddenly moved back onboard again.

"The point has to be made [that] the ships can be rearmed at any time," he said. "As long as they don't make that disclosure we are not in a position to know."³⁶⁹ [NAV DIP New Zealand File]

8 August 1992: In a close vote, New Zealand's conservative National Party voted to repeal the country's ban against visits by nuclear powered vessels. The party said it would wait for a report by a special committee investigating the issue before making a final decision.

Party official Rosemarie Thomas said the vote did not seek to challenge the nuclear-free weapons issue, "But by simply removing the restriction on nuclear powered ships we are signalling to our friends that we are prepared to stand up and be counted," she said. "This is not an idle gesture," she added, "and in no way commits us to global ventures with which we do not agree."³⁷⁰ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

August 1992: U.S. authorities were reported in *Pacific Research* to have formulated the new praxis relating to nuclear weapons following President Bush's July 1992 confirmation that all nuclear weapons had been removed from ships and attack submarines.

"We have affirmed that [the Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy] should remain in effect for all of our forces, both sea-based and land-based. But because of changes in our deployment policy...it's been modified. The neither confirm nor deny statement will now read...'It is general US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines and naval aircraft. Nowever, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft.'"³⁷¹ [NCND]

17 December 1992: A special government committee report released in New Zealand concluded visits by nuclear powered vessels posed no significant risk and should be allowed to recommence. *Reuters* reported the irony of the report being published the same day a ship carrying plutonium to Japan, the Akatsuki Maru, entered the Tasman Sea between Zealand and Australia.³⁷² [Nav Dip New Zealand]

20 February 1993: *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported a New Zealand government study concluded nuclear powered vessels should be allowed to visit the country because the risk of radioactive emissions is so remove as it is beyond "rational apprehension".

Prime Minister Jim Bolger accepted the report cautiously: "There is no intention to change the current legislation," he said, and added, "If a change were to be contemplated in the future this would only be done after we had had the opportunity to canvas opinions openly."³⁷³ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

April 1993: In describing the U.S. opposition against New Zealand's stand in 1985 against nuclear armed port visits, former CINCPAC and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and currently Chairman of President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Admiral William Crowe, states erroneously that the New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation "banned our warships from its ports unless we would give the desired assurances on nuclear weapons." This "demand," Crowe asserted, "ran directly contrary to the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy we had adhered to for over thirty years."

In fact, New Zealand's nuclear legislation *does not* demand assurances from the flag state but leaves it up the New Zealand Prime Minister to determine -- based on the information available to him/her -- whether or not a ship is nuclear armed.

Admiral Crowe also alleged that New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange in his political campaign had promised to prevent American warships from calling in New Zealand ports "unless they declaired that no nuclear weapons were aboard," and that "In his heart, [David Lange] just did not want our ships in his ports".³⁷⁴ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

May 1993: Service officials agreed to cut the Marine security force detachments on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) from nearly 70 to as few as 25 members. The move reported was spurred by the 1991 presidential decision to remove nuclear weapons from surface ships. Guarding those weapons had been the primary responsibility for these Marines.³⁷⁵ [NCND]

8 June 1993: New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger called for a thaw in the still-frosty

relations between New Zealand and the United States over the issue of nuclear port visits. "The present stand-off has gone on for eight years -- too long," he said.

While the New Zealand government is still not welcome in Washington, Bolger pointed out that many other governments had hosted New Zealand over the past year. Trade relations were good with the United States, but the political relationship remains constrained. "It is regrettable that a democratic decision taken by the New Zealand people is not viewed by the United States government for what it is. Our nuclear-free policy is not intended as an affront to our American allies, but as a democratic expression of New Zealanders' respect for their environment," Bolger said, adding that New Zealand had been a true and loyal friend to the United States.³⁷⁶ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

10 June 1993: During a port visit to Stockholm, Sweden, commanding officer Sherman E. Wright of the nuclear-capable cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56) responded to questions about the ship's armament:

"We respect the countries we visit, and the American government has decided that we shall no longer have nuclear weapons onboard vessels arriving at foreign ports." The commander thought it was wonderful "not to have your hands tied...Now we no longer have to come up with dumb answers," he said.³⁷⁷ [NCND]

17 June 1993: President Clinton got stumped by an unexpected question during a press conference. "I have an easy problem for you and it's domestic, too. This one is very easy," a report from New Zealand radio asked:

"A lot of Americans are not widely pro-nuclear and thought the U.S. may have over-reacted in past years in its very heavy-handed threatment of New Zealand. Would you consider a meeting now with a New Zealand leader and discussing the situation? Isn't there some way a compromise can be reached so that you can agree to disagree but still restore the political and security relationship?"

Clinton paused for a second, then smiled. "I've given absolutely no thought to that question," he said to laughter. "And I'm afraid if I give an answer to it, I'll be in more trouble tomorrow than I can figure out."³⁷⁸ [Nav Dip New Zealand]

27 February 1994: The United States formally ended its year-long diplomatic freeze of New Zealand initiated following Wellington's anti-nuclear stand in 1984. While State Department officials insisted defense contracts under ANZUS would not be resumed and the move did "not signify a restoration" of defense cooperation with New Zealand, President Clinton decided New Zealand was "essentially a friend" and the diplomatic standoff was counterproductive. Former U.S. ambassador to Wellington, Anne Martindell, lauded the policy shift, describing the seven-year freeze as an "over-reaction" by the Reagan Administration.

The Asian Wall Street Journal said the West had a lot to learn from New Zealand, which "mounted the most courageous assault of any Western country on the smothering mercies of the Nanny State." In an editorial on 21 February, the paper praised New Zealand's bold economic reforms which had made its central bank one of the most independent in the world, with a stern mandate on price stability.³⁷⁹

12 April 1994: Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, visited New Zealand as the first senior U.S. defense official to visit that country since the mid-1980s when New Zealand banned nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships from its ports.

The United States and New Zealand are "friends and allies," Admiral Larson told reporters and added, "I think what the prime minister and I are interested in is looking at the future. What are the benefits of the partnership? How do our countries fit together as we look at peacekeeping, look at stability in the Pacific and look at larger objectives in the future?"

New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger responded saying that, "I'm delighted to be the one to start this new dialogue. I've been a supporter of this for some time. Friends should talk."³⁸⁰ [NAV DIP NZ]

13 April 1994: New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger said his country had no plans to change its ban on nuclear-powered vessels visiting its ports. The statement followed remarks by U.S. Admiral Charles Larson that New Zealand's ban prevented full military ties.

The Clinton Administration had decided in February to end a nine-year "no-contact" policy and open talks with New Zealand. But Admiral Larson said that the change didn't go further than talks. "That is the limit of our policy change. All other aspects of our security relationship remain suspended."

New Zealand has to "bring something to the table," Larson told reporters, adding that New Zealand should look at the "unblemished" safety record of U.S. nuclear-powered ships. But Jim Bolger responded changing the ban is "not an agenda item in New Zealand at this stage," adding that it was the United States -- not New Zealand -- that had decided not to send non-nuclear powered ships to New Zealand. "It is that response which keeps us a long way apart. That's their decision, and we should hope over time that they would reflect on that decision."³⁸¹

Admiral Larsen said the prohibition on nuclear-powered warships was "the most serious stumbling block" to full military ties between Washington and Wellington, and added that the United States was still not prepared to make a distinction when it came to deploying conventional and nuclear-powered vessels.³⁸² [NAV DIP NZ]

19 August 1994: The *Pacific Stars & Stripes* reported the Navy made an exception to standard Department of Defense policy when it denied nuclear weapons had been present during a military exercise at Guam to safeguard nuclear weapons from terrorist attack.

In explaining the deviation, commander Bob Pritchard, US CINCPAC deputy public affairs officer, told the paper "...it was more important for the American public to know that at no time ... were they in danger from a nuclear weapon."

The incident first had been reported by an ABC's 20/20 program in mid-August. The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations wrote to Guam Representative Robert Underwood that its investigation indicated "no real nuclear weapons were used in the exercise" and that the committee would issue a final report.³⁸³ [NAV DIP US]

October 1994: The Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition protested the arrival of U.S. warships saying the visit was a "wanton assault of the Philippine constitution by U.S. nuclear armed

vessels."³⁸⁴ The protest came despite the U.S. announcement in July 1992 that all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the fleet. [NAV DIP Philippines]

27 March 1995: The port visit issue was raised during a meeting between U.S. President Clinton and New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger. The meeting was the first New Zealand prime minister visit to the White House in 11 years since the Reagan Administration froze relations with New Zealand in 1984 in response to the country's non-nuclear legislation.

"They did discuss the anti-nuclear legislation, which remains on the books in New Zealand," White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry told reporters. "The President indicated that until that issue is resolved it would not be possible for the United States to have the same type of security relationship that we had prior to passage of that legislation. There has been some progress in the general discussion of that (nuclear) issue but it certainly remains unfinished business, as the President indicated to the Prime Minister."

Bolger had discussed the nuclear issue with other U.S. officials in 1995, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher.³⁸⁵ [NAV DIP NZ]

29 June 1995: The Danish government forwarded the Danish Parliament a four-page report in which it admitted that aircraft from the U.S. Strategic Air Command during the 1960s routinely had overflown Greenland with nuclear weapons despite Denmark's ban against nuclear weapons. One of these bombers crashed off Thule Air Base in northern Greenland in January 1968 but various Danish governments have always maintained that the bomber was in Greenland air space due to an emergency and that Danish non-nuclear policy was intact. Faced with evidence released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, the government admitted to the overflights but explained that the United States had acted in good faith because former Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen in 1957 indirectly had approved the overflights during a secret meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Denmark. The report, which was worked out during 18 months of negotiations with the U.S. government, also revealed that following the 1968 accident the U.S. government had promised the Danish government no longer to overfly or deploy nuclear weapons in Greenland essentially grating Greenland status as a nuclear weapons free zone. The report assured that nuclear weapons had not been deployed on the ground in Thule.³⁸⁶ [DENMARK 1995]

14 July 1995: The public confirmation by the Danish government, according to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, was given "with U.S. permission."³⁸⁷ [DENMARK 1995]

14 July 1995: In a cable to the Embassy in Copenhagen, Secretary of State Warren Christopher provided contingency press guidance for use by the Embassy in responding to questions about U.S. nuclear activities at Thule Air Base, Greenland:

[...]

“Q. Did the U.S. deploy any nuclear weapons to Thule Air Base?

A. As for the deployment of any nuclear weapons, it remains U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny information concerning such deployments.

Q. Can you comment on the claim that the U.S. has put restrictions on the release of this

information by the Danish government?

A. We have given the Danish government full and complete information, as requested. In some cases, this information was classified, because of possible implications for U.S. relations with other countries besides Denmark. We always rely on the good judgment of our allies with regard to national security issues."³⁸⁸

18 July 1995: Stepen Strain with the U.S. Embassy in Denmark said that the "neither confirm nor deny policy only concerns information to be published. That policy does not apply to information exchanged between governments."

The statement was given to *Jyllands-Posten* (Copenhagen) in an interview about the Danish government's decision to publish information handed over by the U.S. government about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Greenland in the 1950s and 1960s.

"It is entirely up to the Danish government to assess the sensitivity of the information it received from the U.S. government," Mr. Strain said. "We trust the good judgment of our allies," he added. "Defense minister Perry said recently that we share much more sensitive information with the Danish government than that which has been reported recently."³⁸⁹

[Denmark 1995]

31 July 1995: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs, Sandra O'Leary, told the Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee that the U.S. would still follow a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on platforms or at facilities.

O'Leary said the U.S. is "hopeful that at some point New Zealand will be in a position to re-think its anti-nuclear legislation" in light of the fact that much has changed since New Zealand passed its anti-nuclear legislation, including easing of international tension, and the U.S. removal of tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear capability from most of its ships.

A New Zealand Foreign Ministry official quickly dismissed the proposal, saying "It is not possible to change the legislation at this stage as this requires a national referendum."³⁹⁰

[NAV DIP NCND]

16 September 1995: Danish daily *Politiken* carried a report that a U.S. destroyer loaded nuclear weapons on board prior to arriving in Danish port in 1988. The report was based on official U.S. Navy documents. The report followed the Danish government's recent public assurance that although the U.S. had brought nuclear weapons into Greenland in the 1960s, Danish non-nuclear policy had been respected since then.³⁹¹ Yet demands for expanding an investigation of nuclear overflights of Greenland in the 1960s (see 29 June above) to also look at more recent port visits was rejected by the Danish government. [DENMARK 1995]

28 October 1995: *Japan Times* reported that Japan had allowed entry of nuclear weapons into its ports on board U.S. nuclear-capable warships. The Japanese government had secretly promised the United States to respect the U.S. Navy's policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons on warships. Japanese law stipulates that prior consultation is necessary if the U.S. wishes to bring nuclear weapons into Japan (including ports), but by

promising to accept the Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy, Japanese governments had effectively bypassed its own legislation.³⁹² [NAV DIP JAPAN]

17 June 1996: In an interview with the weekly *Defense News*, Australia's newly elected defense minister Ian McLachlan was asked whether the ANZUS still exists as a trilateral relationship, or whether it was time to start negotiating new bilateral ties with the United States. "We would hope that the United States and New Zealand will sort out their problems. [...] There is a great difficulty because the New Zealanders say they won't have nuclear weapons on any ships visiting their ports and they won't have nuclear-powered ships. We actually support the Americans' position. We are disadvantaged by this. We have to do all sorts of things with the United States that we can't do with New Zealand, and vice versa."³⁹³ [NAV DIP AUS]

1997: The Danish government's commissioned investigation into the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland during the Cold War is published by the Danish Institute for International Affairs. The report confirms previous reports of U.S. nuclear weapons deployments in Greenland despite assurances Danish governments that Denmark's non-nuclear policy was well-known and respected by the nuclear powers. The report concludes that Danish government have administered a double standard nuclear policy: a public non-nuclear policy and a private nuclear policy of accepting nuclear operations in Greenland. The investigation is not allowed to examine the more recent and much more contentious issue of naval nuclear warships visits to Danish ports.

[The years 1998-2004 will be incorporated at a later date]

19 September 2005: The United States affirms in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks that "it has not nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula." The South Korean government affirmed "that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory."³⁹⁴

19 November 2005: Following the announcement of a U.S.-Australian agreement to permit U.S. long-range bombers to use Delamere Air Weapons Range for bombing practice beginning in 2006, Australian Minister for Defence Robert Hill said: "And obviously, if they're coming down to use our bombing ranges, they won't be using nuclear weapons."³⁹⁵

3 February 2006: The Chief of Naval Operations publishes OPNAVINST 5721.1F regarding Release of Information on Nuclear Weapons and on Nuclear Capability of U.S. Forces. The instruction stipulates that navy personnel "shall not reveal, purport to reveal, or cause to be revealed any information, rumor, or speculation with respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board any specific ship, station or aircraft, either on their own initiative or in response, direct or indirect, to any inquiry."³⁹⁶

The instruction also prohibits personnel to from spreading inaccurate or distorted information about the location of nuclear weapons because this "may be as damaging to the United States as the revealing of accurate information."³⁹⁷

While prohibiting naval personnel from confirming that there are no nuclear weapons deployed on U.S. Navy ships and submarines, the directive at the same time confirms that the United States in 1992 completed offloading all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft. In fact, the directive confirms that "It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, naval aircraft, attack submarines, or guided missile submarines."³⁹⁸

The instruction inadvertently confirms that four SSBNs converted to SSGNs will not be carrying nuclear weapons. "For these four ships, the submarine-launched ballistic missile capability will be replaced with a conventionally armed, guided cruise missile capability similar to that resident on attack submarines." It is U.S. policy, the instruction states, "not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard...guided missile submarines."³⁹⁹

[undated]: During visits by nuclear-powered vessels to foreign ports, according to an unclassified statement by the U.S. government, "No effluent or other waste will be discharged from the ship which would cause a measurable increase in the general background radioactivity of the environment". Even so, the "host government may of cause, take such surveys as it desires in the vicinity of the warship, to ensure itself that the visiting ship is not considered a radioactive contamination hazard."

In "the event of an accident involving the reactor of the warship during the port visit," the documents says, "The Appropriate authorities of the host government will be notified immediately". But the U.S. government "does not make technical information on the design or operation of its nuclear powered warships available to host governments in connection with port entry."

In general, "The United States Navy will normally inform the appropriate host government authorities at least 24 hours in advance as to the estimate time of arrival and intended location of mooring or anchoring of its nuclear powered warships."⁴⁰⁰ [NAV.DIP. File]

Endnotes:

1. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 262.
2. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 263.
3. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 266.
4. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 266.
5. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], pp. 266-267.
6. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 267.
7. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 267.
8. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, February 17, 1954; as reprinted in "Public Papers of the President", [source unknown], p. 267.
9. "History of proposed legislation", Senate Report No.1699 [To accompany S.3690], 30 June 1954, pp. 3460-3461.
10. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Chapter 12: Control of Information, Section 144: International Cooperation, item a, Legislative History, [source and date unknown], p. 1104.
11. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Chapter 12: Control of Information, Section 144: International Cooperation, item b, Legislative History, [source and date unknown], p. 1104, [emphasis in original].
12. "Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price On H.R.9757", Hearings on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, House Report No.2181, [To accompany H.R.9757], July 12, 1954, pp. 3526-3527.
13. Captain W.D.Hahn, "Subject: Neither confirm nor deny policy", U.S. Department of the Navy, OP-616, X70875, A16216, 4 December 1985, p. 3, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
14. Captain W.D.Hahn, "Subject: Neither confirm nor deny policy", U.S. Department of the Navy, OP-616, X70875, A16216, 4 December 1985, p. 3, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
15. Captain W.D.Hahn, "Subject: Neither confirm nor deny policy", U.S. Department of the Navy, OP-616, X70875, A16216, 4 December 1985, p. 3, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
16. Captain W.D.Hahn, "Subject: Neither confirm nor deny policy", U.S. Department of the Navy, OP-616, X70875, A16216, 4 December 1985, p. 1, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
17. Headquarter, U.S Air Force Security Service, "Subject: (Unclassified) Security of Special Weapons Information," letter to Director of Communications, Headquarters USAF, 15 February 1955, enclosure 1, pp. 1, 3, 7 and 8.
18. Telegram from the US Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, to the US State Department, 29 July 1955, classified (released under the Freedom of Information Act).
19. Richard A. Ericson, Jr., US Ambassador to Iceland, letter to Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs Olafur Johannesson, 11 August 1980.
20. "Approved minutes, meeting of January 2, 1958, Room 5100, New State Building," Operations Coordinating Board, Washington 25, D.C., 8 January 1958; Obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
21. Captain W. D.Hahn, "Subject: Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy", U.S. Department of the Navy, OP-616, X70875, A16216, 4 December 1985, p. 1; Obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
22. Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, signed Mansfield D. Sprange, 13 January 1958; Obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
23. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 1, p. 1, classified (partially released under the

Freedom of Information Act).

24. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 3. g. (1), p. 2, classified (partially released under the Freedom of Information Act).

25. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 3. a., p. 1, classified (partially released under the Freedom of Information Act).

26. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 3. a., p. 1, classified (partially released under the Freedom of Information Act).

27. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 3. c., p. 1, classified (partially released under the Freedom of Information Act).

28. "Release of information on nuclear weapons and on nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces (U)", Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 005500.16, 14 March 1959, item 3. b., p. 1, classified (partially released under the Freedom of Information Act).

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exchange of social courtesies with local military and civilian officials is usually associated with informal visits; "Routine" visits are made primarily for logistic support, maintenance, repairs, liberty and recreation, or in connection with operational missions. No protocol is required other than that dictated by local practice.

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Following release of the report, Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen publicly stated that after talks with U.S. defense secretary he was assured that while Greenland had been overflowed with nuclear-armed bombers no nuclear weapons had ever been deployed on the ground. Only a few days later Petersen retracted that statement after the U.S. government informed him that nuclear weapons had indeed been deployed at Thule Air Base in two cases; in 1958 and between 1960 and 1965. Petersen decided to release the information despite a request by the U.S. government that Denmark withhold the information. If portions of the information were released, the U.S. said, it would neither confirm nor deny. Despite these circumstances the government maintained that it had no reason to assume Danish non-nuclear policy had not been respected after 1968. The nature of the revelations and the clumsy handling of the matter increased the pressure for more openness and the Danish government finally to allow a Danish institute to make an "independent" investigation of the matter. Yet the investigation would only look at Greenland until the late 1960s, and ignore nuclear-capable port visits to Denmark.³⁸⁷ Message, from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to RUEHCP/Amembassy Copenhagen Immediate 1363, "Subject: Press Guidance – U.S. Nuclear Activities at Thule, Greenland," 140028Z JUL 95, p. 1. Released under FOIA.

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