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HISTORY OF THE

8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

1 JANUARY 1991 - 30 JUNE 1991

NARRATIVE - VOLUME I (U)

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Nautilus Institute
Nuclear Policy Project

Assigned To

Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces

Stationed at

Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea

TIMOTHY M. BROWN, SSGT, USAF

RESTRICTED DATA IN FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. SECTION 144.B, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, 1954.

Historian

EDWARD B. CARTER, COLONEL, USAF

Commander

22 October 1991

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA:

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


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CONTINUATION TRAINING

- (U) As stated earlier, continuation training was viewed as the key to maintaining the wing's combat capability. For the most part continuation training consisted of air-to-surface and air-to-air combat flying training, which emphasized a building block approach, starting with basic techniques followed by gradual increases in complexity. The levels of complexity varied from pilot to pilot. 9
- (U) Air-to-surface training was divided into three sortie types: weapons delivery, nuclear strike and surface attack tactics (SAT). Three different types of weapons delivery profiles were used. The first profile was used for event requalifications, manual deliveries or "back to basics" delivery training. The second profile, also referred to as WD-2, was used for the majority of weapons qualification sorties. final weapons delivery profile was used to train pilots in night weapons delivery missions in two-ship formations over a controlled range using ground illuminated targets. Nuclear strike training consisted of two flying profiles. The first was basically an introduction to nuclear strike normally flown by pilots during mission qualification training (upgrade training) to familiarize them with nuclear strike methods. The second nuclear strike profile trained pilots to fly single-ship nuclear Surface attack tactics (SAT) training was conducted using strikes. various levels of intricacy, from missions which stressed specific tactical skills, like low-level formation, to full scale tactical exercises that integrated those specific tactical skills with intelligence scenarios and live ordnance. During this periot, the wing improved its first-look SAT attack success rates to approximately eighty-five percent, up almost ten percent from last period. First-look SAT attacks, by definition, were attacks against targets pilots had





never seen before first-hand; bridges for instance. Since there are no pilots assigned to the 8 TFW who have ever flown against targets in North Korea, the criticality of this type of training was evident. 10 Colonel Frishkorn expressed his views on the improvement of the wing's first-look SAT attack rates:


We have a fairly aggressive first-look SAT attack program.... We evaluate, the flight commanders evaluate, the weapons office evaluates and the squadrons evaluate what the success is with first-look SAT attacks... The single most important thing that has increased our first-look SAT attack capability is the addition of the ring laser gyro to our aircraft. That has improved the accuracy incredibly on the jet. When you look and you pop-up to hit a target... the little green dot that tells you where the target is going to be... its right there around the target, within less than a quarter mile. So, if you role out and look... in that general area you're going to find the target. 11 Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act


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STANDARDIZATION EVALUATION (U)

(U) The wing's standardization evaluation (stan eval) section provided a quality control function for the wing training program. Stan eval pilots gave insight on a variety of flight and ground duties, but their most critical task was evaluating the proticiency of 8 TFW pilots. Stan eval members determined pilot proficiency either by academic testing or by actual flights, (more commonly referred to as "check rides"), covering instrument qualification, tactical, initial tactical and initial instructor areas. Between January and June, the stan eval team conducted a total of sixty-nine in-flight evaluations, of which ten were no-notice evaluations. During January through June, the team rated five pilots as exceptionally qualified (EQ), fifty-two as qualified (Q), ten as qualified but with discrepancies (QD) and two as qualified with





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(clouds, etc.). The wingman had to figure out his own altitude, heading, airspeed, attitude and get on instrument final all within a few seconds. A process which could be very disorienting and lead to task saturation and (potentially) accidents. Therefore, emphasis was placed on not putting pilots in that situation. Major Feole reasoned: "If we can help that guy out by not forcing him to do that...obviously you've got that much more safety margin for the guy. His task is a lot more simple...."16

ALQ-184 POD


(U) Recent introduction of the ALQ-184 electronic countermeasures pod provided Stan eval yet another evaluation area to cope with. By 9 May 91, the wing had a full complement of the pods, which were an upgrade over the ALQ-119s they replaced. The ALQ-184 featured a better hardware and software package than the 119. According to wing Stan eval, there were very few problems transitioning to the new pod that squadron classroom academics couldn't handle. 17

F-16 SIMULATOR TRAINING (U)

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(U) The wing's F-16 simulator enhanced the overall capabilities of the Wolf Pack's training program by providing training in systems, weapons deliveries and air-to-air intercept missions. The simulator also allowed wing pilots to fly missions that safety, weather and airspace normally prohibited. Training requirements had experienced pilots in the simulator for a minimum of six hours during each six-month training cycle, while inexperienced pilots logged training at least nine hours in the simulator during the cycle. Common simulator profiles flown by wing pilots included local area orientation, emergency





procedures evaluations (administered by wing stan eval personnel), nuclear strike and air-to-air procedures. Chemical warfare familiarization was also conducted with the use of the F-16 simulator. 18

Table 2-3 gives the F-16 simulator utilization breakdown for January through June 1991.

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(U) TABLE 2-3
F-16 SIMULATOR UTILIZATION

and the same	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	אֿעל	
AIRCREW							
Scheduled	161.5	46.5	96.0	152.0	140.0	156.5	
Utilized	157.0	52.0	101.5	156.0	134.0	153.5	
MAINT							
Scheduled	7.5	0	3.0	10.5	7.5	0	
Utilized	7.5	0	3.0	10.0	7.5	0	
UTILIZATION							
RATE %	93.48	68.26	62.77	87.76	77.33	92.32	

SOURCE: Rorts (U), 8 TFW/DOTS to HQ PACAF/DOOT, "Evaluation of Contractor Performance and Simulator Utilization Report (U)," Feb - Jul 91.

FLIGHT SAFETY (U)

MISHAPS & IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES (IFES)

(U) The wing — as always — continued to place heavy emphasis on flight safety. From January through June there were only seven Class



Of the twenty—one assigned, only nine were F110-GE-100 qualified. As is the case with a remote assignment, the frequency of transfers out called for the shop to lose four of its experienced (F110 qualified) mechanics and be replaced with four inbound personnel who were not F110 qualified. A minimum of three months was required for training before the inexperienced personnel became productive. However, because of the short tour length, these individuals remained in some degree of proficiency training throughout their tour, which affected the mission. This was basically the same cyclical battle the Colonel Frishkorn continually fought with the assignment of inexperienced pilots and training. 16

MUNITIONS

(U) The F-16's capability to carry a wide array of ordnance allowed the wing to match specific weapons to specific targets. Unfortunately, the war reserve material (WRM) at Kunsan did not include all the weapons the F-16 could employ. In order to meet any contingency, the 8 TFW had to maintain enough munitions. The MK-82 and MK-84 general purpose bombs were the wing's most abundant munitions. From January to June 1991, wing pilots fired 113,016 rounds of 20-millimeter target shells, dropped 19,788 bundles of RR-170 chaff and fired 17,374 MJU-7 flares. The majority of these spenditures occurred while the wing participated in exercises such as Cope Thunder. Refer to Table 3-5 for the wing's munitions expenditures as of 4 Jun 91.

WEAPONS SAFETY

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(U) The 8 TFW's weapons safety divison was awarded the United States Air Force's (USAF) explosive safety, missile safety and nuclear surety awards for outstanding performance in accident prevention in each of those respective categories. Personnel in weapons safety continually

strived to prevent any weapons mishaps and, since 14 December 1989, the wing has not had a reportable weapons mishap. 18

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(U) TABLE 3-5 8 TFW CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS INVENTORY (U) AS OF 4 JUN 91 (U)

e e torre com	ANNUAL	QUANTITY	QUANTITY
TTEM	ALLOCATION	EXPENDED	ON-HAND
20 MM TP	267,077	113,016	94,259
BDU-33	27,942	11,802	15,104
MK-82	202	·92	110
MK-84	16	10	2,675
BDU-50A/B	384	0	587
RR-170 Chaff	48,350	19,778	137,533
MJU-7 Flare	14,787	17,374	41,659
AGM-65/D	8	. 0	104
M-206 Flare	10,768	47	10,753

Source: Rprt (U), 8 TFW/MA, "50-21 Monthly Expenditure

Report, " 4 Jun 91.