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CINCPAC



COMMAND HISTORY

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Deployment of Nuclear Weapons

(S/FRD) In April 1976 the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (CDRUSACSG) reopened the question of beddown for the LANCE missile system. In addressing the possible consolidation of weapon storage on Guam, the CDRUSACSG recommended that the LANCE battalion and weapons be positioned in Korea and that Army weapons currently stored on Guam be removed to CONUS. The rationale offered by the CDRUSACSG pointed to Korea as the most likely area requiring use of ground nuclear weapons and the cost of construction of new storage igloos at either Andersen Air Base or the Naval Magazine if reserve weapons (artillery and surface-to-surface missiles (SSM)) were to be retained on Guam. This position was supported by CINCPAC, but with the stipulation that the two

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aging SSMS (NIKE HERCULES and HONEST JOHN) be removed from Korea upon introduction of LANCE. COMUS-Korea concurred with putting the LANCE battalion and weapons in Korea and removal of remaining Army weapons on Guam back to CONUS. However, he felt it would be operationally unacceptable to give up the NIKE HERCULES missile system because of the requirement for the additional capability offered by that system.¹

~~(S/FRD)~~ In July the Commander, Central Ammunition Management Office, Pacific noted previously approved plans to ship LANCE warheads to Guam and recommended action to fulfill those plans. CINCPAC weighed in recommending that until resolution of issues cited above, deployment of LANCE be held in abeyance. However, in September the JCS decided to move the LANCE warheads to Guam. They cited the requirement for additional time for Presidential review and the time and review required to get the issue to that level as the reason, and noted that this process could hold LANCE in CONUS for an indefinite period. By 31 December all authorized LANCE warheads were in place on Guam.²

~~(TS/FRD)~~ In anticipation of a directive to move most of the nuclear weapons from the Philippines, a series of conferences with the CINCPAC and component staffs were convened to determine the best means of accomplishing the forthcoming task. This advanced planning enabled planners to locate opportune sealift for movement of weapons with a resultant savings of approximately \$700,000 and the ensuing movement went off without incident or notice (at this writing).³

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Movement of Nuclear Weapons

(C/FRD) In January the General Accounting Office initiated a survey of the adequacy of transport capability and security for contingency movement of nuclear weapons deployed overseas. The CINCPAC staff provided briefings concerning the duties and responsibilities of PACOM units involved in transportation and security matters. Also in the matter of security, a GAO team completed in August a survey of the Defense Nuclear Agency's accountability system for nuclear weapons on Guam. The verification encompassed inspection of unit records, weapon containers, and weapon casings against selected serial numbers that had been provided by the DNA.²

(C/FRD) On 30 September the last of 54 LANCE nuclear warheads arrived at the Naval Magazine on Guam, completing initial deployment of this system to the PACOM.³

(TS/FRD) In consonance with the FY 77 nuclear weapons deployment plan, 140 nuclear weapons were removed from the Philippines between 20 and 28 November. JCS approval for planning was received on 6 November, and CINCPAC issued the execute order on 10 November. CINCPAC admonished that, because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, the need to minimize visibility and risk of public disclosure required that non-essential visitors to sites of the operation be prohibited. Removal was carried out under CINCPACAF Operation Order 76-9, with the code name COMMANDO FLIGHT. The weapons were loaded aboard USS FLINT (AE-32) at Cubi Point, and departed on 1 December. No public interest or reaction was reported throughout.⁴

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1. J321 HistSums Jan, Apr, Sep 76.
2. J3221 HistSum Jan 76; J322 HistSum Aug 76.
3. J322 HistSum Sep 76.
4. J323 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 150501Z Sep 76, 100032Z Nov 76, and 010245Z Dec 76; CINCPACAF 070331Z Oct 76; JCS 7970/060505Z Nov 76; CINCPACREPPHIL 151030Z Nov 76.

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